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CHAIRMAN ELIHU M. HARRIS: The subject of today's
hearing is judicial efficiency and improvement. The problem of
court congestion and delay continues to concern all of us
interested in our State's courts. Over the past several years,
numerous studies and propo
s
at improving our judicial
system have been suggested, yet there continues to be a strongly
held belief by some people that our courts need to be more
efficient and that the jud ial system moves too slowly. As part
of the Assembly Judiciary Committee's effort to get an overview
of the nature of court congestion and delay, the Committee has
invited parties and organizations
rested in the courts to
identify and discuss the causes of the problem and to suggest
specific proposals to improve our j
ial system. The Committee
has asked these
sted
to
sent their views on hm..r
the Legislature can assist
resolving problems facing our
courts. The Committee will then review proposals presented and
take whatever action may be appropriate.
I am advised that witnesses will present testimony
concerning judicial arbitration,
use of court commissioners,
courtroom technology, court fund
and pretrial procedures. In
order to accommodate
1
witnesses who have been scheduled to
testify, I am asking
to be as specific as possible;
outline the need
1 presented; identify what cost
would be incurred
; how it would be
implemented; and,
anticipated effect the
proposal would
1 efficiency. Please
limit your remarks to
s.
We will start with a pre
of a study which is
about to be released by the
Corporation's Institute for
Civil Justice. The study
s court congestion in the Los
Angeles Superior Court over the last hundred years. The findings
of the study should of
us
what kinds of measures
best address the backlog problems
some of our courts.
Our
rst witnesses are Dr. Stephen Carol and Dr. Molly
Selvin of the Institute for Civil
Please come forward.
As you do, I'd like to make a couple of other remarks. One, we
are open to all suggestions
might emanate from the witnesses
today. We are deadly serious
making some changes. We are
really interested in creative approaches to the problem.
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I just left a breakfast meeting earlier this morning
with people from the Los Angeles court system, both Superior and
Municipal Court, hosted by the County Administrative Office and
Supervisor Antonovich. A number of good ideas came from that
breakfast. We might look at a state buyout of the courts as one
possible issue. We want to look at poss ile alternatives to
what we have been doing in terms of standardized procedures in
the judicial process, increasing the monetary limit for small
claims actions, or finding more informal methods of resolving
disputes. We are open to all ideas.
We hope that your testimony will be creative as to what
the Legislature can do to meet the challenge. We can no longer
solve the problem by adding more judges as has been done in the
past. Fiscal considerations are now preventing that as a viable
option. So we would appreciate your assisting us with your
creative thoughts on the issue.
With that, I'd appreciate your beginning.

Thank you.

DR. STEPHEN CAROL: My name is Dr. Stephen Carol. I'm
the Deputy Director of the Institute for Civil Justice at the
Rand Corporation
Santa Monica, California. The Institute is a
private, nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization which conducts research and pol
analysis on civil justice issues.
We are at the end of a major historical study we have
conducted of congestion and delay in the Los Angeles Superior
Court. This study was partially supported by the Hanes
Foundation and by the California Community Foundation, both of
Los Angeles.
It was conducted
cooperation and
assistance, which I most gratefully acknowledge, of the court
itself, as well as the County Bar. This study was headed by my
colleague, Dr. Molly Selvin, who will now briefly describe the
study and its primary findings.
DR. MOLLY SELVIN: Good morning. I'm pleased to be here
to describe the research we've recently completed at the ICJ on
the subject of civil court delay in Los Angeles. My comments
this morning
11 be with regard to our conclusions on the nature
and magnitude of civil delay in Los Angeles, the causes of that
delay, the Los Ange
ior Court's response to that delay
over the years, the
of the court's efforts to reduce
delay, and our
of our research for
policy makers.
In brief, we found that de
been a long-term,
persistent problem
IJos Angeles for more than 60 years. In
recent decades we believe delay has been caused in part by
important shifts in the composition of the civil case load in Los
Angeles, as well as by a trend towards increased litigation
activity in individual cases. These changes mean that cases now
consume more judicial resources
they did in the past.
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The Los Angeles Superior Court has persistently
endeavored to clear its delayed caseload since the early 20th
century. Some of these efforts have had transient effects, but
generally they have produced no long-term reductions in civil
delay. The court's efforts have been hampered by organizational
and financial constraints, the court's analytic capabilities, and
by the court's largely crisis-oriented approach to the problem.
Before I begin, let me say that a written statement that
elaborates on my comments is available. And in addition, I
understand you've all been provided with some copies of a number
of the tables and charts from our report, and I will refer to
some of them.
The Los Angeles Superior Court has a reputation as being
one of the most delayed metropolitan trial courts in the nation.
As recently as last fall and winter, the court was setting new
cases for trial at a reduced rate because of the large backlog of
older cases. We undertook this study of the r.. A. Superior Court
to provide some empirical foundation for the debate over what to
do about civil congestion and delay in Los Angeles. We studied
civil delay in r .. A. since 1880, when the court was founded,
through 1981. Speci cally, the policy questions we addressed
were: What has been the nature and magnitude of the delay problem
in this court; what are its causes; what has been the court's
response; what has been the impact of that response; and, what
a~e the appropriate next steps for the court.
Let's turn to our substantive findings:
We compiled a record of c
delay in the L. A.
Superior Court from 1920, from when
figures are first
available, through 1981. And you can see that on Figure 5.1. It
should be the first one
the packet you've been provided with.
We measured delay primarily as median time to trial. That is,
the interval between the
when the parties first requested
trial to the date when the
was scheduled. Our data
indicate that civil delay is not a recent phenomenon, or even a
temporary one in Los Angeles.
It has been, rather, a long-term
persistent problem. During the
20th century, time to trial
fluctuated quite a bit. Since World War II, however, time to
trial has dramatically increased
about 6 months in 1940, to
40 months in 1981. This rise
been particularly dramatic
since 1970, when time to
al was 24 months. With few
exceptions, the history of civil delay in the Los Angeles
Superior Court is one of
steady and upward increase.
We've also explored the validity of a number of popular
explanations for some of the fluctuations in delay that we
observed, the causes of delay, if you
11. One explanation for
rising delay is that we are, as a population, more litigious now
than we were in the past. Our data indicate, not surprisingly,
that civil filings have
sen
ly since the early 20th
century. In 1880, when
court first
, less than 500
-3-

civil actions were filed in
L A. Superior Court.
In 1980,
in contrast, more than 70,000 new
1 actions were filed.
The
growth in filings can
explain some of the recent
increase in delay,
there was
delay at time when there
was a drop
1
as
1930's.
In
addition, the rate
rease in
s exceeded the
rate of increase
lings. To measure litigiousness, we
compared changes in civil
lings
s in the county's
population. While the absolute number of civil filings increased
enormously over the years, the rate of filings, that is the
number of filingE
population, remained relatively steady.
Approximately 1
200 people have initiated a civil action each
year in the L. A. Superior Court over the past several decades.
That figure is up somewhat
1970 and 1980, but the 1980,
rate of filings
r popu
is still less than the rate of
filings in 1930. We cone
that
sing litigiousness does not
always explain
sing de
Angeles.
Well then Doctor, did you
of judicial positions in

examine
L. A. County?
DR. SELVIN:

Yes we did,

I

1

ll get to that in a

minute.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
DR. SELVIN:
judgeships,
kept pace with the
the L. A. Super
Court
1880 when the court was
addition of new judges
increases in
lings.
number of filings
years. During
filings per judge
Superior Court. By
1,300 filings per j
lower now than at any
with changes
to
the rate of filings
in delay,

for rising delay is the
1 positions, hasn't
The number of judges on
enormously. There were two in
i there are 206 at present.
The
court to keep pace with
caseload per judge, the
somewhat in recent
approximately 1,500
-- in the L. A.•
were approximately
lings per judge is
1930's. When compared
we conclude the changes in
complete
explain increases
ic

A thi

t, wait, wait. You
ling, not filings per
s per
delay is up.
So, in fact,
explain
delay; it
more resources per
explanation that
basic dramatic

just
judge,
you're right.
militates fer
filing and they
it doesn't
understatement.
-4-

DR. SELVIN:

•

Yes.

Our third explanation for delay is that -- the third
popular explanation is that cases now consume more judicial
resources than in the past
We have, in fact, observed
significant shifts in the composition of the civil caseload in
Los Angeles and an increase in the amount of litigation activity
per case. We've observed that more complex personal injury
litigation now dominates the civil caseload in Los Angeles
whereas in the past, say prior to World War II, the L. A.
Superior Court functioned largely as a debt collection agency.
Debt cases predominated. Civil law suits in Los Angeles since
World War II increasingly include multiple parties, especially
more than one defendant.
In addition, cases make greater use of
discovery as well as more papers filed, more appearances made,
more motions requested.
This means that cases that settle,
rather than those that go to trial, take longer to reach that
settlement now than they did in the past. Trials themselves have
grown longer than they were in the early 20th century. Given
these findings, it's not surprising that we've observed also a
slight decline in the number of dispositions per judge in recent
decades.
Therefore, we have some evidence that the delay in Los
Angeles in recent decades has been caused by a change in the
composition in the civil caseload as well as an increase in the
amount of litigation activity per case.
What has been the court's response to delay? The L. A.
Superior Court has been concerned and active since the early 20th
century.
It's taken two major approaches. One has been to add
judicial manpower.
The court has acquired temporary judges in
varying numbers from other superior courts in the state as well
as other courts in the county.
In addition, the court has made
frequent additions to
permanent staff.
The other major approach has been to impose local rules
and procedures. Most of these have been directed at the entire
civil caseload.
They've been designed to speed the processing of
cases, to reduce the length of trial, or to settle cases before
trial. Other types of innovations have been directed at specific
types of cases on the docket. They've been designed to divert or
remove lower value cases from the docket, to induce litigants to
waive a jury trial, or to waive a
altogether.
We evaluated the major solutions the court has imposed
and we found that the addition of permanent judges has enabled
the court to keep pace with its increase in filings; but these
additions by themselves did not significantly or permanently
reduce time to trial. Without these additions, however, delay
might have been worse at any given time than it was.
But with
the changes in the composition of the caseload and the increasing
litigation activity that we've observed, the addition of judges
in the same rate as in the past will not produce permanent
reductions in time to trial.
-5-

We also found
adopted have not succeeded
reductions in delay. These
further increases in t
there had been some
result of the
to trial has continued

1 solutions the court
ing significant or long-term
may also have prevented
In
, we found that
to trial as a
overall the wait

Los Angeles? Since the court
Why has delay
to
ef
long-term reductions?
was so active, why was
First,
we
1
the
court was unable
We have four explanations.
nature
of
s
delay
problem. Without
to recognize the persistent
,
the
court's
pattern
of
an historical view
the
sodic.
It
intensified
its
response was
lical and
, it was able to
efforts during periods
, that mobilization
mobilize the Bar and the court,
waned.
Financial con
ability to initiate and
feel the court's large size
made things more
f
cult
The court
civil delay prob
implemented. Why? The
efforts, in general, on
part of the prob
that consumes the
directed many of
the difficulty of
since most c
rather than go
Much of
in addition,
or the efforts to
the court has used to eva
allowed it to accurately eva
In sum,
Angeles. The court has
imposing a variety of
permanent and
produced trans
prevented delay
particular po
substantial or
efforts were
constraints,
court's largely
Let
of the most

also hampered the court's
to delay. And we
ical dispersion may have
ing the nature of its
solutions it
not focus its delay reduction
rmined to be a large
ion of the civil caseload
resources. Since the court
1 cases, it compounded
particular solutions,
as in the past settle
1 data was not collected,
of analyzing civil delay
, the measures that
1 solutions have not
solutions.

long-term problem in Los
to reduce delay by
nuously adding new
Some efforts have
al. They may also have
than it was at any
s did not produce
The court's
financial
1
s, and by the
problem.
I think are some
s research for policy

makers. We studi
findings apply to
as well as elsewhere.

.A,nge s
metropolitan

but some of our
courts in California

Our ana
, we feel, is not
unique to Los Ange
the
composition of the civil case
the extent of litigation
activity per case we feel
other jurisdictions
beyond Los Angeles. We feel Los Angeles' large size may have
made the management and implementation of procedural solutions to
delay more difficu
than in
courts, but this court's
management tradition is s
other metropolitan
trial courts. That tradition is
z
by judges rotating
among different branches and divisions and by the frequent
rotation of pres
judges
tradition also
results in a lack
institutional memory about the nature and
success of previous efforts to
ss the problem and has
hindered the court's efforts.
Our analysis leads us to conclusions with regard to the
Los
les Superior Court, and
possible next steps
s to reduce delay. The
perhaps for other courts,
to
problem of delay
court needs to devote
to reverse the long-term
se
time to trial.
Also, the court needs to
directly on those
cases that consume the most
How can the
court do this?
We suggest that the court size must continue to
increase. The court
with increases in
1
the volume of
1
frequently adding
permanent judges to its
may well have
kept delay from
If the court fails
to keep pace
worse.
But the
personnel, will be
resources it does
reductions in de
better informed about
of that caseload on
in the litigation
court needs to identi
predict whether a case
to settle or try.
s
determine how to optimally
future, resources.

court needs to know where
ly occurs. The
cs that will allow it to
consuming or lengthy
essential for the court to
sting, as well as

also explore
We suggest the court
as well as analyze
automated
terns to
its civil caseload. The court currently makes little use of such
Los Angeles may be able to
systems. Other
and may be able to
learn something
sting resources.
more effectively

With a more detailed analysis of its caseload and perhaps the use
of an automated management system, the L. A. Superior Court may
choose to adopt one of a number of individual strategies to
reduce delay.
The court may decide to
a tracking system for
different types of cases depending on their predicted complexity.
The court may also decide to impose limitations on
discovery which many lawyers and judges think is responsible for
a good part of the delay in the litigation process.
Finally, the court has recurrently had difficulty
measuring the true impact of its innovations on time to trial;
therefore, we suggest that the court might design an evaluation
as part of any future procedural innovation and collect data
specifically for that evaluation during the life of the
proceoure. In addition, the court might choose to implement some
of its procedures experimentally.
In conclusion, I'd like to add that we briefed the
members of the L. A. Superior Court Executive Committee during
the past summer on this research. Since then the court has asked
us if we would assist them in designing new approaches to delay
reduction in Los Angeles based upon our suggestions. We are
anxious to be of assistance in this endeavor and are currently
seeking the required financial support.
Again, I'd like to thank you for the opportunity to
speak to you
s morning. And I'd be happy to answer any
questions.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you. Any questions?

Mr.

Stirling.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Dr. Selvin, what percentage of
the superior court's resources are allocated to criminal cases?
DR. SELVIN: That's one of the most difficult questions
we had, and we can't answer that. ~udges rotate in this court,
and have for as long as we can determine, between civil and
criminal departments depending on
need.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: So we don't know just by
courtroom time what percentage of the time is taken up by
criminal proceedings?
DR. SELVIN: We
that at the present, but we don't
know that in the past and so •.•
ASSEMBLY~~N

STIRLING:

All right, at present what do you

estimate it to be?
DR. SELVIN:

that at the moment, I'm sorry.

I don't
-8-

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
Well, if you don't knmrl
that, you don't know what percentage of their time is spent on
sentencing of gui
pleas from the muni arraignment.
DR. SELVIN

No.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
How much of the civil -- I
would allege to you that that's reasonably significant,
especially in light of the court unification debate, because
logically the
court is having to take an insertion of
the workload that
be
sposed of at the muni arraignment,
and in effect having to rel
and rereport and all that
sort of thing, so
's
the process and it's creating a
duplicative process. And frank
I'm surprised that the a.mbi t of
your study didn't cover
e
since we had the
proposition on
ballot
that was designed to attack
that very problem.
Hmv much of the
s
array of civil case
complicatedness was
n the discretion of the judges that were
hearing the case? In other words, how much would their
discipl
or
terms of
amount of discovery and the
responses to
ir own delay?
DR. SEININ: We were
and given that, particularly
difficult to determine.

ing with a historical record
back as we went, that's very
l, for example, in the course
and judges and get kind
zation of what's going on?

of your
of a subj
DR. SELVIN:

No, we

t.

There's a lot of wisdom in folks.
That's
you arrive at -- I think
the most
made is the institutional
memory; the
presiding judge position
means that there's
and strength. And the
club decides
's
s year, or this woman, this
year or next year,
they're probably great folks and do a good
job and at
frank
have no real institutional
management or
1
experience. And they
finally get up to
move on and the next one
has to come
. And
that that's exactly the
problem. But
the course
recoro~endations, did you make
any recommendations to
longevity of the
institutional memory
accountability of the
management of
courts
?
made in the past to
to, I think, six years,

increase
-9

and we did not investigate those specifically in terms of why
they weren't adopted •••
ASSEMBLY~AN STIRLING:
Even if it -- I think that's not
a bad idea. The problem becomes, if you get a good one for six
years, it's great; if you get a bad one for six years, it's a
disaster.
Is there anything that increases the accountability of
the courts to the pub c for -- Was there anything in your
recommendations that would attack that institutional problem and
make the efficiencies of the court more accountable to the
public?

DR. SELVIN: Well, I think if we had a better sense -"we" meaning the court and the community in general -- of
specifically what part of the caseload was the problem, how to
identify those cases. That's something that's clearly is passed
on from one presiding judge to the next.
Part of it is an
information problem. The court doesn't know how to deal with
cases as they are filed that will prove to be difficult cases
down the road.
I think in addition to the problem of changing
people every couple of years, there's a sort of lack of
information underneath that.
I think some of the institutional
problems would be eliminated if there was a better information
base ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Yes, but don't you see, it's a
chicken and egg argument.
If you had the resolve and the anxiety
in the management to account for its productivity, the
information systems would have long since been demanded and
developed.
So the fundamental question gets to be, how can the
courts, an independent branch of government independently
elected, be made more accountable to the public, not for the
philosophy of their decisions, but
the timeliness and
efficiency of their decisions?
DR.SELVIN:
I think -- From our study we spent a lot of
time reading the Los Angeles Daily Journal to get a sense of what
the court did and how the legal community reacted.
In my
judgment, the court has been quite concerned about its delayed
caseload since the late 1920's,
began to be perceived as
a problem in Los Angeles. And I think -- I'm not sure I
understand what you mean by accountabi ty, but the court was
very sensitive, clearly, within the legal community in Los
Angeles about that problem for a long time.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, I've never heard debated in
a judges election the quality of management of the courts. Have
you? Therefore,
's not a publicly accountable function.
It's
just a big whale out of water and the normal response to the
Legislature, when we ask them about their delays is, "Well, if
you'd give us more resources we'd be able to do a job." But when
we start examining, they haven't done all the normal management
things that any institution should do.
So the question, the
fundamental question that still has to
answered is, what is it
-10-

about the institutional arrangement
can make the group, the
court, more accountable for trying to get management systems in
place and trying to reduce their backlog, and that sort of thing?
And I guess the answer is that
wasn't within the ambit of
your study or recommendations.
DR. SELVIN: Do
want me to answer that? I think
what I've said, that the court real
needs to have a better
sense of what some of
problems are before it can decide how
to proceed, because at
s point it's not -- I would stand on
what I said.
ASSEMBIJYMAN STIRLING:
you, Mr. Chairman.

•

Thank you, Doctor.

Thank

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. One more thing. Could you
comment please on record keeping in terms of its impact on the
problem of trial court ef
iency?
DR. SELVIN: This is something that we've begun to
explore and I think we're aware of some other trial court
jurisdictions throughout the
that have implemented
automated management systems and
've been used to do things
like case tracking, noticing, other parts of the litigation
process. At present I'm not aware that the L. A. Superior Court
uses that type of system, and we think that it might. We haven't
investigated this
detail. And it's one of the things that
we'd like to do if we were able to do some follow-up research in
this area. We think the L. A. Superior Court might be able to
benefit from this sort of a
managing its caseload, as
well as analyzing some of
CHA.IRMAN HARRIS:

Any

questions?

questions,
of your research real
was. We
at what may be the actual causes
the fact that there
s been
scope of your research, the
question?

before I ask too many
sense of what the scope
it didn't really look
It simply looked at
delay. But what was the
, I suppose, is a better

DR. SELVIN: Well, we
to find out what the nature
of the problem was
nee
re have
concerns of this as a
recent problem
that it's particularly bad now. We wanted to
see what it was in the
st, whether delay was a real problem,
for example, or
was more of a rhetorical issue. And
we found that in fact de
was a prob
in the past and that it
had a long history
Los Ange s. We also wanted to see if we
could determine
some of
causes of delay in Los Angeles
were, given the
formation and the historical record that we
had. We also wanted to see what
court has done since there
have been persistent concerns
the court has been inactive in
this area, or not act
also wanted to try and
determine if
the court d
a
fference.
-11-

ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: In terms of focusing in on the
causes of delay, what did you look at?
DR. SELVIN: Well, we looked at, as I said, some of the
more popular explanations:
litigiousness, whether there had been
sufficient numbers of judges to cope with the numbers of filings,
whether there have been changes in the caseload to indicate that
there have been other causes, whether there have been changes in
the amount of litigation activity in the county, in the cases
filed in the county.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: To what extent did you look at
the actual day-to-day administration of the courts; that is,
continuances, motion practice, including discovery?
DR. SELVIN: One of the things we did was to draw and
analyze a sample of 1,400 civil cases that were filed in the
court between 1915 and 1940, and between 1950 and 1979. We used
coders at Rand to code information about these cases. We looked
at the register of actions rather than the civil case file
because that would have been an enormous task. We coded things
like whether there was discovery; how many parties were there;
whether there were continuances; whether there was a pretrial
conference held; whether there was a trial held; how the case was
disposed of ultimately; whether it was settled or tried or
dismissed.
So we used those records as well as information from
the California Judicial Council memoranda; records of
correspondence that went back to the founding of the Council in
the late 1920's. We used records from the County Bar. The Bar
over the years has been quite active and collaborated with the
court in efforts to reduce delay in Los Angeles and has had a
number of con~ittees that have acted
cooperation with the
court. We also -- I'm sorry.
ASSEMBLY~ffiN

CALDERON:

Well, I did want you to finish

your ..•
DR. SELVIN: We also used legal newspapers, as I
mentioned before, to try and compile a narrative of how the court
acted and what the response to
was within the community
locally.
CALDERON: So with respect to those cases
that you did examine, what were your findings in terms of how
their handling may or may not have operated on this whole
question of delay?
ASSEMBLY~~N

DR. SELVIN:
the number -- Well,

We found that there has been an increase in
terms of handling

ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: You took a look at these cases
and examined the continuances, examined the motions that were
you find anything
made including
scovery
significant in examining those aspects of those cases, that you
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felt was significant in light of what your task was, which was to
examine delay in the courts?
DR. SELVIN: Well, as I said, we found that there has
been more discovery
cases
,
,
second half of our
sample, since 1950 as compared to 1940 and prior. There are more
parties in cases, there are more events, individual papers filed,
hearings requested and so on. But it's difficult to determine
from that, you know, whether a judge was correct in granting a
discovery or whether he shouldn't have granted discovery.
Our
record doesn't enab
us to make that determination.
ASSEMBLY~~N CALDERON:
Did you examine
impact if any the fact that there happens to be
proportionately are we the same today, in terms
courts and judges and lawyers, as we were, say,
1930?

at all what
more lawyers; or
of the number of
back in 1940 and

DR. SELVIN: The number of lawyers in the county per
population has gone up somewhat in the last decade; but it has
fluctuated somewhat.
I think that table may be in the .••
CH~IRMAN HARRIS:
I'm going to be presumptuous and
interrupt Mr. Calderon.
I think that after your report is
finalized, we'd like to see about having a briefing for the
Committee on the report.
I think
would probably be much more
productive than trying to explore it in general terms now.
I
have one further question. Wou
you say that your study was
more academic research than a hands-on analysis? It seems that
most of it was from a
storical perspective rather than from
interviews with judges about their experience.
Is that a fair
characterization?

DR. SELVIN: Yes. The scope -- I wouldn't so much
characterize it as
versus pol
, but the scope of it
was to determine what
storical background -- you know, what
current problem? Is this
is the empirical basis
that's an important
something new; is it not? And I
question.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Yes
is. There's no question about
re
other
stions? All right. Thank you
it. Okay, are
very much. We appreciate it. We will look forward to sitting
nal report.
down with you once you have gotten
DR. SELVIN:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. Nmv, Mr. Hanst, the
President of the State Bar. ·Hill you come forward and discuss
the Bar's
and responsibility in resolving litigation
backlogs and discovery issues? Welcome, it's good to have you.
I see you're joined by colleagues. Wou
you introduce them to
all of us?
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MR. DALE HANST: Yes. Chairman Harris -- I don't know
if we can get this mike close enough to be useful or not. I'd
like to introduce, on my right, Tom Davis from Bakersfield, who's
Chairman of the State Bar Legislation Committee, who's committee
will be dealing with the various
s that come through the
State Bar for our recommendations
terms of court congestion
problems as well as other problems that affect lawyers in the
state. On my left is Jim Ward from Riverside, who is the
Chairman of the newly established permanent Board Committee on
the Courts whose charge, basically, is to deal with the kind of
problems that we're here today to talk about. And in that
connection he will be overseeing some other efforts that I'll
tell you about in a minute, as far as the State Bar is concerned.
Let me preface my comments by indicating to you that
these comments are basically my personal comments; that the State
Bar has not, as an organization, had an opportunity to review
some of the proposals that I might be throwing out to you for
consideration today. They are simply ideas and thoughts that
have come to me in my numerous conversations with people
throughout the state, since I kind of began my term as president
by taking on the problem of court congestion, court reform and
some change in our
scovery
all of which have been
very well received, by lawyers throughout the state who I've
talked to.
I think it's very interesting to hear the discussion of
the Rand people. I think the statistics are enlightening. For
one, I have always felt, as I think a lot of people have, that
the litigious society problem was one of the principal causes of
our increasing litigation.
them to suggest that there
are no more filings now than
were many years ago on a per
capita basis in Los Angeles is most interesting. However, I
don't think -- I have seen figures from throughout the country
that indicate that in most of the country that those figures are
not consistent. In other words,
a greater percentage
of filings throughout the country
on a population
basis.
But the problem is...
of all wrapped up in
one. You can't look at these
s and tell what the
problem is. The problem is that you
more complex
litigation, and that's what
're talking about when they say a
debtor oriented, you
, ••. a debt collection court back in the
'30's, versus complex litigat
now.
Where does the complex 1
come from? The
complex litigation comes from the increasing idea that we have
our society that there must
some
of redress for every
wrong that somebody incurs, the expans
of the rights to the
type of litigation. For example, there is a letter that you've
received from a judge
Fresno
deals with the problem of
multiple cross complaints for
and indemnification in
products liabil
cases. Well, that's just an example of what
-14-

happens in these cases. The judges are confronted with rules and
laws and judicial decisions that allow 14 or 15 cross complaints
to be filed in a products liabi
case, with all of the
attendant discovery.
That turns that case into a case that lasts
10, 15, 20, 30, 40 times as long as the typical debt collection
case.
So, to me, it's the litigiousness on the part of society,
but that comes about from the feeling that we have that all of
these rights have to be addressed.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: President Hanst, let me interrupt you.
It seems to me that the dispute is not just whether or not people
should have the attitude that they ought to be able to redress
their grievances, all grievances through the courts.
I don't
think that is really the problem.
I would much rather see them
using standardized systems of redress in the courts than going
out and hitting each other over the head, or shooting each other.
That's, obviously, sometimes very final and very complete in
terms of resolution.
But I'm interested in whether or not there
are ways that we could allow people to seek redress, but much
more efficiently, informally.
Sometimes right and wrong is very
clear and we do not need to go through the entire process of
elongated arbitration and resolution in order to reach a common
sense result.
If somebody hit someone in the head, it seems it
ought to be fairly clear that, there was an injury and there were
a thousand witnesses that saw some guy get hit in the head. Now,
how do we, in fact, determine what's fair as a result of that
type of grievous action? I'm trying to figure out if there are
ways that we can reach reasonable conclusions without all the
complexities and the formalities that have become systematized in
our justice system.
MR.HANST: Well, there certainly are ways, and you've
hit upon some already.
I mean, the State Bar, and I think you,
Chairman Harris, carried some arbitration litigation.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. HANST:

Yes.

I mean some legislation.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

MR. HANST: And I think that has been working
successfully. And that is one of the things that we're going to
be looking at this year in conjunction with, I hope, your committee and the like committee in the Senate, to explore alternative
methods of dispute resolution.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
For example, what about directing
people toward informal arbitration even prior to getting into the
courts? Now, for example, in marital dissolution cases we ask
people to go see a counsellor. Quite often they go see a
counsellor prior to getting involved in the entire plethora of
issues in dissolution to make sure this is what they really want
to do. The court's time is not taken up in a situation where 5
-15-

months down the line they say, "we
We wish we'd ta
to somebody 5
able to work out our
"
Bar might work on?

' t really want to do this.
ago. We might have been
that the State

MR. HANST: Absolutely.
I
any effort where you -any approaches where we can take people away from the courts and
force them into mediation of their problems, either on a private
basis -- I think it's worth considering; the neighborhood dispute
resolution center type of approach that we've had. Now a lot of
people say that that's not a solution to the problem, because the
problem is complex litigation. In my
ew, it's a partial
solution to the problem
we can take out of a judge's
time in terms of working to handle this kind of problem is going
to give him more time to
to
the complex litigation
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
alternative approaches?

Has the Bar analyzed any of these

MR. HANST: We cons
, I guess a couple of years ago
before I got on the
there was
question of a
neighborhood
spute resolution center
thing. There are
pilot studies going on now in Los Ange s in the arbitration
area, I think, and we're due to receive a report on that
particular issue within a month or two.
for the Bar to give us
an analys s o
resolution
alternatives
in California or
elsewhere in
We 1 d
viewpoint on those
issues. That's one of the things I'm
ly interested in
exploring. Are
ways to divert people from the system in
the first place? If people
to
igious in
resolving their di
are ways that we can
stop some of
the formal. system.
fti.R. HANST:
of the solutions to
system with cases that can
looking into that
come up with some
legislation

stion about that. One
people from the
other ways. And we are
to work with you to
area; maybe propose some
s area.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
If you cou
give us some
sense of where
January.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

was cute.
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that effort and
might look at by

(LAUGHTER)
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: Mr. Chairman.
I just wanted to
-- Mr. Hanst, I just wanted to sort of follow up on diverting
people from the system.
It seems to me that in an effort,
through arbitration and other means, to
litigants from the
courts to a more appropriate form for the resolution of their
dispute •.• Sometimes we tend to add an extra tier of procedure
because as long as the alternative hearing, whether it be
arbitration or some other dispute resolution hearing, is final on
the merits, which we have problems with, you can always come back
and you always litigate. And it tends to mean -- in my
experience, at least in terms of arbitration cases, has been that
it tends to prolong litigation as opposed to shortening it.
MR. HANST: Well, that's a very good point, and I think
-- I have heard, however, that in toto that there is probably a
substantial savings because while it does expand the time in
certain cases, the majority of the cases do not go on to the
trial de novo and you don't have that expansion. But this raises
another question, too. And let me emphasize that what I'm saying
now are my just personal comments and we really haven't looked at
a lot of these things. But I think at some point we have to
decide what price society is willing to pay to sustain this
system. And can we have perfect justice at every level
throughout this society within the system as we now know it? And
maybe it's time to think about whether some of those approaches
ought to be made mandatory; whether that isn't a sufficient
justice at whatever level we're dealing with.
I mean, if we're
talking about a perfect justice
respect to every right and
every issue, from a dollar to whatever, I don't think society can
afford the price. I don't
there is any solution to that
problem.
So I guess
1 I'm saying is that lawyers have to begin
to be willing to lock at changes
their traditional concept of
how the system ought to work, and we ought to be looking at ways
to provide maybe not 100% just
a particular case within the
way that we conceive 100% justice
I mean there's a lot of
argument about voir dire; there's a lot of argument about
unanimous juries in the criminal area, you know. And we can't
forget the criminal area because the criminal area, unless you
separate it and then you're going to have two separate systems,
affects the ability to get the civil cases out because of the
delays over there. But I don't
ow what the answer is on voir
dire; I don't know
the answer is on unanimous jury verdicts.
But I know one thing, we shouldn't just throw it out because it
isn't traditionally the way that we've practiced law and it's not
our traditional system.
It's
other areas. We have to
determine whether there's some lesser quality of justice that
those other areas have. And, you know, at some point we just
can't afford to continue to go as we presently are. So, you
know, I think that's a very good point directed towards, is it
time to make some of these things mandatory? If you do make them
mandatory, you obviously are going to save time.
-17-

1\SSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: How about making just -- an<'! J'm
not by any means attempting to besmirch any of the Judiciary's
reputation in any way, but to get at, or suggest that they're any
part of the problem at all, if they are.
I don't. know.
But what:
I do want to ask you is just in terms of distributive justice, or
in terms of determining how just we need to be at every step of
the case, would it strike you as being a good idea to start at
looJ.~ing at how 1 ules of civil procedure are simply applied, and
starting very basically with the continuance? And being more
forceful in terms of compliance with time requirements for notice
and time requirements for filing motions? And again, I'm not
asking tl1at question with any knowledge whatsoever about what the
practice is out there.
I have a suspicion that it miqht be a
contributing factor; I don't even know how hiq.
MR. HANST:
Sun", it's a contributing factor, but we
have to recogn ze that judges are human bcJngs just like
legislators are human beings and just like lawyers are human
beings, an<'! none of us ...
CHlHRtJIAN HARRIS:

Nobody

i zes

~!].Y.

of those fact:s.

MR. HANST:

None of us are
rfect and you're going to
roach tluouqhout thP ~Judiciary, hut what we
nc(~d to do is through legislation.
Establish SOJ11C - - discovery
j s i1 good example.
J mc~an, t.here' s a lot of cri1:icism now in the
discovf'ry area that, W(~ll, juc1gc~s don't enforce the sanctions.
Wlwn somebody comes up, they're hesitant to fine them $300 for
doinq something or for not filing a proper interro<Jatory. Well,
you know, it's human nature, unless the rules are spelled out and
cast in a little better concrete, and that comes from
legislation. That comc?s from
kind of review that we hope to
~c a~lt• tn set up in the discovery area this year, with your help
again.
:r 've indirat.ed we have a jc,int committee now, est.ablished
t1etween the Judicial Council and the State Bar, chaired by Jim
War<'!, here on my left, whose job is to tell us within the next
couple oi months how w0 can formulat.e an ongoing statewide
r·ommission with legislative support and legislative participation
und judicial part·
ipat
and attorney participation and public
particjpation designed to, with
the next couple of years,
hopefully, come up
an answer to the discovery problem.
I
1ncan, the discovery
lem pervades the whole system.
There's
on argument a~out whether or not it truly causes congestion.
Well, my own feeli
s,
re can't be any doubt the fact that
something that takes tha much time, that gives rise to the
motions that you heard about from the Rand people today, affect
~md delay the :;ystem.
W0've tr
approach this on a
f'iecemeol, patchwork, handaid
over the last three or
four yPars and have gotten absolutely nowhere.
You can make one
little step at a time which is helpful, but it doesn't really
address the whole prob
hdVl'

d

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
qtH'Stion,

<:~

•

That's very cogent.
I have one other
St.irling mny have a question as well.
-18-

Did any resolutions relating to court efficiency emanate from
your convention this year, ones that we'll be looking at in 1984?
Do you have a package yet from the State Bar in this area?
MR. HANST: Chairman Harris, I cannot answer that
because the packet has not .•.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
right. The answer is no.
that right?
MR. HANST:

Is

Apparently not.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

•

So the answer is no. That's all
They don't have any at this point.

All right, that's fine.

MF. HANST: There will will be suggestions coming from
us through our efforts to deal with the local Bar associations on
the court efficiency and administration issue. That was raised
by the Rand peop
It was raised by Mr. Stirling's questions in
terms of, how do we get the courts to operate more efficiently in
their own administration. Well, one of the problems throughout
the state now-- and I can't deal with Los Angeles.
It's really
a separate kind of issue in terms of problems they have here.
But throughout the state, the courts are not consistent in the
way they administer their courts and what we're trying to do,
from the Bar Association point of view, is make the lawyers
throughout the state aware, in their local Bar associations, of
these problems of the ways that have been suggested by the
Judicial Council to properly make your courts work on a timely
basis, try to make the people in one county upset about the fact
that their county takes two or three years to get to trial when
the county next to them only takes six months. And make them
wonder why that's happening and make them try and work with the
judges and put some pressure on
judges from the other side of
the bench in terms of doing some of these things.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay.

MR. HANST: So that's one of the things that we're going
to do. Now, in doing that, we'll come up with ideas from time to
time from these various areas in terms of what's worked
successfully there.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Good.

MR. HANST: Some type of mediation approach; some type
of private lawyer working
the discovery area and resolving
discovery disputes -- that sort of thing.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. HANST:

And we'll bring those to you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.
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MR. HANST: But I think, you know, I really think we
need your help on this discovery issue because, ladies and
gentlemen, that is a major issue in my view, and everybody I've
talked to, bar none, has indicated there is a problem in that
area and we have to deal with it. We can't deal with that issue
without resources from the state, without cooperation from you
people in terms of having some kind of ongoing study. Now I
don't know exactly the right way to approach it .•.
CHAIR!'flo.AN HAERIS:
I think you've made a very important
point; one that has been noted.
Is there anything your
colleagues would like to offer to us?
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I have a question of Mr. Hanst.

Yes, okay.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: First of all, Mr. Hanst, you're a
great breath of fresh air. My own conclusion is that the judges
-- the bench in the past has been subject to the workloads of the
attorneys who, because their cases are not moving along quickly
enough, have to take more cases and therefore their own
calendaring and scheduling becomes a problem so they try to get
the cases delayed to balance more cases. Everybody wins if the
bench moves along more efficiently; they get their cases resolved
sooner. But the interplay has been the bench versus the Bar, or
trying to appeal to the Bar, and in effect be popular and well
accepted and well respected and that sort of thing. And so the
real solution will come from the leadership of the California Bar
Association doing exactly the things you've outlined; and
creating an atmosphere among the members of the Bar that it's
good to have an ef
, timely resolution of complaints and
that sort of thing. And the fact that M.r. Ward and yourself and
the Bar Association
self is showing an interest in doing this,
I think is 90% of the battle. That fact that you're attentive to
it and that you're thinking about it and talking about it is
really a fundamental shift in the posture of the Bar versus court
efficiency.
In the past, court efficiency has lain dormant,
subject only to the energies of the chairman and several others
and aggressive judges, but when those guys pass from the helm
then, as the Rand Corporation indicated, it goes back. So I
congratulate you and the Ca fornia Bar Association.
In the last
two years there has just been extraordinary quality of leadership
there and I
's rea
come a long way and I hope that
that continues.
I'm sure the chairman and the rest of us are
committed to helping you in that regard.
MR. HANST: Well the test will be if we can continue on
beyond this year and keep it going on an ongoing basis.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

We want you to press on and to press

forward.
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Yes. The answer is really in the
soul of the leadership of the California Bar
and as long as they are there, it will turn around.
in that. I'm concerned with this notion
afford perfect ~ustice or fair justice. I
MR. HANST:

I didn't say fair.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

•

I said perfect.

Perfectly fair.

ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING:
The Supreme Court sophistry in
that case was enormous, I thought.
I think we've got a long way
to go in terms of the kind of leadership that you're
demonstrating here before we give up and have to answer the
question that you posed to us. The information system is in
place
the courts; the institutional arrangement to make the
courts accountable, in a real sense, for their efficiency; the
demand and the drive for more efficiency; the technological
innovations that are available -- even word processing. We find
our appellate court just went to word processing recently,
updating
procedures.
I mean, there's a whole array of
things that are simply good management, good organizational
development that have not been put in place. California court
management has been moribund. And so long before we need to ask
whether we can afford to allocate this much resources to good
justice, we'd need to implement all these things. And I'm
we can do it.

to

ific question -- two of them: First of all, half of
criminal load, we understand is DUI.
Isn't it time for DUI
an administrative function rather than a judicial function?
HANST:

I certainly think it's time for that to be

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Will your committee look into

that?
MR. HANST:

Certainly, we can.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. HANST:

Okay.

Again, within our limited resources.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, I'm not sure we need a full
Rand study.
I mean, I think any attorney -- well I shouldn't say
that. Most of the old hands in Los Angeles could have told us
what she
us, if they'd just thought it through, without
major study.
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MR. HANST: It may be time for us to look at several
areas. I mean, you know, many years ago we set up a separate
procedure, a separate process for workman's compensation.
we have to look at certain areas and deal with them and treat
them specially in order to give our system more time. But I
think what I'd like to leave with you is that you shou
I
think, try to look for ways, try to be receptive to changes
procedure •.•
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

We're receptive.

MR. HANST:
••. and process that will bring about
the litigation process to early resolution rather than the
problem we now have. Lawyers don't settle cases until
're
faced with a trial.
ASSEHBLYMAN STIRLING: Right.
the judges, which is a function .••
MR. HANST:

No, no ••.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. HANST:

Which is a function of

... of their popularity ••.

Oh, no it's not •

ASSEHBLY.t-A..AN STIRLING:

... with the lawyers.

MR. HANST: No, I disagree 'l.vith you.
I don't think
that's a function of the judges.
I think that's a problem of our
system. A judge cannot make a lawyer settle a case until he
confronts that lawyer with trial, when there are no other teeth,
or no other •..
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Right. The setting of
date, though, is the availability of the courtroom which is a
function of the management of the court which is a function of
the superior presidings •..
MR. HANST: If it were that simple, Mr. Sti ing,
answers wou
very easy, but it is not a function ••.
s for
ASSEMBLY~AN STIRLING:
Well, my superior pres
I 5
the last three years in San Diego County assure me direct
that simple. They set -- when they have a courtroom, they set
And if they have any doubt that this guy is ready they set
for trial. And it's funny how quickly the thing gets re
lmd they've brought their backlog just tumbling down.
MR. HANST: What we have to do also is make the
litigants want to solve their problems. You have a bill
in the Senate right now, Senate Bill 1277, having to do
attorneys' fees. That bill was approved by the State Bar
Legislative Committee only, at this point, but the purpose
s'
function of that bill is to change our approach to
-22-

got

really
f
it
the
are
sort

•
is more
today

se

1

, then you

case
that

approach, I understand, was recently adopted and has
successfully ...

MR. HANST:

that's the exact opposite •..

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: No, no, no. Not at all.
Specializing -- I mean, in California we have the worst of
We have process management, which means nobody's accountable
the case. What the federal courts have, in a way -- their tax
judges and that sort of thing are specialists in a subject
also have accountability for the case from filing to deci
the fact that they specia ze doesn't mean that it's
with the case's specific calendaring. I think the
calendaring
we have
California is an absolute disaster.
Nobody's accountable for a case. The superior presiding j
comes and goes and so nobody's there. The feds are
for their case and they specialize. And I think it's time for us
to look at that:-too.
some me

Well on the face of it, specializ
across the board, if we can make it work.

ASSEMBLY~AN STIRLING:
Individual calendaring, I
does too. But California judges don't particularly
that
because it
s them more accountab , unfortunately.

MR. HANST:

or Tom, do

have any

ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: Mr. Chairman, I just
a statement because I think you're the appropriate
the statement to. And I think
ought to be part of
discuss
ly part of the debate in terms
laws
s hearing, or any legislative action.
I
that it is the nature of the adversary
and advocates
function in that system, to do all
they're
red as a professional to do -- required
profess
s in terms of representing their cl
I think
when we talk about doing all we can to
clients, we're not only talking about doing our
st
researching
timely with our motions,
rapport with the court, we may in some instances even
about identi
the weaknesses of the court and
those
sses
I'm not saying
every lawyer does
I wouldn't be surpri
if we found some
seems to me that the two key agents if there's
there's
one: the courts,
But in reality we're all lawyers in
system.
think that if we don't develop a commitment,
of the courts, but also on the part of the
only on
attorneys
those courts, that we need -administration of justice and so trial
betterment
-24-

•

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
you made was on
MR. HANST:

most important statement
We
11 focus on that.

Okay.

much.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS
add, gentlemen? Thank

1
much for coming.

All right. Our next witness
11 be Mr. Ralph
the Administrative Director of the Courts and Secretary
1 Council. Mr. Gampell.
Good morning, how are you?
MR. RALPH GAMPELL:
CHAIRY~N

HARRIS:

I'm well, thank you.
I'm

I missed the meeting

We
you'll be available on the 19th,
full Council meeting.

Mr.

Great.

bit of housekeeping

there.
MR GAMPELL: M.r. Chairman, members, my name is
Gampell.
I'm the Administrative
rector of the Courts. And I'd
like to discuss one or two matters, but before I get into a
presentation, I'd like to address one matter that Assemblyman
Calderon raised.
I hope the Judie 1 Council at it's November
the 19th
s seal of approval on a project
ch
we will promulgate
I hope
the handling of law and motion.
It's been a
s of toes have
to
be treated very carefully,
that will be
rst
set of uni
s, and I
11 then go on
other areas
What I'd
with you -- at least
beginning,
se
ll
a lot more
ings that
you want to
I'd l
to discuss with
our findi
You may recall
was 1978
s
'79 to sunset at
of '84; and SB 810,
of last session,
continued j
cial
of December of '8
That original
s
requi
ial Council to
examine judicial arbitration
to the Governor
the Legis
r of '84. That
report has
Council, will go
full Council on
11 go to the Governor
and the
s
s
I believe that
changes will essentia
be cosmetic between now and
I'd like to share those findings with you.
judicial

You'll
dete

1 that
a

cutoff was cases that were
le determination, to
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j
'79 and '82. And you'll remember
or more
judges was a statutory size of court
which judicial
However, we
that there was no
some
courts,
most courts,
the
filing
the at issue memorandum and the
going to
l.
We believe
s is a blip which
11 eventually show a
reduction. Because
's quite interesting to watch,
courts
that have
other techniques in reducing the time between at
issue
trial, you find it
along like that and all of
it drops off. That is, as you attack your civil active
list there seems to be a critical point. You see it in counties
1
, Santa Clara, where it drops -- particularly
Sacramento
and then it
off suddenly and you get a
1
24 going down to 7 in months. Quite suddenly. We bel
may
well
in Los Angeles. They are on a
curve as far as civi active
st time is concerned. But we
lieve that mandatory judicial arbitration may show quite a
sudden drop -- we hope quite soon.
courts unanimously tell us that arbitration is a
tool. Now, what is the opposite si ?
rate of contested trials, as far as we can te
at least can't tell whether not the rate
ls has been reduced because of judicial
The reason we can't tell that, of course, is we've
study; we've no double bind: this case to
case not to
Now, it's
that the inc
of contested trials has gone down, and
down
remarkably.
In our statistics we have one
category of PI, Motor Vehic : Personal
ury, Motor
Between '80 and
's gone down 34%. Contested trials
34%. In
r
s of PI cases,
12.4%. In
1 complaints,
s is
gets a bit edgy,
by 4.9%i contract cases,
s of that sort.
f

.
f

cate that some
are not
Not neces
, Mr. Chairman. It
:tvlR.
le those case are not
of
the peop
the settlement of cases
:awyers who
settl
cases. And
may
PI
mean, and I
was ginger
moving in this area,
may mean that some k
of cases
a kind of rather
tutional amount of work in keeping your word processor
going. The
who handle big contract cases are used to
flippi
and out comes the request for discovery.
more
you have and the more answers you
the more motions you have, the more you bill
client
ASSEMBijYMAN CALDERON:

It's outrageous.
-28-

•

great
calendar.

, both on the criminal and the civil sides
I was wondering if the Judicial Council has

a

se

I don't have criminal stati
s was a civil hearing, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

me

Yes.

MR. GAMPELL: It is -- well again, anecdotally. As
as civil, and I'll discuss criminal within just one moment, s
largest civil filing category is family law.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay.

MR. GAMPELL: And that decreased by about 5% in '82,
th the largest decrease in Los Angeles, Orange and Santa
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay.

MR. GAMPELL: And our most recent figures, and this may
not reflect the incidence of Prop 8 because there are so
other factors involved in that. We find that about almost 90%,
88.3% of
cases are disposed of before any trial. And
only about 8%
red jury trials. And it was until recent
our experience that criminal only took somewhere, depending on
the courts,
25% and 30% of all judicial resources. Now
it is
clear, again I must say anecdotally, also as
figures are
, that DUI is putting big pressure on
municipal courts. But when, I think it was Assemblyman
a
, can
be disposed of administratively, or -- I
it was.

MR. GAMPELL: There's a problem and that
offense
s a mandatory prison sentence. And
constitut
can't be sent to jail by an administrator
though there
of people on my list that I would
have in that
, but there are certain constitutional
prohibit
Could you give us or could
us a
cases that are hitting our system,
civil
, and then, again, the percentage of those
cases,
ly and by percentile? In other words,
the criminal cases of a certain type, or 25% of them a
type.
I 1 m trying to get a handle on whether or not we need to
look at a
ific course of action, i.e., to deal with
kinds of offenses or specific kinds of legal matters that are
being adjudicated.
11

GAMPELL: Yes. I believe that our annual
now. I have a copy of one page of it whi

spos
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I

I

watches

CHAirut"lAN
very we

You don't have to watch
herself.

that context, there are
a judge to do. He's an e
of
ssures on judges which I
ought
Any judge who is really tough is
to have a
o troub
He's going to be unpopular in
Bar
He may find a contested election with one of these popularity
polls saying
's not very sweet. And that's run in the
he 1 s
middle of a contested election with a
people mad at him and he doesn't get the support from
cow~unity.
everybody is ready to take a cheap shot
judge has really gone on the line to try to help
along.
It's not an easy thing to say to somebody, "I'm
you cannot
a continuance. I know it's your wedding and
whatever,
the court's full of witnesses and lawyers
you've got to go."
But Ralph, be realistic. How many
attacked on the issue that
re

judges
too tough?

MR GAMPELL: It's very hard to tell. It doesn't
as "too tough," it shows as "not polite," or whatever else
buzzword is.
de
MR. GAMPELL:

No.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Oh.

But you don't want to be in a
if
a judicial poll, the
practice
say
you're not, whatever the
"understanding," or something like that.
CHAIRMAN HARRI :

Most of those polls only matter

1

MR. GAMPELL:

1

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. GAMPELL:

__ ,

Yes.

Oh, no, Mr. Chairman, with

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

_...;.__

no.

Oh, please.

Those polls will be picked up
by the Chronicle, which says,
It's politely put.
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L.

rea

•

MR.

Trials de novo tended to be
amongst contract cases. And again,
One,
dislike of
process. By the
I've made
to
that it's
that a complex case is
I think a complex case is a case
and a lot of motion practice and where the
spute, but where the law is usually quite
malpractice case, you're not going to
subrogation case, the asbestos case,
There are
llions of parties.
which the Judicial Council became
to be appointed to hear the
fferent law firms.
It's a
s size, but the lavr is abso
in that particular case.
So when Mr. Hanst is
not necessarily

MR. GAMPELL:
ASSEMBLY~~N

No.
STIRLING:

He's talking physical

i

st, Mr.
those are the
Why
be
wou

go to

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Mr.

, are you li

I think
Mr. Gampell, fol
s
MR. GAMPELL

Oh, God.
Have

ss
now, or are

1

1

courts

Yes, not only have
j
has word processing.
Has their
to learn to use
's
more
courts was not
a
-34-

st

STIRLING

GAMPELL:

To

It

'
Yes, I be
so.
I must add that
But we have a
STIRLING:
GAMPELL:

No.

s is a

Under

STIRLING:

No.

Yes,

is

are

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
GAMPELL:

Sure.
And I
-35-

s

ng

s

s i

we

•
s

or

But in trying to have commiss
s do
re really affecting is that you're dumping
s that otherwise the state would have to
UNIDENTIFIED

Not bad.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Even in traffic court?

MR
Oh no, I'm sorry. When you have a
commissioner
, the problems are rather subordinate.
time that
's jail hovering over here, no commissioners.
whether or not, for example, the TAB experiment is cost ef
the
islature is going to receive, I'm sure, tons of
al on
from TAB, from analysts, from
teamsters
Everybody is
to get into that dispute.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Now

Right.

MF. GAMPELL: And we are not in a position, because that
is not data that we collect ...

MR. GAMPELL:
... as to whether or not TAB is cost
effective.
n general, whether or not you use a commiss
or a judge, the actual money saving is $10,000 or $15,000 a
in Los Angeles, I think gets 85% of
A commiss
salary of a j
difference from the state's
is that that is all picked up by the county, inc
for a judge, you pay or you were
also you were paying general
So all you've done there is you've
the
1 cost.
that
that we
you take all the
to the state.
be dea
They wou
fourths of a j
s

traffic
the state
municipal and
those traff
tern of commis
necessari
salary.

of counties
does, for example.

ss
CHAI~AN

MR
the notion
doesn't seem

HARRIS:

traf

court

Yes.

, sure. It would work
well.
some way
is going to be cost e
out. The cost ef
s •..
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a

•

• GAMPELL

••• and we see jury trials •••

of

s

as an is

HARRIS:
GAMPELL:
tradit

But every one of these -- well,
hope we'll go on doing it •••

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
a

Yes.

When the
crafting •••

of

MR. GAMPELL:

Council issues a

••• have gone into submitting it.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.

For example, discovery: the not
all of a sudden lawyers began to crank
CHAI&~N

what's

HARRI :

Okay.

It isn't altogether true. There
we'd have a fairly extended analysis of
1 Rules of Civil Procedure . .
HARRIS:

of a

•.• whi
was a kind of granddaddy o
scovery.
Okay
any member of the Judie
back to the old
s into court blind and
to an enormous amount of
of the cases and say,

Council
fight
fight it
discovery.
arbitrate?

we

HARRIS:
out a
which

Okay.
s
hard, other than
, to come up with a set o
viable.

ust
answers

I understand. We can
to see if we can
a

answers

-4

prioritization of the problems.
In other words, we ought to be
able to come
, and to say, "Look, here are the things we
ought to focus on. Here are some things that we recognize as
problems. We can't do anything about them, either because the
Legislature has not taken action, or because the funds aren't
available to
" I'm really frustrated because we can't even
agree on the problems. Everybody says, "Yeah, well, the problem
is there's inefficiency. Or, yeah, the problem is there are not
enough judges." Those are all so simplistic. We keep having
these hearings and we can never focus on our approach. How are
we going to tackle the problem? How are we going to eliminate
the need for more judges as the only solution to dealing with
backlogs and to dealing with dispute resolutions?
MR.GAMPELL: Let me see if I can answer that by voicing
some of my own concern.
I said, I think, once before, before
this committee that there is no question that you can address
which has a statewide significance.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Right.

l4R. GAM.PELL: For example, I can name you some big counties in this state that have no backlog problems whatsoever.
CHAI~AN

HARRIS:

Sure.

I understand.

So, what do I answer about those?
got there.

tell you
CHAIPY~N

HARRIS:

I can

Right.

MR. GAMPELL: But equally well, I can also, in just
laying that out, I can say, look, Los Angeles has some structural
problems. The branch courts that were imposed on the superior
court are
ly unmanageab
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay.

MR. GAMPELL: Now, I don't know whether -- it seemed
that to me.
' t presume, with Judge Peetris and Mr. Zolin
here1 to say that as an article of faith.
But it does seem to me
that
re are a great many management difficulties that were
imposed on that court in which they had no part whatsoever. Past
supervisors had interest in locating a branch court here or a
court there. Those are structural problems.
CHAIFPAN HARRIS:

Okay.

MR. GAMPELL: Judge Peetris, I'm sure, will discuss the
management problems that are inherent in a court of that size.
I'd be
sted to discuss with you and with him whether or not
that court somewhere down the line might be broken down into
smaller courts.
-41-

se are very subtle problems.

that the courts that
reduced their backlog.

brought in lots of
are 10 of you here.
go to trial. You'd
point is, those

se as good management
a good answer.
I want to
1 doesn't think that
We've got to solve these

some

to

stion about it. I
ipatory, as opposed to
Council. I look to you and try
perspective on the issues. But
I'm going to throw
if I can get it through
through.
the thing that Mr. Hanst

lpful if we could talk
of time to say, look,
work for this,
the advance notice.
's not a question, because

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I don't want to deal with it from the
standpoint of hostility or antagonism, because I'm telling you,
I'm going to do something.
I don't even know what yet. But I'm
going to do something. Because this -- really, this is crazy.
There's no use in Chuck being here, or Larry, or Sunny, or any of
the rest of us if we do not see a problem and offer some
solution, even if it's the wrong one. We've got to get off of
the dime, and move towards implementing some change, because
what's going on at this point isn't working. And I'm telling
you, we can't solve it by adding more judges. That's the only
thing I realize.
MR. GAMPELL:

I never said that ..•

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I don't say you did, Ralph, and I
wasn't putting you on the defensive.
I'm just saying where I'm
coming from, that's all.
MR. GAMPELL:

I'm always scared about one thing •••

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. GAMPELL:
Royal Air Force days.

Okay.

•.• and that goes back to my old British

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

MR. GAMPELL: And that was a commanding officer who
, "Don't stand there, do something."
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. GAMPELL:

Right.

That always bothers me.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

MR. GAMPELL:
And that's why I think we ought to look at
to what extent is the system already righting itself.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay.

MR. GAMPEL: And it may very well be in the process of
doing a lot of very good things.
CHAIID""..AN HARRIS:
Judicial Council, too.
MR. GAMPELL:

Well, I'd like to hear that from

Okay.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
If the system is righting itself and
all I need to do is stand by and observe, then I'm willing to be
on the sidelines.
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Well, clearly, it's doing it in a lot of
All right. Oh yes, I mean, Alameda
question about that. But I'm
the state.
Sacramento County's better; San
small. .•

GAMPELL:

Mr. Chairman, these are not small

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I understand. We're going to have a
week to see how Larry Stirling puts

ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON:

Mr. Chairman.

They're scared of Larry.

He knows

--~--~~----C~A~L~D_E_R_O~N_:

Let me just make a statement
que
, and maybe the question will be all.
need to answer. But this whole conversation that
last 10 minutes reminds me of this
sement that I saw about this medium sized
sing for a lawyer -- a one-armed lawyer. This
called -- because I thought that was unusual
was some handicapped federal provision
with but -- When he called back, I said, why
one-armed lawyer? He said, because every
the past always, when we asked him a
an answer and then says, however, on the other

This translates into a legitimate
at a minimum. Do you believe that
of addressing these problems that we
solutions to, with respect to the
courts and a more efficient administration
Yes, but I don't believe -- I believe it's
And I'm not -- this is just not a
lieve that lawyers will be tugged from two
-44-

directions. For some lawyers, it's a public service. For other
lawyers, it's a rice bowl issue. Obviously, if you're in a law
firm that makes a lot of money by grinding out discovery 'til
it's this high, you don't want to see civil discovery reduced.
However, the organized Bar, it seems to me, is making, I mean, a
very determined effort.
It will need the cooperation of the
judicial branch; it will need the cooperation of the Judicial
Council; most importantly it will need the cooperation of the
Legislature. And there will be some very tough people trying to
stop you from doing it, because a lot of people like a lot of
discovery. A lot of principals, not lawyers, a lot of principals
back East want a lot of discovery. And they're going to bring
pressure on you not to reduce it.
CHAIFMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much, Ralph. We
appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Davies. All right, Mr. Campbell,
would you please have a seat. You're going to talk to us about
electronic recording, is that right?
MR. CHRISTOPHER CAMPBELL:
elements in the new technology.

Well, as among a number of

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Great.
If you could summarize and
then if you have anything to add for the record, we'd appreciate
it. We've gotten our general statements now from the State Bar,
from Judicial Council, and from the Rand Corporation. We're
going to move very rapidly now and you're going to be the first
one to demonstrate that principle.
MR. CAMPBELL:

I will try my best, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIFMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

MR. CAMPBELL: Mr. Chairman, honorable members of the
Assembly Judiciary Committee, my name is Christopher Campbell.
am a consultant to the Edmund G. "Pat 11 Browr.. Institute of
Government Affairs.
Prior to this, I served in a full-time
capacity as the Institute's associate director and general
counsel for a period of three and one half years.

I

On behalf of our Honorary Chairman, former Governor
Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, our Chairman of the Board, Mr. Russell B.
Pace, Jr., and the Chairman of our Criminal Justice Committee,
Dr. Walter Zelman, I want to thank you on behalf of the Institute
and the members of our Criminal Justice Committee for this
opportunity to address you today.
The Edmund G. "Pat" Brown Institute of Government
Affairs is a fully recognized 501C3, nonpartisan, tax exempt
educational organization. Through programs such as conferences,
seminars and independent research projects, we attempt to bring
people together and involve them in the discussion of many of the
important issues facing the people of California. We wish to
commend you for your ongoing search to find new ways to make our
judiciary and justice systems more efficient.
-45-

An area which we have been vitally concerned with for
now deals with the role that technology can play in
search. With the quantum leaps that are taking place in
s area, it is incumbent upon all of us to consider what these
logies hold as potential for our future.
For the past
several months, under a grant awarded by the Los Angeles County
of Supervisors, we have been looking specifically at:

some

(1)

How telephones might be utilized to facilitate
greater counsel representation;

(2)

how computer-aided transcription and electronic
recording may be employed so as to lower overall
court transcript costs; and,

(3)

how the justice system might benefit by the use of
expanded applications of face-to-face video.

The key to our approach has been to seek out means which
encourage cooperative effort between bench, Bar, public and
sectors. We found at the outset that any attempt to
reduce change involving technology stands a much greater
chance of success if those who are potentially impacted have the
opportunity to plan for its implementation. We have been pleased
with the willingness of these parties to participate in seeking
to develop the most effective applications for these various
logies.
Beginning next week we will issue the first in a series
dealing with our research efforts. While discussion
our specific recommendations will, as I'm sure you can
rstand, have to wait until such time as we formally make our
sentation to the Board of Supervisors, I do wish to share a
thoughts today on those issues I just mentioned.
We believe that telephone technology represents and
lized resource for addressing justice system needs. The
physical presence by counsel, while obviously an
sirable situation under many circumstances, has very little
others. We have identified a number of areas where
telephonic conferencing could be employed with the goal of
client charges and maximizing attorney and judicial
ciency. Among these areas are: law and motion hearings; ex
e hearings; pretrial conferences; discovery motions; and
s conferences.
Similarly, expanded video applications are becoming more
apparent.
How far are you along in the analysis of using the
as a way of dealing with those kinds of problems?
MR. CAMPBELL:

We are substantially moved forward on it.
-46-

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
So we can look forward to some pros
and cons on those ideas and a list of a number of areas where a
telephone might be useful •••
MR. CAMPBELL:
CHAI~~N

Right.

HARRIS:

Good.

MR. CAMPBELL: With the rapidly growing availability of
technology, video contacts can be used in many circumstances
without prejudice to an accused's right of a fair and public
hearing. Among systems currently in use are video arraignments
in misdemeanor matters and, under the terms of AB 177 enacted
earlier this year, for felony arraignments on a limited basis,
where all parties agree.
Video teleconferencing is also being used successful
for public defender and probation officer/client interviews.
Among the benefits realized by these systems are lower
transportation costs, increased frequency of client contact, and
reduced client hostility.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, in conjunction with the search to
find alternatives for traditional shorthand reporting methods, we
believe that the time has come for greater use of both electronic
recording and computer-aided transcription in the production of
official court records. We believe that a combination of all
three systems is warranted; but while the technology exists,
issue presents complex questions of a labor and management nature
as well. The overriding issue in this area is whether the
reporter associations and court administrators can form effective
compromise programs.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You think that the biggest problem,
then, as it relates to court reporting is the labor/management
problem and not the technology?
~-1:R. CAMPBELL:
Yes, sir.
In remarks to this committee
in March of 1981, you, Mr. Chairman, stated that the time was
coming soon for the greater use of electronic recording and that
it was up to court administrators and the reporting community to
develop new approaches. Our research has found, unfortunately,
that very little of the necessary compromise has indeed taken
place.

As I said at the outset, next week we will be offering
some specific recommendations. We would hope you and the membe
of the committee would watch closely in the efforts that we
believe will ensue. And again, I want to thank you for this
opportunity to talk to you today, and we look forward to worki
with you in the future.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you. We will look forward to
that advice.
I did think that something was going to have to be
-47-
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Do you have any estimate of cost

savings?
MR. SULLIVAN:

Pardon?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Do you have any estimate of cost

savings?
MR. SULLIVAN: The prior estimate in the prior example,
GAO talked about a $10 million cost savings nationwide, if
adopted.
CHAI~~N

HARRIS:

That's what percent of the actual cost

now?
MR. SULLIVAN:

I'm not aware of the ••.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
a $100 million.

You don't know if it's $15 million or

MR. SULLIVAN: So, with those additional pieces of
evidence, I want to conclude; but, again, as Chris Campbell noted
earlier, the real issue is not so much of proof on one side or
the other, whether or not savings occur in particular tests or
not, but it's really whether or not the Legislature is going to
keep on the books an anticompetition law, in effect.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Your perspective is the state of the
art is not the problem. The question is whether or not, in fact,
the Legislature is going to meet the concern of the court
reporters that their jobs may be jeopardized as a result of the
increased technology.
Is that right?
MR. SULLIVAN: Right. Absolutely. There's great
tradition in this area of recording the printed word.
In the
14th century we had the calligraphers. They probably had an
association. They got on the books a law which took on the
threat of woodblock carving that was going on then. And they had
a law that forbid the duplication of images.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

That's a very cute analogy.

MR. SULLIVAN: And evidently that was eventually
overcome, although some of the early testimony on what word
processors are doing to us, your committee may want to analyze
the repeal of that ••.
CHA.IRMA.N HARRIS: We would appreciate seeing one if your
association does any analysis of estimated costs savings. That
would help us, I think, in understanding the balance between the
jobs that would be eliminated and the benefit to the public in
terms of cost.
If the cost difference is minuscule, then I think
that would, in fact, be a very weighty conclusion.
-49-

MR. SULLIVAN:

Right.

HARRIS: If the cost is substantial, then I
will be a much harder burden on the court reporters
their continued dominance in this area.

CHAIRP~N

to ju

MR. SULLIVAN: We don't really think it has to be a
matter of job elimination. It's a matter of really converting
the same people.
In many instances, just changing the kind of
equipment that they use.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay, all right.

SULLIVAN: That happens all the time in many
Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I appreciate it very much. Thank you.
right, now I'd like to have Mr. Gene Lokey and Mr. Dennis
rth. Come forward please. Gentlemen, welcome.
MR. EUGENE LOKEY:

Thank you.

MR. DENNIS PEBWORTH:

Thank you.

MR. LOKEY: My name is Gene Lokey.
I am the Legislative
Advocate and the Executive Director of the Electronic Reporting
Association, and wish to make some brief comments and a few
sugge
And I have Dennis, who is a live electronic
currently in practice in Los Angeles County .••
CHAIRP..AN HARRIS:
MR. LOKEY:

Let me explain that.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. LOKEY:

This is a "live" electronic reporter?

You have dead electronic reporters?

Well, there's a .••

MR. PEBWORTH:

And that maybe tells you what you asked

me to say
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right, all right, go ahead.

No

MR. LOKEY:
I appreciate the comments of the previous
re
to the notion that the argument is no
focused on the technology: do we have the equipment? The
entertained a bill two years ago at which time experts
the country were invited to present the evidence
to
committee on that matter. And furthermore, electronic
reporting
California is not something new, because since 1976,
Government Code §72194.5, has authorized proceedings in
ipal or justice courts provided that there is no court
r available. So in a sense, we're only talking about
-50-

expanding the use of electronic reporting, not starting the use
of e
This year a bill was enacted which goes into effect
1st, which provides that in the Administrative
Procedures Act that if all the parties agree, under the
Admini
Procedures Act you may have electronic reporting.
And f
ly, in the omnibus bill that dealt with the
whole area of education, a provision was inserted into the
conference report in SB 813 which said:
"A record of the hearing
shall be made and the record may be maintained by any means
including electronic recording, so long as a reasonably accurate
and complete written transcription of the proceedings can be
It

At this point I'd like to turn over the testimony to
Dennis Pebworth, and then at the conclusion, I have about four or
five speci
suggestions.
CHAI~mN

HARRIS:

Do you have any cost estimates, Mr.

?

MR.

Pardon me?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you have any cost estimates as to
the amount of money that could be saved?
It depends upon whether you mean a full
c system •••
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Right.

MR. LOKEY: That is almost -- no numbers there. Where
savings is the difference in two areas, and
would pay a person, be it a certified shorthand
or a certified electronic reporter or a monitor.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. LOKEY:

There is a cost savings there.

CHAIRM..l\N HARRIS:
for

Okay.

Okay.

MR. LOKEY: The second thing is whether or not you pay
dictation process.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. LOKEY:
rate.
CHAIR~Jill

Okay.

And finally, whether or not you modify the

HARRIS:

Okay.
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MR. LOKEY:
CHAI~~N

So those are the three variables that you
cost.

HARRIS:

MR. LOKEY:
CHAIRY~N

CHAIR¥~

We will try.

HARRIS:

MR. LOKEY:

Can you give us cost figures on those?

All right.

Under separate cover.

HARRIS:

Thank you.

Mr. Pebworth.

MR. PEBWORTH: Thank you very much. I approach this a
little bit differently because I earn my -- I actually attempt to
pay my bills with this business. I do these hearings of -- I do
principal
federal work. 1 do this type of hearing for the U.S.
House of Representatives two or three times a week, and I'm in
court at least every day.
problem when I listen to this debate is that we keep
·talking past
other. We're using the same words, but they
mean different things to different people. ER is almost a
generic term, or electronic reporting, and it means different
things to different people based upon the arguments being made.
It can be anything from a shiny 128 channel machine with bells
and whistles
buttons and somewhere the tapes get sent out and
transcribed perhaps as if it were a robot. It could be a
portable
thing perhaps. For example, like we have here,
which is
s
lar to the equipment I use as a matter of fact.
I work
lly in the federal system. I report for some 25
different
1 agencies. And I do understand electronic
reporting, because I do it every day, and the problems.
But
we have is, there's no central control in ER.
It takes a
of forms. The format that I use is an exact
paral 1 to what a CSR (Certified Shorthand Reporter} does. I go
to a courtroom; I bring my own equipment. My kit, my complete
rig, costs less
$1,000. I'm a subcontractor to these
different
I go in, I record it, I take it home, I
produce the transcript, I sign off on it. I am responsible for
it. And I
rear end, so to speak, on the line saying that
this is the record and I'm responsible for it. It's thousands of
pages. Tens of thousands of pages are produced electronically in
the federal system. It's very, very extensively used. And
actually
successful.
ASSEMBLY~~N

CALDERON:

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr. Chairman.

Yes, Mr. Calderon.

ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: Explain to me: Whenever in
situations where a portion of the record needs to be reread at
some later
in the proceeding perhaps an hour later and it's
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a particular reference to a conversation occurring between two
parties that has now become a paramount issue in whatever
proceeding, and you need to go back and find that. How do you do
that?
MR. PEBWORTH:
that routinely, yes.

Yes, that happens all the time.

I do

ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: And so you just have to go back
there and keep listening to the tape until ••• ?
MR. PEBWORTH: While the proceedings are being recorded
electronically, of course they're monitored witn a small ear
piece, and I take copious notes, which is being done over here.
I hope anyway.
I take copious notes, and the notes identify
every speaker each and every time he speaks and it also performs
a structure of the hearing: direct and cross and voir dire and
the marking of exhibits.
I can find any portion of the testimony
in a matter of minutes.
If it was an hour ago or if it was even
yesterday, I can find it, based on my system of taking notes.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON:

So ••.

MR. PEBWORTH:
I can read back the pending question,
which happens a lot.
"Reporter, could we have that question back
again?" I can do that in about 10 seconds.
ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON: All right, if you were recording
s hearing and I said, "All right, now what was that statement
~4r. Hanst made with respect to the State Bar's position?"
And
you were recording this hearing.
MR. PEBWORTH:

Yes, I could find it.

AS SEMBLY:t'..AN CA.LDERON: And I could say, you know, "Could
court reporter please relay back that •.• "
MR. PEBWORTH:

Yes, I could find it.

ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON:
that?

And how long would it take you to

MR. PEBWORTH: Three or four minutes -- if it were way,
way back in the testimony. That doesn't happen that often, but I
could find it in a few minutes.
I want to explain, define the word "reporter," because
s is what's causing an immense amount of passion and confusion.
I spoke at a conference of shorthand reporters last April
Newport Beach, one of their annual meetings. And a young lady
afterwards approached me and she said, "How dare you call
yourself a reporter?" And she was gesturing as if typing on a -you know. She said, "You don't report, you record." Well now,
"ree-cordn and "wreck-urd" (phonetic) are the same word.
It's a
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verb or it's a noun, okay? And I asked her, I said, "Well, what
is it you produce?" And she
,
11, I produce a verbatim
record." And I said, "Well, I do too. I mean, we make the same
product, don't we?" It's a di
without a difference,
whether you report it or you record it, because actually on a
stenograph you are indeed recording the proceedings.
difference is the device we use, because the stenograph is indeed
a recording device. And it's a distinction without a difference.
We produce the same product; we only use different
ces. And
my question to all of you and to anybody is, if I could do
in
cuneiform and bake the little clay tablets in my portable battery
powered microwave, as long as I could do it quickly and
accurately, what possible dif
would it make?
UNIDENTIFIED:

I'm just

sed we're not.

MR. PEBWORTH:
In other words, why don't we talk about
the product instead of fussing about the method? There's an
emphasis on technology that is
sturbing to those of us who work
on it. To cast a debate as man versus machine is vic
,
because the record -- only a
ng can be re
le for
the record. You can't take a machine
leave it. You can have
a whole range of disasters that can occur if you've got an
unattended machine. Only a human
can take the
responsibility for the record. The reporter, in our definition,
is the individual who goes to
courtroom; goes to get and
bring back the record and signs off on it and says, "
s is the
record of proceedings." And
I
, whether it was
cuneiform or whether it was written in Sanskrit, who cares? If
it's accurate, that's what we're after, that's the
1 thrust
the product. The emphasis on technology, I submit, is complete
splaced, or discussions about state of the art, and so forth.
CHAIRMAN HARRI
MR. PEBWORTH:

Excuse me.
Yes?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: The reason that we talk about
technology is that we're talking about the cost savings that
technology brings. We're not looking at it from the standpoint
of man versus machine. We're looking at it from the standpoint
of cost. Does it cost less and does
produce the same product?
This, I think, is very re
Because the central question
is, can we get a record that
, can we get a record that
is reliable, and at the same
save money? If both of them
cost the same, then that's a
argument.
MR. PEBWORTH: Yes, of course, but they don't cost
same, which is the point I'm coming to,
that this
preoccupation with expensive and sophi
cated equipment with
kinds of gadgets and protections
buzzers and whistles and
things is completely misplaced.
I do about 10,000 to 15,000
pages a year for the federal
and I do it
a
that
costs less than $1,000. You
-- routine court report
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1

can be done with very modest equipment, the claims of some
notwithstanding. The government -- instead of
specifying people, they're trying to specify equipment, and this
is where I think the emphasis is misplaced.
If you had certified
court
, certified electronic reporters, who met all the
same
the stenograph reporters had in terms of
academic requirements, in terms of schooling and spelling and
grammar
legal terminology and courtroom format -- I'm sorry,
transcript format -- courtroom procedure and so forth, if all of
these qualifications were met and you had certified people, you
could
the job and you wouldn't need multimillion dollar,
fancy, sophisticated equipment. But it is, of course,
politically difficult because of all the jobs that are involved,
and I realize that it's very sensitive and that's somebody else's
domain; not mine. But it's misplaced to worry about all of this
comp
equipment. For example, a stenograph doesn't have a
little dashboard on it with blinking lights that says the
ribbon's getting dry. Or a little blinking light that says the
paper's almost run out. Or it doesn't have a little shock device
for the fingers that says you're tired and you're getting shadows
on
stenograph. Or there's not a law •.•
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

You've made the point.

MR. PEBWORTH: Okay. There's not a law that says you
to put them in metal containers in case your house catches
rE!.
In other words, you certify the people and you say,
"HE:!re's
job. You know it. You're trained. We trust you to
do what
're being paid to do." lmd that's all we're asking on
our
, see. vze v1ant to compete. And if you open it to the
, this is where the cost savings will occur.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
. PEBWORTH:
record

Anything else you'd like to add?

I bel

I've done it .

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Anything you want to submit for the
11 be part of the hearing transcript.
CHAI!Uf,AN HARRIS:
MR

PEBWORTH:

Mr. Lokey, you have .••

Thank you.

MR.

The committee has before it a bill that will
dealing with the certification procedure.
It
bill, and we requested that the discussion take
opponents and the proponents during the interim
taken place on many occasions -- and we
hope that the committee will look upon that bill talking about
the certification.

be

The second one is relative to the Government Code. A
simple amendment would provide the expansion via the Judicial
Council
other courts.
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courtroom
luded in
future.

The third wou

So therefore,
would make
costs, e
people who
working

to

The same
the one who
, someone who is
monitors -- and I
s who simply li
accountabili
if you have a
electronic
me please, wou
we
the
, okay?. But if
witness
it slip.
recommend that
I suggest
who produces

In
s

corner,
MR. GARY CRAMER:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS

a

MR. CRAMER:
I think you should -- I suspect that you
our written documentation.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

MR. CRAMER: And we'd just like to add a few comments
couple of comments first in regard to the proponent's of
recording in terms of accuracy.
If indeed electronic
were all that accurate, it is clearly legal to be used
lance field; and there's almost no electronic
of depositions in this state anywhere. That's not to
isn't any; however, we have a great deal of
finding any place where indeed it is being used.
Court reporters do indeed do more than routine
And I suggest to you that perhaps the proponents of
c recording weren't quite as totally candid with you as
have been, to the extent that I suspect they have some
costs for a transcript; what they would want to
for a transcript and indeed how much money they would
be paid to monitor that sa~e equipment. And I suggest
I suspect, that it is exactly the same amount of
I'm presently being paid if they're going to do it
courtroom I'm doing it in.
I

last statement was that the same person
it. Well I suggest to you, that's what's
recording devices.
If you're in the
six hours a day and then you have to go home and
cannot type it as fast as you hear it, because
at 200 and 300 words a minute, most of the
transcript is going to be paying that person the
to take for preparing that transcript. And there
savings that you may have had.

to make a couple of comments on our written
I notice that in several instances, by several of
who have appeared here, they indicated that there's a
complex cases. And I guess maybe our
wherein we indicate that the cost of transcripts
mostly as a result of long cases is really substantiated
complex" cases should have been used instead of
cases.
I think it's important to indicate that we believe the
Court is probably one of the very few courts in
has an adequate monitoring system of reporters in
they file transcripts in time. And that's why
small number, percentage-wise, of reporters 'Vlho
particularly those who file late chronically.
I think the statement with regard to the Judicial
on its own. We believe their present method of
with us is terrible.
Just to give you an example,
-57-

a proposal was supported by our association in San Diego -- I
ieve it was a San Diego court
-- had suggested
there should be a Judicial Council change in rules to relate the
size of the transcript to how
to
le it. As it
stands now, whether the transcript is 10 pages or 10,000, we have
exactly the same amount of
to
that transcript. And we
suggest that's unreasonable. We
that we be supported in a
change. The Judicial Council re
apparently to accept our
arguments and to move on that issue.
that the federal ER
for utilizing tape
And
'd be happy
to you that the
not get into

I think it is
to
study indicates that it
re
recorders.
I think
's
to provide documentation that would
federal ER study is fatally flawed,
specifics of that.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. CRAMER:

Do you want to submit something?

Yes, I' be

We believe we are
transcript regardless of
whether you are using a tape
reporter -- and that if the law
use of tape recorders we
official record. And I'd
more when I get to the next

to.
the
that is,
or a live shorthand
changed to expand the
the ones to type
that a little bit

With regard to
-- and if I
can refer that as CAT -- I'
just a little bit
about what we see coming,
this is the area that
you're probably going to be
This is technology.
This is technology
, both now and in
future. We did a
,
fie
, but a study.
Based on the results of our
have about 25% of the court
reporters -- the official
is, those that work in
the courtrooms across the State of
ifornia -- who are
utilizing CAT, computer-aided transcription. But I think the key
is what is going to be happening
the very near future in terms
of interfacing with the court. CAT will allow us to provide a
great deal of additional
ce to
without any
additional expense to those court
at state
expense or at local expense.
to be able to do,
as an example, is col
the rest of
court area needs,
department, the
clerk's office, the
myriad of people
who are staff peop
to
that same
data. With computer-aided
take that
information we're collecting
the court and
provide that information to
other areas. That is, we
have to collect who the
are, what case they're on, the
sposition of the cases.
information that I heard
Mr. Gampell refer to cou
be collected by court reporters
who are utilizing
equipment.

The hearing impaired has become a serious problem in
some areas. Over the last couple of years, we've had about one
hearing impaired defendant a month who we have had to provide a
method whereby they can satisfy the legal requirements. We have
doing that utilizing computer-aided transcription. That is,
we have the ability to write on a modified stenotype machine
11 instantaneously put the transcript on a screen for those
are hearing impaired.
I think that one of the major items, in terms of cost,
is the fact that there is literally millions and millions of
dollars being spent on the latest state of the art computer
equipment for the efficient operation of the court without one
dime of taxpayers money. This computer-aided equipment ranges
anywhere from approximately $12,000 to $14,000 to about $50,000;
between $50,000 and $60,000. These are expenses that are be
absorbed totally by the court reporters. You'll notice a copy of
a proposal from the Los Angeles Municipal Court reporters to the
Los Angeles Municipal Court asking that court to participate in
purchase of that kind of equipment. The theory is that by
buying one master, or large system, we can generate sufficient
to drive the cost down. The purchase of that equipment
would result through a payment by the reporters for utilizing
that equipment, a profit, as in private industry profit, that
would help to offset the current and present cost of providing
court reporting services.
I think one of the issues to be concerned about is
we're looking to save money in terms of providing court
services; however, I think we have to look in terms o
rnatives to what the present method costs. And I'm
sting that where you have transcripts being generated,
cost effective method of preparing transcripts is to utilize
reporters, particularly who are utilizing computertranscription.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Have you done any cost studies?

MR. CRAMER: Well, not
however, what I'm suggesting to
tionally takes about three
transcript as he does to report
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

in a dollar and cents method;
you is that a court reporter
times as long to prepare a
it.

Okay.

MR. CRAMER: Utilizing this computer system, he would
to utilize just one hour for each hour. A transcript out of
a court, we generally figure it's about 35 pages an hour. What
I'm suggesting to you is that a pretty good typist working from a
is good for about 35 pages a day, not 35 pages an hour.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I see.
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MR.CRAMER: We have a proposal here on the bottom of
Two, where if you would, in one of our recommendations
rhaps I should touch on this, because I think there's a
ficant savings here. At present, in providing a daily
that is, where the proceedings from the morning are
for you this afternoon; the afternoon's proceedings are
lable the following morning. The way the law is presently
constructed it requires two reporters and the cost of those two
to prepare that kind of a transcript. We're suggesting
that if you amend the law so that there could be some
logy fee, perhaps about half the cost of a per diem, at
in r .. A. County, that would -- L. A. County presently pays
reporter $150 a day.
If we were able to get the law changed so
we could receive a $75 additional in remuneration, we would
in a position to prepare daily transcripts utilizing one
reporter, resulting in a savings of $75 a day. We calcuthere's approximately, and it varies from day to day, but
approximately 15 criminal dailies going on per day in the L. A.
Court. That translates into a quarter of a million
a year in savings. We think that can be done
ately, probably at the opening of the session.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

All right.

ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING:
75 and save $250,000?

Wait a minute, how do we spend an

MR. CRAMER: Because you're presently utilizing $300
of court reporting services because you're utilizing two
reporters to generate a daily transcript. This would allow
court reporter with an additional $75. So you're saving $75.
're having a little problem with the tape recorder, are we?
(Laughter)
CHAI~~N

HARRIS:

That's cute.

MR. CRAMER:
One of the other problems we see in the law
s you might be interested in addressing, is the fact
according to the Legislative Counsel, there is a prohibition
court, at least as viewed by the Legislative Counsel, in
of this proposal we have to the L. A. Municipal Court.
Counsel is telling us it is illegal for the court to
ipate in the purchase of that equipment, and perhaps that's
area you may want to address. We're obviously not asking
you mandate that by any means, but perhaps some enabling
slation in that area ••.
CHAIR¥~N

HARRIS:

Okay.

MR. CRAMER: We think that the communication between the
Council and ourselves needs to be improved significantly
we think that there is some harm to the system as a
of the Judicial Council's unwillingness or inability to
ly communicate with us and understand reporter problems.
-60-

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

Anything else you'd 1

No, I think that basica
today.

covers

to
we

Again, I
s area.
It is one
is
we want to be constructive
the realities that are being
one of your very tell
able to respond to it, but I can'
of time. Your telling argument is
it's not mandatory, people
' t use
depositions. Most of the
Yes.
ze •••

And all

requires is a

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I was interested in that because I
o
of the time, in my own law of
,
court reporters rather than electronic recording.
I
perhaps because it might be more cost effie
1

not

MR. CRAMER:
I think that what you would find in the ER
because that's always controversial, but I think -- I
that we can give you somewhat of an objective view
what you would find is we could probably give you it
demonstrating that, you know, we're terri
are lousy and I suppose the proponents of
give you it by the pound demonstrating, you know,
and we're awful.
I think what it really comes
ask the fiscal officers in the courts where
tell you it's working great.
If you ask
ze the transcripts, they'll tell you
's
And if you ask the judges, you'll probably
Those that are familiar with the
you it's not working terribly well;
court but transcripts are hardly ever
to tell you it's working pretty good.

MR. CRAMER:
terms

And I think that's really the bottom 1
of information.
very

MR. CRAMER:

Yes?

-61-

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

MR

CRl\_MER:

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR. CRAMER:

CRAMER

.•• on line and as you punch

in

transcript.
STIRLING:

ASSEMBLY~~N

MR.

..• directly to a computer •..

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
MR

Is the technology there so that
--what's that kind of machine

.•• text?

That's correct.

CR~~ER:

ASSEMBLY~4AN STIRLING:
Then it seems to me that would be
enormous savings in transcription. Nowhere, though, have you
cost of the transcripts is going to go down.

CFAMER: Well
isn't yet.
I hope I'm correct when
cost of this equipment is so expensive
, that ...
Why is it so expensive simply to
1, the vendors have got us by the
t very many of them, and for me to go out and
would provide that service will cost me
ASSEMBLY~~N

MR

CRAMER:

STIRLING:

What vendor, what brand name?

Exscribe, down in San Diego.
Exscribe.

MR. CRAMER:

Oh, down in San Diego!

Yes, down in San Diego.

s.
San

Well, we're trying to help the economy of
doing the best we can.
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There you have
right now are getting
, you cost too much.
must
to

Your

telling us
it's the state's
cost of
j
business, just as
executive branches.
of

various proposals in recent months
so been a
courts.
user costs
to increas
i
pays
State of
large states of
amount of

is telling us
they want
form
're
lling to piecemeal the
assist local courts. And the courts have
slature with legislative requests asking
ssments; special fees.
I know our courts in San
before your committee within the last year
to know where the money is going to be
the firing line and we need to make sure
we have for advancing, such as
because of the budget considerations
on a year-to-year basis.
some comparisons of costs, and indicated in a
Diego County that over a four-year period
Court contributed $1.5 million to the
of
County of San Diego; and $19 million
San Diego, just as one indication of the
of P.C. 1463.
being in the active role of
ling generally
an
of
judicial branch. But
ing confusion, too much disparate impact
courts are willing, I think, to through
ff
to begin to work with the
a sensible solution on this. We do
solution is, but we're more than
reasons that perhaps the courts have
as
could have in areas such as
technology is one of the first things to go
ority of any court's budget has to do
salaries and benefits. And when cuts
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MS.

a bureaucratic
district
is time to
made for the

is that over
only
that
as a
issue

MS. SMITH:

I

very soon

to

MS. SMITH:
rman.
CHAIRMAN
MR. CORCORAN

I

I add one thing to that?
HARRIS:
been meet
with district attorneys
on this exhibit problem, especially the
an
to the federal matter of keeping

•• destroying the rest, and I have gotten
Okay. Well, if you can give us some
s rational, then that might
lp us to get
I'd be glad to.
Well, if you'd let us know as a
these things are used, I think that
lancing point, because it's not the district
We've heard that before, you know: "All we
want the records stored, and how they're stored
're stored isn't our problem."
I think their general attitude is the law
, you know, we really don't care.

But I

11 provide you

That would be great.
much.

that
We look forward

, can you tell us why or what the
ial
s re
to a study of the automation issue
GAMPELL: Yes, sure, I'll be happy to. There's no
secret about automation that's going on.
at presiding judges' meetings, at
' meetings. We know of automation in Los
San Bernardino County; almost every big county
cannot mandate automation, Mr. Chairman,
a state mandated local cost.
It's that
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that equation,
is Superior Court

third
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Sure, be
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to .•.
that be an acceptable way to
be

All right, fine.
would, in
the
Court
strators
I
we'd be able to get a
either do it through the Assembly Office
Committee, we'll see if we can find a
we get an idea of what is necessary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
All right, our next witness will be
Peetris, the Presiding Judge of the
Mr. Frank Zolin, the Past President of
Association and the Executive Officer
the Los Ange
Superior Court.
sticking it out through
You're welcome, Mr.
s,
Judge and to my right is
Officer and Jury Commissioner. And at
assure you that although the Los Angeles
to limit
to one
which
no means indicates that we're not
sted,
with you on any and
Your name
been
wou
want to ••.
Well,
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in vain all
I want to save a

topic which
do want to address
of
courts of the
a point now
the courts' costs
available revenue is decreasing and we're
more towards users'
s. And although our
ition -- not against the users' fees if
effective and shifting the burden
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transcript,
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recording
or monitor.
device with an
have
traditional
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s

us an analysis,
Okay. Can you
devices various
as
the kind of
Vile need
ana
is of the pros
this
objective. We need
the electronic
fied shorthand
works. One side
of agreeing on what
can do anything they can do." The other
' t do
can't do it at all
to get a
aren't appropriate."
merits of each.
We've been doing that so long, I think it's
been set
Well,
us an update, and more
us an idea if you have any specific legislative
mentioned permissive legislation. I'm not sure
to be able to do initially, but we may be
in what circumstances ER is permissible.
project. We need some alternative
this, so that we can demonstrate fact from
doesn't
; and, again, cost savings
ana
is that's going to
ly help us.
I

actual

We 11 be happy to g
you
point in time what we're saying is
implementation of some of
se devices has a
error
to
So when I
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can see 5% to 10% of the courts can use ER
give you a
r
than that until
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What you're saying is
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I certainly can.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay.
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Code

We would certainly support an extension of
allow other counties to experiment with twoare many applications where we
that
s technology would either improve our
costs or, hopefully, both.
CHAIRMAN

Okay.

ASSEMBLYMAN

Yes?
Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ca
Just a brief que
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rst of all, I share some of
the most recent work done by
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same reaction to a report on housing that
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did raise an
some type of longevity or long-term
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last 20 years,
there
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from administration to administration. In
have you done anything, or
procedures that will
on even

ASSEMBLYMAN CALDERON:
will

That's already •..

I'm working with the next assistant
the presiding judge,
Mr.
that has the
of
I think -- I want to
you, as well as everyone who's been
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All right.
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answer, of course, is
was the basis for
the "squire." And
view. Okay. I don't want

by Professor Langbine in 1981, University
, called "Plea Bargaining and Torture." And
plea bargaining to the old days when you
witnesses or a judicial confession, and now
"Let's Make a
,"
is
thinks we have "Cut 'em Loose, Bruce"
We don't! He's a j
in New
We

~~~~~~~~~~~~

CHAI~~

HARRIS:

I know Bruce

MR. CLEA.RY: He's a sweetheart. But,
point is, in
i
, l!Je 've got "Godzilla, 11 "The Hammer of God, 11 11 The
Prosecutor's
" "
Policeman's Friend," and I have not seen
of
i
and the Legislature by
se
-- What you need to develop is a
of
you get some accountability of prosecutors on the
they're bringing to criminal court; because you
shouldn't
the taxpayers with these fantastic costs for
prosecuting "Mickey fvlouse" cases. And there's a lot of "Mickey
Mouse" cases
through the system. The uniform determinate
sentenc
has established the fact that we send more check
writers
thieves to the Joint than we did before. A
great
the Legislature can be proud of in handling our
criminal
system on the basis of priorities.
to also suggest an expanded escobar motion;
where you have now, with the P.C. 17 reduction
a misdemeanor, I would suggest that it also apply
which the judge could determine realistically
is not going to go to the Joint for more than a
sent law, the judge has total discretion in
which includes up to a year's time.
It's only
sentences that are regulated by the Legislature.
st that that might be another alternative.
Pre

hearing.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I ...

How many of these have you got?

Just two more.
I'll be
quickly, okay?
you to sleep but that's all right, I've got •..
No you have not put me to sleep, I
want to
.HR

I just want to make my

and I

ize ..•
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. CLEARY:

Well, you ve got a lot of good points,
is.
So I want to make sure ...

No, this is condensed.
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(Laughter)
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. CLEARY:

Mr. Chairman, I have condensed it ...

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. CLEARY:

CHAI~~N

You are!

Yes.

.•• but at the same time you're not

CHAIRMAN HARRIS
MR. CLEARY:

Thank youl

So that my record is protected .•.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. CLEARY:
burdened •..

Thank you!

And I'm speaking at a rapid rate.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. CLEARY:

Alright.

Right.

With my voluminous comments.

HARRIS:

Alright.

MR. CLEARY: Preliminary hearing is the distillation of
the case in the real sense. We have, in California, the leading
thing.
In criminal justice, California was the leader in getting
this early shakedown cruise: look at the case, a minimal. Now
you excuse certain witnesses from the preliminary hearing under
the laws of California, but you get a look at the case, what it's
really worth. Is this really a heavy-duty case, lightweight,
multi; how it looks. You look at it early on. But now we want
to get rid of it.
And see, I come from the federal system. Welcome to the
federal system.
what do we have over there? Have you ever
seen a preliminary hearing in federal court? How many have ever
seen a preliminary hearing? First of all, they're rara avis:
rare birds. They don't
t. Because if you get a grand jury
indictment, you never have one. And then if you have one, hearsay upon hearsay upon hearsay upon hearsay upon hearsay. That is
to say, an agent gets on the stand and testifies to extracted
report, and that
s
hearing. Sick. Illegally
seized evidence which cou
otherwise be attacked for (inaudible)
can't be heard. Preliminary hearings are nothing. And so what
you have to do is save up and say, if you•re going to roll the
dice, you've got to go to trial. You're taking a tremendous
burden when you could have had early resolution by looking at the
case through a
liminary hearing pushed up to the trial date.
Grand j
The federal grand jury was designed as a
shield to protect the accused. It's been turned into a sword.
And ironically, a state prosecutor has led the reform in the ABA,
-95-

because he himself was
object of a grand jury investigation.
And I only pray every night that our State Legislature would too
be the subject of a grand j
investigation, because then they
would know what it's really
they wou:!_dn't be so
quick to issue it out
izens of this state. And
therefore the ABA
s now
4
Illinois and New
York adopted at least the right
counsel be present in the
thing. And you want to bring
s anachronistic vestige of
the past, this antediluvian device of the federal system and use
it in the California procedures.
I think it is 10 steps
backwards, and
call that progress.
The last
, and you heard from the
D.A. from San
I happen to be from your
district and I'd
into the problems
there, they're selling you a bill of goods. That stuff could
make defense lawyers "puke," and we don't have the time here to
give you an itemized rejection of each and every point. But
summing
up very simply
,
's adopting the federal system.
And the ironic thing, in the federal system they look to
California fede
models. Why? Because
usually the
came from the state
system, have
,
that is now sold to the
rest of the
We
a system where we
couldn't get
of
that motion
suppression. We finally got -- when did we get them? 1886?
rst time, the McCarthy era Jenks
1936? 1 August 1983.
Act was modified to g
statement that early to examine
police officers to say
went on at
arrest.
The
Legislature's
go forward with
consider some
is, you shou
worked in
defense in

simply for this
strongly urge that as you
the prosecution that you
the
fense, and that
adoption of that which
itions for the
HARRIS:
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want to
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MR
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a revolutionary here!
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(Laughter)
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the transcript.

of nerve
I've
vlere
I
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How come you don't wear a
in federal hearings
pub
, you know.
I've
to change your name on

(Laughter)
You're in big trouble.
Alright. No, I appreciate your testimony. A lot of
what you said has a great deal of validity. We'll look at it
seriously.
I also would like for you, if you can, either through
the Association or you personally to give us some reaction to the
District Attorneys' proposal on discovery.
MR. RICK SANTWEIR: Can I say a couple of things about
that? We did not receive -- I'm from the California Public
Defenders, okay?
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. SANTWEIR:
this morning.

Yes.

The first time we saw it was basically

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay.

MR. SANTWEIR: There are just, in first blush, an
incredible number of problems with it.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. SANTWEIR:
I
areas that you might want
your particular committee
considering or concerning
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay.
might just point out three very brief
to even think about.
I'm not sure that
is the appropriate committee to be
itself with criminal discovery.
Right.

MR. SANTWEIR: But this deals basically with superior
court criminal discovery; not municipal court; not really
preliminary hearing -- prepreliminary hearing, although he says
it does.
It doesn't give you most of the things that a defense
attorney should be concerned with in a serious case; and it does
not even touch juveni
Those areas aren't even mentioned in
this so-called comprehensive statute.
I would suggest to you
that maybe the reason why the District Attorneys' Association
calls this a comprehensive statute is because that gives them,
based on the U.S. Supreme Court, the basis on which to ask for
alibi information, which otherwise they would have no right to
get. And that's basically what they're doing with this thing.
But we will give you some feedback.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. SANTWEIR:

I'd appreciate that.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We'll look forward to it.
gentlemen, thank you very much.
-97-

Okay,

Now, the next witnesses will be Donald Walter and Paul
Cyril.
MR. PAUL CYRIL: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Walter
isn't here.
I'm Paul Cyril from the Northern California
Association of Defense Counsel.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes.

MR. CYRIL: Briefly, to mention a matter that I heard
one of the representatives of your Committee talk about on a news
program: complex litigation, complex cases, and pretrial aspects
of those. We think, in agreement \vi th our colleagues on the
other side of the fence in the CTLA, that the system in general
vlOrks pretty well. We are getting to trial very rapidly in many
counties. There are obvious exceptions, and fine-tuning is
necessary all over; and perhaps more than fine-tuning in some
places.
But to address the subject of complex cases: We think
that discovery procedures should minimize disputes which bring
cases into law and motion for various types of orders. We think
that discovery should not get in the way of trial dates, so that
the trial calendars can be maintained as much as possible. We
think that discovery should be conducted in such a was as to
maximize the ability of counsel on both sides to evaluate cases
at the earliest possible time, to get settlement conferences -to have meaningful settlement conferences -- and get the cases
settled if they shouldn't be tried. We believe all those things.
We have submitted an example of one way, perhaps, of
assisting, and that is a minor revision of §2037, dealing with
experts, which gets involved with complex cases. Every complex
case has one, two, three, 10 experts, perhaps.
Some modification
of that, we think, is necessary to advance the time when these
experts are disclosed so that some of these things can happen
that I just mentioned.
That's all I have to say.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
good comments.
MR. CYRIL:

Great.

I appreciate it.

Those are

Thank you.

CHAIRM~N HARRIS:
We'll certainly take note of them.
Thank you very much for your testimony.

Okay, next will be Ms. Virginia Jung Lum.

Welcome.

How

are you?
MS. VIRGINIA JUNG LUM:

I'd like to submit this for the

record.
-98-

CHAI~~N

first?

Thank you.

HARRIS: Okay, would you like to submit that
Thank you very much.

MS. JUNG LUM: I'm here on behalf of the California
Young Lawyers' Association,
up of young lawyers in
their first
years of
lawyers 36 years of age
and younger. They're automatically members when they're admitted
to practice in California.
I'd like to emphasize some of the pretrial matters which
would address a problem that I hear about over and over from
lawyers, and that is that it costs too much to prepare a case and
it takes too long to bring a matter up for trial. Very often,
the major complaint of clients and lawyers is that they get ready
for trial -- that costs plenty -then they sit around and
wait for assignment out to court
And they're put over for a
month; six months; sometimes a year. This is very frustrating
and it's difficult in terms of developing creditability for our
system of justice, which we believe to be basically a very good
one.
So we submitted a total of
like to go over
brie

suggestions, and I'd just

First of all,
e
shment of a panel to evaluate
cases after they are filed, or soon after they are filed. The
person who spoke just
fore me emphasized the need to move cases
toward settlement. In fact, most cases when they get to trial
are settled by the judge. Why not have cases evaluated early
after filing to determine whether they can be placed on a slow or
a fast track? If we were to e
a panel made up of a
judge, or a judge and several lawyers, we might be able to have a
good basis for evaluating a case and then assigning a case out
for an early mandatory settlement conference. In many cases we
think that this would probably be quite effective. The pressure
from a judge, particu
a good j
, is very effective in
moving counsel towards sett
of the case. This panel
should, of course, have the di
to permit other cases to
proceed with substantial
scovery before mandatory settlement
conference is set up; but
all cases, a settlement conference
should be mandatory, and
should be held earlier than
immediately before
,
ch is
current practice.
A second
single assignment of
cases. Currently,
a case goes to the judge at
the very beginning and stays
judge until it's tried.
In state court, we might be able to
this where discovery,
pretrial matters, settlement conference, and the trial would all
be held before one judge. Currently,
practice •.•
CHAIFMAN HARRIS:
consolidation?

So

be an argument for court
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MS. JUNG LUM: Yes. Well, I'm not sure what you mean by
consolidation. I - - we call it •.•
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, I'm talking about cooperation
between municipal and superior court. You're going to have
things that are now heard at the municipal court level heard all
the way through. Then you obviously need -- If you're going to
have one judge do it, then he 1 s got to be able to both hear the
preliminary, do the preliminary, and also ultimately decide the
issue at trial.
~iS.

JUNG LUM:

Well, I'm speaking more in terms of civil

matters ..•
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. JUNG LUM:

Okay, I understand you •

••• where you file a case •••

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay •

••• there's discovery, there are pretrial
MS. JUNG LUM:
matters that are heard. Before the trial there's law and motion.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Okay, I understand.

MS. JUNG LUM:
••• there's a settlement conference and
then the trial. And currently 1 the practice in most courts is
that a different judge will hear law and motion; a commissioner
might hear discovery; generally settlement conferences are heard
by a judge who will not hear the trial. In federal court,
however, the same judge hears the case from beginning to end and
can schedule settlement conferences and status reports from all
counsel. It's suggested that this might be an experimental
program, or at least a subject for study, to be implemented in
state courts. There are several advantages which might be had:
One, the judge's
liarity with the case would be enhanced.
This would probably make for very effective settlement
conferences. The judge would be able to monitor the case. If
the case isn't moving he could set it up for a status report;
urge counsel to
if they're not getting anywhere in terms
of discovery; but in any event, move the case forward.
I've
listed other advantages, but I won't go over them because I know
that you want to move on.
The third proposal would be to authorize courts through
a statutory enactment to
ect to venue. Very often cases are
brought in the wrong district. And currently the Code of Civil
Procedure provides that a court may, on its own motion, stay or
dismiss a case if the case is brought in the wrong state; but the
judges do not have
authority to move a case to another
district where the venue is clearly improper. Very often counsel
simply does not realize that the case is brought with wrong
venue, or they
ze
but
's more convenient for them, and
for what ever reasons they waive
But there could be a more
-100-

equitable distribution of civil cases if the judges have the
power to move cases out.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. JUNG LUM:
CHAIRP~N

Who would review that?

Well ...

HARRIS:

The appel

court?

MS. JUNG LUM: Either the judge, or -- Well, initially,
it's suggested that an administrator might review cases to make
sure that they're
led
the proper district~ or a court might,
a judge might review
if it's challenged by counsel.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. JUNG LUM: A special panel to replace juries in
complex litigation is another suggestion. Very often cases are
so complex that
takes longer to try cases before 12 lay
persons than it would to try a case before, say, three judges, or
a couple of judges and some lay persons with expertise in that
particular area. This special sort of panel might be viewed as a
jury.
CHA.IRMAN HARRIS: Have you looked into any of the
constitutional problems with that?
MS. JUNG LUM:
problem in
might be viewed
certainly ...

Well, there is arguably a constitutional
to a jury; but a special panel
a jury. In any event, it would

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: It's a unique idea.
any precedent for it, that's why I was asking.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. JUNG LUM:
CHAIRY~N

But

HARRIS:

I don't know of

Okay.
se are suggestions.
Sure,

I want creative

approaches.
MS. JUNG LUM: So that ei
they could be approached
on an experimental
, or they could be a subject for study
by the appropriate body.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. JUNG LUM: Finally, Assembly Bill 781, which was
considered by your Committee and through the foresight of your
Committee was
, but unfortunately was rejected by a Senate
Committee last
ld
reconsidered. This would require
-101-

that there be mandatory tentative rulings in law and motion. And
that would basically result in several advantages. One, it would
encourage, or actually require, the judges to be prepared, to
have read the papers, and to issue a tentative ruling. Second,
upon issuance of the tentative ruling, counsel could avoid
appearance if they have nothing new to say. Very often counsel
have said everything they have to say in their papers; they're
prepared to go with a tentative ruling.
It saves them an
appearance and it saves the clients a lot of money. Finally, it
just frees up the court's time. A lot of time is saved through
the tentative rulings. Some courts have it but not all courts
do.
If they were required to do it, I think you'd find an
overall savings in time of the court as well as money for the
client.
Finally, I think consideration should be made toward
raising the jurisdiction for small claims court. I've just
picked an arbitrary amount here, but $15,000 is often what it
costs in terms of preparing a case for trial and seeing it
through. Cases, right now, up to $1,500 may be filed in small
claims court. That amount should be raised so that people can
have their day in court.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

To what level?

MS. JUNG LUM: Well, I honestly can't say.
that's something that should be studied.

I think that

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You just think we ought to review the
current level toward the eye of making it more realistic with the
current cost of litigation?
MS. JUNG LUM: Yes, I think $5,000 or $10,000 is
certainly reasonable. The fact that many lawyers are now
volunteering as pro tern judges in these sort of cases also adds
to the effectiveness of permitting litigants to have their day
heard in court through what is basically alternative dispute
measures, and yet the enforcing authority of the court still
exists.
So, small claims jurisdiction should be raised so that
more people are allowed to get in and be able to afford having
their grievances heard without going through the very costly
measures of going through litigation with counsel.
CHAIRl>lAN HARRIS: Well, thank you Ms. Jung Lum. First
of all I want to commend you for your testimony.
I'm very
pleased that the Young Lawyers' Association of the California Bar
is taking an interest in these issues.
It's nice to see that
lawyers, before they get a vested interest in the system, are
willing to make some very creative approaches to problem-solving.
All of these are unique ideas. We hope that as we approach the
problem of judicial efficiency that you'll not only continue to
give us input on these ideas, but will expand your views into
some of the other areas you have heard discussed today and that
will be part of the transcript that we'll issue from this
-102-

hearing. We want to get a handle on the problem. Young lawyers,
until they get a vested economic interest, are able to be much
more pragmatic, much more objective in their analysis.
I think
the ideas you have put forth certainly are worthy of great note
and we will be studying them careful
MS. JUNG LUM:
please let us know.

Great.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
'l'hank you.

I

If there's anything we can do,

We will.

We'll be talking to you.

We have one more witness. Miss Halperin, would you like
to come forward, please. Thank you.
I'd appreciate it if you
could have a seat, introduce yourself, any affiliation you care
to make, and then, in brief, give us some understanding of why
you're before us.
MS. HALPERIN: First of all, I'm very grateful that
you've let me speak in front of you.
I just learned yesterday
about this hearing.
I would like to tell you that I hope I am an
exception.
I am someone who's superior court civil suit is seven
years old.
It is still alive.
It was filed October 26, 1976.
CHAIRJV'.tAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

MS. BETTY HALPERIN:
I have been in pro per for 14-1/2
months against one of the biggest, most powerful law firms in the
entire country.
I have had one semester of law school at night,
10 years ago, but I have consulted professors of the law schools
and I have consulted the law books.
I want to tell you that I
have taken notes from your witnesses about the backlog of the
courts; on accountability.
I'm here to tell you that I am not an
exception for a long case in the Los Angeles Superior Court.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
since the date of filing?
MS. HALPERIN:

Your case has not been adjudicated

That's right.

Let me tell you something

else •••
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

What is the status of the case now?

vJhere is
MS. HALPERIN:
case is now being -- there's a
pending hearing on court reporters' and clerks' transcripts which
need correction for the court of appeals.
CHAI~~N

case yet?
has been

HARRIS:

But there's been no decision in your

Or •••
HALPERIN: No.
I would like to tell you that there
my case and I •••
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
(inaudible) •
MS. HALPERIN:
mean it that way.

Well, I can't get into that

No, I don't mean it that way.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I don't

I understand.

MS. HALPERIN: Superior. Court Presiding Judge Peetris
sent documents down to the district attorney's office January 10,
1983; but the district attorney's office sat on my case, and then
closed it.
CHAIRY~N

HARRIS:

Oh, so your case has been closed?

MS. HALPERIN: But they never investigated it.
I want
to ask if this committee has any authority to pass legislation so
that an ordinary person like me can have criminal charges
investigated.
I want to also say that if my case had no merit,
it would have been thrown out by now.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, we're going to --We will try to
inquire as to what happened in your case.
MS. HALPERIN:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: And see what we can find out.
sounds very unique, but we'll try to at least get some
explanation.

It

MS. HALPERIN: I would like to say one more thing, for
which I have proof, that on June 3, 1983, I sat outside of Judge
Peetris' office with documentation asking him if he would please
ask the district attorney to make an investigation on this
altered document, which a forensics expert verified. And Judge
Peetris had his secretary come out with a hand written message,
which I have in front of me, that there was nothing he could do;
but why didn't I try the D.A. or the city attorney. So I checked
out what with the City Attorney, Ira Reiner. He's not supposed
to be the one to take care of it. Someone along the way is
stopping my case.
My last statement is that I have a feeling that as one
of your past witnesses said, there is a need for neutrality,
because the defendant in my case are a giant entertainment
corporation.
I sincerely thank you for letting me speak with you; but
I think that somebody was pulling your leg about how the superior
court works. And I would like to know, for instance, does the
superior court judge have the discretionary authority, or the
mandatory authority to take judicial notice of a fraudulent document? Because •••
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, he has the determination of
whether or not he thinks it's fraudulent, obviously. But I don't
want to get into that.
MS. HALPERIN:
CHAI~~N

Okay.

HARRIS:

MS. HALPERIN:

We've got your testimony.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

We'll see what we can find out about

it.
MS. HALPERIN:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. HALPERIN:

We appreciate you're being before us.

Very much.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: And again, I'm sorry that it's taken
so long to resolve your dispute.
I'd like to find out why.
MS. HALPERIN:

Thank you very much.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You're welcome. Okay, does anybody
else have anything they'd like to add? Yes ma'am.
MS. PATRICIA GAZIN:
Association.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. GAZIN:

Right.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I'm from the Grand Jurors'

Yes, I thought so.
Thank you.
I knew I hadn't gone crazy.

Go ahead.

MS. GAZIN:
I'm Patricia Gazin.
I'm President of the
Grand Jurors' Association of Los Angeles County; and I'm also
representing today Val Cavey, who's President of the California
Organization for Grand Jurors.
We simply want to remind this committee that both these
groups have an abiding concern in increasing the efficiency and
speed of court processes.
And also we have an abiding interest in watching the
Legislature sometime, someday, merge the marshal and sheriff's
office.
CHAI~~N

HARRIS:

MS. GAZIN:

Okay.

And we will be vigilant.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Good.
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MS. GAZIN:

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Would you afso, if you
further thoughts, please let us know.
I know you
through most of the hearing. If there's anything
of your Association that that would aid us in our
certainly appreciate any specific recommendations
care to offer.

have any
patiently sat
that comes out
work, we'd
that you might

MS. GAZIN:
Indeed. We will send you copies of the
recommendations of the grand jurors.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MS. GAZIN:

Fine.

Thank you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: On behalf of Assemblywoman Mojonnier
and myself I want to thank all of you for coming. And, again, we
look forward to any additional testimony any of you care to
offer. We're going to be looking at court efficiency very
seriously and hope to make some legislative initiatives in
January. We will continue unabated until we get some changes
that we think are appropriate. Thank you.

* * * * * *
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Los Angeles,

Chairman Harris and committee members, I want to express CalTax's appreciation at
ing invited to participate in this
hearing today. Our appr
to
f iency in the judicial system
is the same that we t
to bring to other areas of government
activity. That is to press
maximum productivity with the
tax dollars available, while
ing the best level of service
that the public, through the political process, has expressed a
desire to have. Regarding the judicial system this approach
recognizes that basic constitutional rights of individuals and
constitutional restrict
on government are prominent.
I want to confine my
to one area of
efficiency which continues to attract attention. This is the
ever-growing evidence that both increa
savings and improved
service can be achieved by
iminating the statutory
restrictions that in many situations prohibit electronic
recording equipment from be
used to make an official record of
judicial proceedi s.
Cal-Tax cannot bring
ta to the continuing debate on
this issue. But we can
taking note of the body of
research and comments arguing that the courts ought to be allowed
to use electron
methods to
ove reporting and to hold down
costs.
In this regard I want to
1 attention to recent
developments at the federal level:
*In June 1982, the u.s. General Accounting Office reported to
the Congress that "electronic recording systems are a proven
alternative to the traditional
ice of using court reporters."
In the digest of its 68-page report (137 pages, if various letters
of comment attached as appendices are included) the GAO states
that numerous state and foreign court systems are using
electronic recording
terns, achieving substantial savings, and
also providing excellent se
to the courts and litigants. In
addition, electronic recordi
ovide a better record of
-107~

Testimony on
Judicial Efficiency and Improvement
November 8, 1983
Page Two
court proceedings and enable greater management flexibility and
control over recording activities." The report took note of the
assertions of opponents of electronic reporting and stated that
"GAO's evaluation of these arguments showed they have little
merit because electronic recording machines have features
designed to eliminate most of these problems, and by using proper
procedures, the remaining problems can be readily overcome."
*In July 1983 the Federal Judicial Center distributed an
executive summary of the front pages of the report (A Competitive
Evaluation of Stenographic and Audiotape Methods for United
States District Court Reporting) it produced for the Judicial
Conference of the United States as part of meeting the
requirements of the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982. The
report's conclusion is summarized there in one sentence: "Given
appropriate management and supervision, electronic sound
recording can provide an accurate record of United States
district court proceedings at reduced costs, without delay or
interruption, and provide the basis for accurate and timely
transcript delivery."
As in every other study of electronic reporting, these
studies are bound to offer targets for challenges and rebuttal by
the other side. But the real issue is not whether a particular
test showed X dollars of savings. The real issue is whether the
Legislature is going to persist in outlawing recognition of
technological advance.
Incandescent lights did not have to be statutorily freed in
order to compete with kerosene lanterns in the courtroom.
Ballpoint pens did not have to overcome protection granted to
fountain pens used in judicial record keeping.
Anti-competition legislation regarding the written word seems
to have a long tradition. In the 14th Century, organizations of
calligraphers dealt with the advent of woodblock printing by
securing laws to prevent the "duplication of images." (Warren
Chappell: "A Short History of the Printed Word") Obviously,
technology eventually won out.
What we are urging are not prohibitions or mandates in
any direction, but simply a change in laws that will let all
forms of reporting compete on the basis of effectiveness and
cost. This change should not focus on people losing their jobs,
but on people converting to improved equipment. This is a
process going on continually in many occupations and even
occurred once not too long ago in court reporting when stenotype
machines replaced pen and ink.
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In closing, I want to emphasize that we recognize the
question of efficiency and performance in court reporting
involves more than equipment. At the same time that it moves
toward opening the door to competition in reporting methods, the
Legislature may want to address related questions such as
reducing the need for full transcripts. There may be more
situations in which entire proceedings may be stored
electronically to be transcribed only if needed. The technology
may permit identifying and transcribing only selected portions
of a proceeding.
One thing is certain, there is neither the abundance of
government revenue nor the lack of evidence to permit postponing
any longer the legislative changes to permit courts to improve
their efficiency in the area of reporting.
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Introduction

I'm pleased to be with you this morning to describe to you research
we have recently completed at the Institute for Civil Justice on the
subject of civil court delay in Los Angeles.

My comments this morning

will focus on our conclusions concerning the nature and magnitude of the
civil delay problem in Los Angeles, the causes of delay, the Superior
Court's response to this problem, and the impact of these efforts on
fluctuations in delay.

Finally, I will share with you our sense of the

policy implications of this research.
In brief, our study of the court since its founding in 1880
demonstrates that civil delay has been a long-term, persistent problem
in Los Angeles for more than 60 years.

Our analysis indicates that in

recent decades delay may have been been caused, in part, by important
shifts in the composition of the civil caseload as well as by a trend
toward increased litigation activity in individual cases.

These changes

have meant that cases consume more judicial resources now than they did
in the past.

The Superior Court has persistently endeavored to clear

its delayed caseload since the early twentieth century.

But while some

of these efforts to reduce delay may have had transient effects, neither
the addition of judges nor the introduction of new rules or procedures
have produced long-term reductions in time-to-trial.

The court's

efforts to reduce delay have been hampered by organizational and
financial constraints, the court's analytic capabilities, and by the
court's largely crisis-oriented approach to the problem.
Before I begin, I would like to mention that the Haynes Foundation
and the California Community Foundation partially supported our research
on civil delay in Los Angeles.

In addition, we received excellent

cooperation on this project from Frank Zolin, Executive Officer of the
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- 2 Los Angeles Superior Court and from the Los Angeles County Bar
Association.
Study Objectives and Methodology

As many of you may know, the Los Angeles Superior Court has a
reputation as one of the most delayed metropolitan trial courts in the
nation.

As recently as last fall and winter, the court was setting new

cases for trial at a reduced rate in order to hear a large backlog of
older cases.

1

There is at times in the Los Angeles legal community a

perception of a crisis in the court, a sense of frustration over how
best to solve it, as well as a belief that civil delay and congestion is
a relatively recent phenomenon.
In undertaking this study, we sought to provide an empirical
foundation for the debate over what to do about civil delay and
congestion in Los Angeles.

Specifically, our research addressed the

following five policy questions:

•

What has been the nature and magnitude of the civil delay
problem in Los Angeles?

•
•

What are the causes of delay?
How has the Los Angeles Superior Court responded to increases
in civil delay and congestion?

•
•

What impact have these efforts to reduce delay had?
What are the appropriate next steps for the court?

To examine these questions, we adopted a case-study methodology,
analyzing the court over a century, from its founding in 1880 through
1981.

We examined records from the court and the California Judicial

Council, reviewed legal newspapers, and analyzed a sample of 1400 civil
cases.

These sources enabled us to compile a narrative history of the

court's response to delay and to evaluate the impact of those efforts.
We also compiled a number of economic and demographic growth indicators
for Los Angeles County to help us identify the changes in the area's
social and economic climate which may have contributed to changes in
civil filings and delay.
1

CCP Sectiofi 583 mandates trial or dismissal of civil matters
still pending five years after the lawsuit was filed.
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The Historical Pattern of Delay in los Angeles
Let me turn now to our substantive findings.

We compiled a record

of delay in the LA Superior Court for civil cases from about 1920, when
the figures are first available, through 1981.
primarily as the median time-to-trial.

We have measured delay

2

Our time-to-trial data indicate that civil delay is neither a
recent phenomenon nor a temporary one.
term, persistent problem in Los Angeles.
century, delay fluctuated quite a bit.

Rather, it has been a longDuring the early twentieth
But since World War II, time-

to-trial has increased dramatically from 6 months in 1940 to 41 months
in 1981. 3 The increase has been particularly spectacular between 1970,
when time-to-trial was 24 months, and 1981.

With the exception of two

decreases during the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, which we believe were
the short-term effects of procedural changes, the history of delay in
Los Angeles has been one of generally steady and overall increase.

The Causes of Delay
We explored the val

of a number of popular explanations for

the fluctuations and increases in delay that we observed.

One of most

commonly-heard explanations for these increases is that we are, as a
population, more litigious now than we were in the past.

Our data

indicate, not surprisingly, that the number of civil filings 4 has grown
dramatically since the late nineteenth century.

A scant 446 civil cases

were filed during 1880, the court's first year of operation.

By the

1920s and 1930s, between 10,000 and 20,000 new civil cases were filed
each year.

During the early 1970s, more than 40,000 such cases were

2

Time-to-trial is the most common measure of delay used in the
California courts. It is calculated from the date the parties request
trial to the date the trial is scheduled. Note that the parties
frequently file their request for trial some months or even years after
initiating the lawsuit.
3
The draft of the report from which the statistics I am presenting
today are drawn is currently under revision. It is possible that this
revision will result in the modification of some of these figures.
4
We have excluded from the category of "civil filings" family law
and probate litigation.

3-

- 4 filed annually.

By 1980, that figure had jumped to more than 70,000.

This growth in the number of civil filings certainly explains some of
the recent increase in delay, but there was rising delay at times when
there was a drop in filings, such as during the late 1930s.

In

addition, the rate of increase in delay has sometimes greatly exceeded
the rate of increase in filings.
To measure litigiousness, however, we also compared changes in
civil filings with changes in the population of Los Angeles County.

We

found that while the absolute number of civil filings increased
enormously over the years, the rate of filings (the number of filings
per capita) has remained relatively steady.

Generally, over the past

several decades no more than one-half of one percent, or 1 in 200
people, has filed civil suits.

Between 1970 and 1980 filings per

population steadily increased, but in 1980 the rate of filings per
population was still lower than in 1930.

The 1940s, 1950s and 1960s all

experienced persistent and significant increases in delay while the rate
of filings per population remained relatively steady.

It seems that

rising litigiousness does not always explain rising delay, particularly
since the 1940s.
Another commonly-heard explanation for rising delay holds that the
number of new judgeships -- permanent judicial positions -- haven't kept
pace with increases in filings.

The number of permanent judges on the

Los Angeles Superior Court has grown substantially over the years from
just 2 when the court was founded to 206 at present.

The frequent

addition of new permanent judges to the Superior Court bench has enabled
the court to keep pace with the growth in filings in the county.

As a

result, the number of filings per judge -- the caseload per judge
has, in fact, declined in recent decades.

In 1965, there were

approximately 1500 filings per judge; by the 1979 that figure had
dropped to about 1300. 5 The number of filings per judge is lower now
than at any time since 1935 and is currently much lower than during the
1920s or even the late 1940s.

When compared with changes in the time-

to-trial in Los Angeles, we conclude that changes in the rate of filings
5

We used total Superior Court filings, including all civil as well
as criminal litigation, for this calculation. By doing so, we can
incorporate changes in the volume of other types of litigation that
contributed to the overall caseload per judge.
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per judge do not explain increases in delay, particularly in recent
years.
A third prevailing explanation for increases in delay holds that
cases now consume more judicial resources now than in the past; that it
takes longer to dispose of individual cases now than in the past.

of

the litigation process may also result in more judge-time per lawsuit.
We have, in fact, observed shifts in the composition of the civil
caseload in Los Angeles as well as an increase in the amount of

•

litigation activity per case.

We have found that more complex, personal

injury litigation now dominates the civil caseload.

In its earlier

years, the Los Angeles Superior Court, like many metropolitan trial
courts, functioned largely as a debt collection agency.
it is preoccupied with personal injury suits.

Now, however,

Moreover, we found that

civil lawsuits since World War II increasingly include multiple parties,
especially more than one defendant.

In addition, we found that

individual cases are characterized by a greater use of discovery as well
as more papers filed, appearances made and motions requested.

This

increased activity has meant that even cases that settle rather than go
to trial, take longer to reach that settlement now than did cases that
settled in the early twentieth

Finally, we found that on

average, those cases in which a trial is held, have a longer trial now
than in the early twentieth century.

Given these findings, then, it is

not surprising that we have also observed a slight decline in the number
of dispositions per judge in recent decades.'

The Response to Delay
The Los Angeles Superior Court has by no means ignored the problem
of civil delay.

Rather, it has been concerned and active since the

early twentieth century.
major groups.
personnel:

The court's efforts can be divided into two

First, the court has consistently increased its judicial

The court acquired the services of a number of temporary

judges over the years from both outside the county and from the lower
courts in Los Angeles and, as we noted above, the court also frequently
added new permanent judges to its staff.
6

Second, the court also imposed

As with filings per judge we have included both civil and
criminal dispositions in this calculation.
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- 6 local rules and procedures aimed at reducing delay.

Some of these were

directed at the entire civil caseload; they were designed to speed the
processing of all civil cases, to reduce the length of the trial for all
cases that went to trial, or to settle cases before trial.

These

procedures include alterations in the court's calendaring system,
continuance restrictions, and the imposition of mandatory pretrial and
settlement conferences.

The Superior Court also devised a number of

innovations directed at specific types of cases on the civil docket.
The court instituted a variety of personal injury panels, induced or
mandated arbitration for certain types of disputes, and pushed for
increases in the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court.

These efforts

were designed to either divert or remove the lower value cases from the
docket or to induce litigants to waive a jury trial or, preferably, to
waive trial entirely.
We have evaluated all the major solutions the court implemented
since the 1920s.

While, as we noted above, the addition of permanent

and temporary judges enabled the court to keep pace with growth in the
volume of civil filings, these additions, by themselves, did not
significantly or permanently reduce the time-to-trial in Los Angeles.
The effect of the addition of judicial manpower on delay has been
overshadowed by the increase in litigation activity we have noted.
Clearly, without these frequent increases it is likely that the Superior
Court would be even more delayed than it is or has been.

But it also

seems clear that as long as both the volume of cases and the amount of
litigation activity per case is increasing the addition of judges at the
same rate as in the past will not by itself produce a permanent
reduction in the time-to-trial.
Procedural solutions have also not succeeded in producing longterm or significant cuts in civil delay.

As with the addition of

judicial manpower, the imposition of these procedures could well have
prevented or tempered subsequent increases in delay.

In some instances,

moreover, we have found short-term reductions in civil delay following
the implementation of a particular rule change or procedure.
of these changes resulted in long-term reductions in delay.

But none
Overall,

the wait to trial continued upward in the Superior Court, particularly
since the 1930s.

The only exception to this trend occurred during the
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- 7 early years of the current mandatory settlement program, between 1973
and 1977; time-to-trial was declined by 33 percent and remained less
than it had been in 1971 when the current program began.

By 1978,

however, time-to-trial again began to rise.
Why Has Delay Persisted?

Our

his~orical

review also suggests possible conclusions as to why

the court was unable to devise or implement procedures or solutions that
effected long-term reductions in delay.
First, the Superior Court, like most metropolitan trial courts,
generally failed to recognize the persistent nature of its delay
problem.

Without a historical view, the court's pattern of response to

delay has been somewhat cyclical or episodic.

The court's efforts and

those of the local legal community to rectify the problem intensified
during periods when delay rose steeply.
Second, financial constraints also hampered the court's ability to
initiate and sustain procedural reforms or to acquire additional
personnel.
Third, the court's consistently large size relative to other
metropolitan trial courts, its geographical dispersion, and its
management organization have also limited the court's ability to
effectively combat delay.
Fourth, we believe that this court, like all metropolitan trial
courts, has had difficulty effectively analyzing the nature of its civil
delay problem or the impact of the solutions it implemented.

As a

result, the court has often not focused its delay-reduction efforts on
what we think is a particular problem -- that is, that portion of its
civil caseload that has consumed the most judicial resources.

The Los

Angeles court, like most all courts, has little institutional memory
perhaps due to its size and the regular rotation of its leadership.

As

a result, the court has introduced some procedures more than once
seemingly without understanding why that innovation wasn't particularly
successful.

Furthermore, the court directed many of delay-reduction

efforts at all civil cases rather than focusing on the portion of the
caseload that has consumed the most judicial resources.

This strategy

has compounded the difficulty of analyzing the impact of a particular
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- 8 procedure since most civil cases, currently as well as in the past,
settle rather than proceed to trial.

Finally, much of the court's

statistical data, in the past as well as at present, has not been
collected primarily for the purpose of analyzing civil delay or the
efforts to mitigate it.

Consequently, the measures the court has

frequently used have not allowed it to accurately evaluate a procedure's
effectiveness.
In sum, then, the historical record reveals that civil delay in the
Los Angeles Superior Court has been a long-term, persistent problem.
Since the 1920s the court has diligently endeavored to reduce delay by
imposing a variety of special procedures and by continuously adding
temporary and permanent judicial manpower.
have had transient effects.

Some of these efforts may

Moreover, the court's efforts may well have

prevented delay from rising even higher than it was at any given time.
Yet, our analysis indicates that the court's efforts to reduce or
mitigate delay have not succeeded in effecting substantial or longterm reductions in time-to-trial.

The Superior Court's attempts to

reduce delay have been hampered by organizational and financial
constraints, the court's analytic capabilities, and by the court's
largely ahistorical or crisis-oriented approach to the problem.
Policy Implications

Let me conclude my comments by suggesting what I think are some of
the more important policy implications of our research.
In the first place, although we intensively studied the Los Angeles
Superior Court, we believe that some of our findings apply to other
metropolitan trial courts as well.

Specifically, we suggest that our

analysis of the causes of delay -- the changes in the composition of the
civil caseload and the pattern of litigation activity we observed
not be unique to Los Angeles.

w~ile

may

the large size of the Los Angeles

Superior Court may have made the management and implementation of delayreduction procedures more difficult than in other courts, this court's
management tradition' is similar to that of other metropolitan trial
7

This tradition has included the frequent rotation of judges
through different departments and different branches of the court, and
the election, every two years, of a new presiding judge.
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courts.

This management tradition, which often results in a lack of

institutional memory about the nature or success of previous efforts to
address the problem, has hampered the court's efforts.
Our analysis, then, has lead us to a number of conclusions
regarding possible next steps for this court, and perhaps other
metropolitan trial courts, in their continuing efforts to mitigate
delay.

Basically, the Los Angeles Superior Court needs to devote

sustained attention to the problem in order to reverse the persistent,
historical pattern of delay in Los Angeles.

At the same time, the court

needs to focus its delay-reduction efforts on those cases that consume a
disproportionate share of the court's limited judicial resources.

How

might the court proceed in this direction?
First, we believe that the court's size must continue to increase
with the caseload.

Our analysis indicates that the court has

successfully kept pace with increases in the volume of civil filings
during the past several decades by frequently adding judges to the
court.

We believe these additions may well have prevented further

increases in delay locally.

If the court fails to keep pace with future

increases, delay might be much worse than it is at present.
But the court's supply of resources -- particularly judges
and will continue to be limited.

is

Consequently, the court needs to apply

the resources it does have in ways which will produce long-term
reductions in delay.

To do so, the court must become better informed

about the nature of its civil caseload and the demands that caseload
places on its current resources.

Careful analysis of the caseload may,

for example, reveal where in the litigation process delay most
frequently occurs.

Such an analysis may also help the court identify

characteristics that would predict whether a case will be particularly
lengthy or time-consuming to settle or try.

This information is

essential in order for the court to determine how its resources are
currently being spent, to assess the current balance between case
"needs" and court "services," and to develop more efficient strategies
for allocating its scarcest resource -- judge-time -- to civil case
processing.
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- 10 We think that the court might also explore automated management
systems to help it better analyze as well as manage its civil caseload.
The court currently makes little use of modern automated record
management systems in monitoring the enormous volume of documents and
case files in the system.

In recent decades, a number of metropolitan

trial courts across the nation have installed automated information
systems to assist with the management of their caseloads.

In some

courts, these automated systems enable judges and court administrators
to more effectively control their calendar and to regulate attorney and
judicial practices that are believed to contribute to delay.
With a more detailed analysis of its caseload and, perhaps, with
the addition of an automated information system, the court could adopt a
number of individual strategies to reduce delay.

The court might, for

example, decide to introduce a tracking system for different kinds of
civil litigation.

The court might also decide to focus its

delay-reduction efforts on the discovery process which many judges and
attorneys see as a major source of delay.
Finally, we found that the Superior Court has recurrently had
difficulty measuring the true impact of its procedural innovations on
civil delay.

For the most part, the court has relied on changes in the

its aggregate measures to indicate the success or failure of a change in
rule or procedure.

We suggest that an evaluation be made part of future

delay-reduction innovations.

Moreover, the court might choose to

implement future procedural changes in an experimental fashion

thus

providing comparative data for a more accurate analysis of the impact of
that procedure on civil delay.
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November 3, 1983

•
TO.:

Members of the Assembly Judiciary Committee

FROM:

Committee Staff

RE:

Interim Hearing on Judicial Efficiency and
Improvement, November 8, 1983

On November 8, 1983 the Assembly Judiciary Committee will hold an
interim hearing in Los Angeles on judicial efficiency and
improvement. The hearing is scheduled to begin at 9:30 a.m. in
the Seminar Room of the Museum of Science and Industry, 700 State
Drive, Exposition Park.
Recently, much public attention has focused on the problem of
congestion and delay in the California court system. Both
critics and defenders of the courts note that increased costs and
delays restrict the ability of aggrieved parties to gain access
to the state's judicial system.
(Committee staff has enclosed
·several recent news articles regarding court congestion.
The
articles exemplify the continued concern over the problem of
court delay.)
Despite the great amount of attention this problem
has received and various .attempts to deal with it, many of our
courts continue to have more work than they are able to handle
in a timely fashion. This hearing is being held to provide
interested individuals and organizations with an opportunity to
present their views on how the Legislature can assist in
resolving the problem of delay and congestion in our courts.
It
is anticipated that an overview of the problem and proposals as
perceived by these interested parties will enable Committee
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-2members to better analyze and review specific
legislative proposals aimed at improving judicial efficiency.
The Committee has invited approximately 40 organizations
and individuals who have expressed an interest in the California
court system to identify and discuss the causes of court
congestion and delay and to suggest proposals for reform.
Committee staff has received responses from 16 parties who plan
to present testimony at the hearing. The Committee will receive
testimony from representatives from the Judicial Council, the Los
Angeles Superior Court, the State Bar, several lawyers groups,
and other experts in the operation of the state's court system.
Witnesses have contacted the Committee with an interest in
presenting testimony on judicial arbitration, court funding, the
use of subordinate judicial officers, courtroom technology and
pre-trial procedure.
·
In addition, a report on a soon to be released study by the
Institute for Civil Justice (the Rand Corporation) on court
congestion in Los Angeles will be presented. The study, which
reviews the nature of court delays in Los Angeles over the last
hundred years, was intended to offer insight as to what types of
measures may be helpful in addressing the current problem of
backlog facing some California courts.
Although witnesses were asked to submit a brief outline of their
testimony for distribution to Committee members, staff has
received relatively few actual written responses. Therefore,
witnesses have been asked to testify as specifically as possible
and to:
clearly outline the need for their proposals in
furthering the Legislature's efforts to promote judicial
efficiency;
identify any anticipated cost in implementing proposals
they suggest;
identify the mechanism for implementing proposals (e.g.,
experimental project, statutory authorization or
statutory mandat.e);
identify the anticipated effect of proposals in
increasing judicial efficiency.
Committee staff has been advised that witnesses will be providing
testimony in the following areas:
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-3JUDICIAL ARBITRATION
In 1978, mandatory judicia
was enacted as an
alternative to traditional dispute resolution in an effort to to
ease the burden on the courts. Di
s
lving $15,000 or
less were to be submitted to arb ration.
In the counties of Los
Angeles, San Bernardino, Santa Barbara and Ventura the amountin-controversy limit was raised to $25,000. In 1983 the
Legislature enacted AB 186 (Harris, Chapter 978, Statutes of
1983), which authorizes all counties, other than those with the
higher limit, to increase the arbitration limit to $25,000.
Although 1
s diss
sfied
arbitrator's decision
may request a trial de novo, i.e., one at which the outcome of
the previous arbitration has no bearing, several proponents of
judicial arbitration contend that extending the use of
arbitration wou
be invaluable
reducing court congestion.
(A copy of the report "Judicial Arbitration in California - the
First Year", prepared by the
Institution for Civil Justice
is enclosed.)
The Judicial Council will
formation on a report it is
preparing which evaluates
success of mandatory judicial
arbitration.
It is also expected that testimony will be offered
which encourages enactment of
slat
to extend the use of
mandatory judicial arbitration.
COURT FUNDING
st in discussing court
trial court system are
arrangement, a mixture of
iency, insufficiency and
ing of the courts argue that
giving the courts the
by allowing long range

Several witnesses have
funding. Many parties
concerned that the
sent
state and county
, breeds
inequity. Proponents of state
it would
judie
eff
necessary resources to reduce
fiscal planning.

Under existing law, the state
major portion of the
salary of each Superior
It also pays the employee's
contribution to
judge'
fund for both superior and
municipal court judges, ·
the employee's contribution to the
Superior court judge's health
The counties pay for a
portion of the salaries of
munic
1 and justice court judges
and the total salary
benefits
entire court support
staff. The counties pay the bulk of the courts' operating
expenses from
fines,
fe
s and fees they collect. The
state also pays for a portion of the courts' operating expenses.
The chart below outlines
percentage of the court budget
contributed by
state
count s
1982-83.

-1 3-

-41982-83
COURT FINANCING SUMMARY
Total Court Costs by Funding Source (State and Local)
State Judicial Operations~/
b
State Assistance to Trial Courts- 1
Total State Costs
County Costs (Trial Courts)
Total Court Costs (est.)

$ 39.4 mill.
60.4
$ 99.8 mill.
465.9
$565.7 mill.

6.8%
10.7
17.5%
82.5
100.0%

Since the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, the funding of the
trial courts has received a great deal of attention. Governor
Brown established the Commission on Government Reform, known as
the Post Commission, which issued a report on the fiscal
alternatives and implications on the state's assumption of
financing all or selected elements of the existing trial court
system.
In 1981, the Judicial Council recommended state funding
of the trial courts and this Committee held an interim hearing on
AB 1820 (Berman), a bill which would have enacted the Judicial
Council's recommendation, in the same year. AB 3231 (Farr) of
1981-82, authorized an Assembly Office of Research study of all
local government programs and finance, which resulted in AB 2100
(Farr). The AOR recommendations, including state funding of the
trial courts, are contained in AB 2100, which is pending in Ways
and Means Subcommittee #1. This bill will be available at the
hearing.
SUBORDINATE JUDICIAL OFFICERS
It has been suggested that one way to significantly reduce the
burden on the courts is to broaden the powers of court
commissioners and referees.
Currently, the superior courts
employ about a hundred commissioners and juvenile court referees.
Although the majority of these judicial officers hear cases
related to juvenile and family law, in some courts they sit as
temporary judges in both civil and criminal cases.
In Los
Angeles, where nearly 60 of these officers hear cases, they are
involved in all areas of the trial courts' docket.
A representative from the Court Commissioners Association will
propose enabling legislation which would broaden the authority of
commissioners. Committee members will receive a copy of this
proposal under separate cover before the hearing. The Committee
will also hear the results of a Judicial Council study on the
current use of subordinate judicial officers. The report
examines the wisdom of using subordinate judicial officers as
temporary judges.
(Enclosed is the section of the Judicial
Council re?ort which discusses the legal authority of
commissioners and referees.)
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-5COURTROOM TECHNOLOGY
The Committee will hear several proposals relating to court
reporters and courtroom recording technology. Currently, the
majority of the court transcripts in California are generated by
traditional stenographic reporters who type shorthand notes onto
folios.
They then read these notes aloud into tapes which are
played back and transcribed by other personnel. A small fraction
of court reporters use Computer-Aided Transcription (CAT)
technology. These reporters type their stenographic notes onto
magnetic tapes which are fed directly into computers. The
computer automatically generates a rough draft which the court
reporter can edit on the computer screen producing a transcript
quickly and without additional personnel. The third method of
court recording, electronic audio equipment, produces audio tapes
of proceedings.
The tapes must be transcribed in order to
produce a written transcript. This equipment must be supervised
by trained personnel during proceedings.
Existing law provides that all civil proceedings in municipal and
justice court must be taken stenographically by a court reporter
at the request of either party or the court. Criminal
proceedings in those courts must be taken stenographically by a
reporter on the order of the court.
If an official or temporary
court reporter is not available to report a civil action in
misdemeanor criminal proceedings in municipal or justice court,
the court may order that the proceeding be electronically
recorded.
sting law also provides that all civil proceedings in superior
court must be taken stenographically by a court reporter at the
request of either party or the court. Criminal proceedings in
superior court must be taken stenographically on order of the
court, the district attorney or the attorney for the defendant.
The Committee will hear testimony on the virtues of both CAT and
electronic recording technology. Very few court reporters
presently use CAT technology because the reporters, who buy and
maintain their own stenographic equipment, are unable to purchase
the expensive, sophisticated computers necessary. Legislative
Counsel has opined that while, under Government Code Section
68073, "the counties are responsible for maintaining rooms and
equipment necessary for the transaction of the business of the
courts," this section "excludes from this supervisorial
responsibility all stenographic and transcribing equipment and
other personal property and supplies of court reporters used in
the preparation of transcripts." The Court Reporters Association
will present a proposal which would authorize the trial courts to
buy CAT equipment. A copy of the proposal is enclosed for your
information.
Other groups will advocate extending the use of
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TO:

Rubin Lopez, Consultant
Assembly Judiciary Committee

FROM:

John W. Davies, Assistant Directo
Administrative Office of the Cour s

SUBJECT: November 8 Interim Hearing
Pursuant to your request for materials for the
November 8th interim hearing meeting, please find attached a
copy on legal authority which will be included in an upcoming
report on commissioners and re rees
Attachment
0321K
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DISCUSSION
1.

Legal Authority

As of June 30, 1983, the superior courts employed 117
commissioners and juvenile court referees to perform subordinate
judicial duties.£/ Of these officers, 95 serve full time, 22
part time. They function largely in the area of family and
•
juvenile law. In certain courts, they regularly sit as
temporary judges in civil and criminal cases, hear matters
involving probate, mental health, writs and receivers, domestic
violence prevention applications, attachments, and post-judgment
creditor-debtor remedies. In the Los Angeles Superior Court,
which employees just ov~r one half (59) of these officers, they
~

11

The superior courts are Alameda, Contra Costa, Fresno,
Imperial, Kern, ·Los Angeles, Marin, Napa, Orange, Plumas,
Riverside, Sacramento, San Benito, San Bernardino, San
Diego, San francisco, San Joaquin, San Luis Obispo, San
Mateo, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, Siskiybu, Sonoma,
Stanislaus, Tehama, Tulare, and Yolo.
3

•
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section confers the following powers on a commissioner:
(1) Hear and determine ex parte motions for orders
and

alt~rnative

(2)

writs of habeas corpus;

Hear and report findings and conclusions to the

court for approval
matters, includi

rejection, or change on all preliminary
family law matters, and issues of fact

in contempt proceedings in divorce, maintenance, and
annulment of marriage cases:
(3)

Take proof and make and report findings of fact,
'•

subject to the court rehearing the issue on the exception
of any party;
(4)

Hear, report on, and determine all uncontested

actions and proceedings other than actions for divorce,
maintenance, and annulment of marriage;
(5)

Act in connection with bonds and undertakings,

oaths and affirmations, fees for the performance of
official acts, and an official seal; and
(6)

Act as a temporary judge when otherwise qualified
I

and when appointed for that purpose.
Subordinate judicial duties under Code of Civil
Procedure section 259 generally involv~ issuing routine ex
parte orders and orders to show cause, primarily in the area
family law.

il

They

also require reporting to the court for

(continued)
meaning of •subordinate judicial duties.• The words were
intended as an •appropriate constitutional phrase
sufficiently broad to permit specific details to be later
enacted or adopted by the legislature or rulemaking
agencies.•
(Rooney v. Vermont Investment Corp.
(1971 10
Cal.3d 351, 362. Before 1966, the section authorizing he
use of commissioners (Cal.Const., former art. VI, § 14).
referred to commissioners' duties in relation to the
•chamber business
the judges of the superior court.•
Chamber business has been defined as business •limited to
the subsidiary and incidental steps in practice and·
procedure, leaving to the court the judicial determination
of the issues presented by the pleadings.•
(Estate of
Roberts (1942} 49 Cal.App.2d 71, 77.)

5
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is ioners also act as temporary judges under the
au
t
Constitution and statute. (Cal. Const., art.
VI,
Civ. Proc., § 259(5).) The 1 al
implicat ons
ac ical significance of this authority are
exami
t.
(b)

They
commiss
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full or
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1977, must
at least
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exclusively in the juvenile court.
itially to that office or they may be
ssigned to act as juvenile court
event, the referee takes office under the
Institutions Code section 247, which
e of the juvenile court, or the senior
esiding judge, to appoint any number of
rees to serve at the pleasure of the
referee, if appointed after January 1,
itted to practice law in California~for
t
amount and rate of compensation for
t
board of supervisors.
s limited to juvenile court referees under
s itutions Code section 247. Referees under
ence procedures (Code Civ. Proc., §§
luded from the scope of this report as
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Perrone (1979) 26 Cal.3d 49.)!/

Second, the referee's

findings and order are subject to review by a judge of the
juvenile court, with the possibility of rehearing.

& Inst. Code,

§§

(See Welf.

248, 252-254.)

Like a commissioner, a referee may hear a juvenile
court case sitting as a temporary judge.
S 248.)

Jessie

(Welf. & Inst. Code,

In that instance, the constitutional prohibitions of

w.

v, Superior Court, supra, 26 Cal.3d 41 and In re

Perrone, supra, 26 Cal.3d 49 do not apply.

Nor do they apply

when referees hear matters involving fitness {Welf. & Inst.
Code, S 707) or dependency (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300), as
these hearings do not amount to jeopardy in the constitutional
sense.

(See Charles R. v. Superior Court (1980} 110 Cal.App.3d

945, 957.)

!/

Jeopardy attaches in juvenile court jurisdiction
proceedings, despite the advisory nature of a referee's
findings and orders (Jesse w. v. superior Court, supra, 26
Ca1.3d at 44}. Consequently, a referee's determination
favorable to the juvenile cannot be reheard under Welfare
and Institutions Code section 254, which provides for a •de
novo• rehearing before a judge. Inasmuch as the acquittal
becomes a final determination rather than a subordinate
judicial act, it is impermissable under article VI, section
22, of the California Constitution.
(Id., at p. 47, fn.
5.) Since a referee could not acquit under the juvenile
law, but only convict, a juvenile would require two
separate trials -- one before a referee, the second before
the judge -- before being finally acquitted. That, t~o,
would be unconstitutional.
(In re Perrone c., supra, 26
Cal.3d at p. 49.)
Whatever the merits of legislatively curing Welfare and,
Institutions Code section 254, the Legislature has
+
apparently adopted an opposite approach. It has respon~ed
to the Supreme Court's decision by amending Welfare and.
Institution Code section 248 to adopt explicitly the
·
prohibition against a referee conducting a hearing if •the
state or federal constitutional prohibitions against double
jeopardy apply unless the parties thereto stipulate in
writing that the referee may act in the capacity of a
temporary judge.•
(Stats. 1980, ch. 532.)

8
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fommissioners and referees as temporary judges

•

Commissioners and referees acting as subordinate
1 officers are to be distinguished from those acting as
judges. Code of Civil Procedure section 296(5)
rs a commissioner to •act as a temporary judge when
ise qualified to so act and when appointed for that
.11 Referees may sit as temporary judges even in
le court cases where double jeopardy attaches (Welf. '
. Code, § 248), and their •orders• become final in the same
as orders made by a judge.• (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 250.)
The commissioners and referees surveyed in this report
more frequently as temporary judges than as subordinate
icial officers. Most sit entirely as temporary judges.
perform purely subordinate judicial duties generally
on
when it is unnecessary to act as a temporary judge,
n ex parte or uncontested matters. Otherwise, if the
r
ires the finality of a judge's Iorder, commissioners
eferees typically act as temporary judges in most courts.
An individual acting as a temporary judge must obtain
lation of the parties litigant. (Cal. Const., art.
tion 21.) If the temporary judge is to sit in the
le court, the stipulation must be in writing. (Cal.
Ct., rule 1316(b}.) Commissioners, in contrast, are
ired to obtain a written stipulation in order to hear a
a temporary judge. (Cal. Rules of Ct., rule 244(a).)
, the parties' conduct may be •tantamount to a
tion• if their partipation was voluntary and without
ion. {Estate of Soforenko (1968} 260 Cal.App.2d 765,
People v. Oaxaca (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 153, 165.) ,~his
t

appointment may be in the form of a blanket order
ssigning specified duties to named commissioners or a
al rule providing that all commissioners of the court,
r a commissioner assigned to a particular department, may
xercise specified powers under Code of Civil Procedure
tion 259, such as acting as a temporary judge. (Rooney
. Vermont Investment Corp., supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 368.)

9
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rule, which applies only to commissioners, was recently stated
as follows:
Under the •tantamount stipulation• doctrine,
the parties confer judicial power not
because they thought in those terms; had
they done so, the stipulation presumably
would be express. Rather, an implied
stipulation arises from the parties• common
intent that the subordinate officer hearing
their case do things which, in fact, can
only be done by a judge. (In-re-Mark L.
(1983) 34 Cal.3d 171, 179, fn. 6.)
Once clothed with the authority of a judge, the
commissioner or referee is governed by the laws applicable to a
judge •. (People v. Oaxaca, supra, 39 Cal.App.3d at p. 159.)
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I.

COURT REPORTING - FUNCTION:

Court Reporters perform two distinct functions:
collecting the record (reporting) and preparing verbatim
transcripts.
Transcripts are remunerated separately.
MYTH:
The increase in the cost of transcripts is
due to a dramatic rise in reporters' transcript
fees.
FACT:
In 1880 Reporters' transcript fees were $.20
per folio.
In 1983 reporters' transcript fees are
$.60 per folio.
The intense growth in
transcript volume is mainly responsible for the
increased expenditures.
MYTH:
Late filing of appeal transcripts by
reporters is the major cause of appellate delay.
FACT:
Only a very small percentage of court
reporters are the cause of appellate delay.
The
Los Angeles Superior Court reports 1% of their
reporters are chronically delinquent in filing
transcripts.
The Judicial Council's present method of
communicating with the court reporting community is
inadequate.
As an example, the Judicial Council
refuses to adopt rules which provide for a
correlation between the length of a transcript and
the time required for its preparation.
RECOMMENDATIONS: -

Provide for the appointment to the
Judicial Council of one court reporter.

-

Establish effective monitoring
procedures so that reporters
filing transcripts late can be
identified quickly.

-

Impose existing sanctions to
adequately deal with reporters who file
transcripts late:
Government
Code 69944, Business and Professions
Code 8025 (d), and contempt power.
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II.

UTILIZATION OF TAPE RECORDERS:
The ability to produce verbatim transcripts and the
quality of transcripts produced from tape recorders is
directly related to the quality of the equipment, the
courtroom environment, the monitor of the tape and the
commitment of those requested to utilize tape recorders.
RECOMMENDATIONS: -

If there is to be an expansion in the
use of tape recorders, that it be
under the direction and control of the
court reporters.

-

The preparation of transcripts from the
tapes be done by court reporters.

-

The utilization of tape recorders
be proscribed.

III.

COMPUTER-AIDED TRANSCRIPTION, (CAT):
CAT is the utilization of a computer to assist
shorthand reporters in the preparation of verbatim
transcripts.
A court reporter reports proceedings
utilizing a modified stenotype machine which produces, in
addition to the reporter~ usual paper notes, an electronic
duplication of the notes.
The electronic notes are fed
into a computer which matches the electronic notes to the
rter's indiviual writing style (dictionary) and
nslates the notes into English.
The reporter then
i s, proofreads, prints and binds the transcript into a
final document ready for filing.
The court reporter's ability to enter data at 200
to 250 words a minute combined with advanced computer
technology can offer many added services to court systems
without additional cost to the tax payers:
the entry,
retention, retrieval, transfer and archival of electronic
data; word processing; "sanitizing" of jury instructions;
the
rtunity for the hearing-impaired to participate in
the judicial process.
Tape recorders eliminate the
utilization of computerization.
RECOMMENDATIONS: -

-

Provide for a technology fee to enable
a single court reporter to provide a
daily transcript.
(Estimated savings to Los Angeles
County: $250,000
per year.)
Abolish prohibition against a county
providing CAT equipment.
(See
attachment A, legislative council
opinion.)
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-

Provide reporter orientation for judges
in order to utilize CAT more
effectively.

-

Provide funding
purchase of CAT
(See attachment
Municipal Court

for
equipment by courts.
B, proposal from L.A.
Reporters.)

Based on a survey taken by the California Court Reporters
Association, approximately 25% of the official court
reporters in California are now utilizing CAT -- literally
millions of dollars of state-of-the-art computer equipment
without any expense to the tax payers of California.
CONCLUSION:
The California Court Reporters Association
supports the appropriate use of technology to increase the
efficient production of the verbatim record.
CAT is the future for the most efficient and
cost effective delivery of court reporting services.
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The authority of the court to order the purchase or
ase of equipment is circumscribed by Section 68073 (Ex oarte
dber, 91 Cal. 367, 369). Thus, even thou<Jh it mightotherwise
argued that equipment used by court reporters in the
reparation of transcripts is necessary for the transaction of
business of the court, the Leaislature has preempted the
ect.
Accordingly, a trial court is without authority to
or lease special C.A.T. equipment. Moreover, there is
revision of law which would authorize a court to charge court
rters a fee for the use of court equipment.
Very truly yours,
Bion M. Gregory
Legislative Counsel

~() t&tJii-

By
'""'[
Clinton J. deWitt
Deputy Legislative Counsel
dW: j f
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MUNICIPAL COURT REPORTERS COMMITTEE
LOS ANGELES COUNTY COURT REPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
546 COURTHOUSE
110 NORTH GRAND AVEN
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA
(2 13) 485-1519

AUGUST 9, 1982

TO:

THE LOS ANGELES MUNICIPAL COURT

FROM:

THE MUNICIPAL COURT COMMITTEE, LOS
ANGELES COUNTY COURT REPORTERS
ASSOCIATION

SUBJECT:

C.A. T.

THE FOLLOWING IS A PROPOSAL FOR THE COURT AND THE
COURT REPORTERS OF THE LOS ANGELES MUNICIPAL COURT
TO PARTICIPATE IN THE PURCHASE AND USE OF COMPUTERAIDED TRANSCRIPTION EQUIPMENT.

(NfTACHMENT "B")

AFFILIATED WITH LOCAL 660-SEIU • AFL-CIO
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DISCUSSION:
VENDOR:
XSCRIBE IS RECOMMENDED. THE MAJOR ADVANTAGE OF XSCRIBE
IS THE REDUNDANCY PROVIDED BY THEIR SERVICE CENTER IN CASE
OF EQUIPMENT FAILURE; ALS0 7 AVAILABILITY OF OPTICAL-SCAN
TRANSLATION AT THEIR SERVICE CENTER. WHILE OPTICAL-SCAN
IS MORE COSTLY 7 IT WOULD ELIMINATE EXPENSIVE STORAGE PROBLEM
FOR "OLD" NOTES. THE OPTICAL-SCAN CAN ALSO BE USED FOR
PREPARING TRANSCRIPTS FROM NOTES OF UNAVAILABLE REPORTERS.
ADVANTAGES OF C.A.T. AND COURT OWNERSHIP OF COMPUTERS:
- WILL ALLOW COURT REPORTERS TO PROVIDE SERVICES NOW
UNAVAILABLE; I.E. 7 KEYWORD INDEXING, ON-LINE TRANSLATION 7
DISKETTES, ETC.
- CAN REDUCE AND/OR CONTAIN COURT REPORTER TRANSCRIBING
COSTS.
- WILL PROMOTE THE USE OF C.A.T. BY COURT REPORTERS.
- WILL HELP OFFSET THE COURT REPORTER'S FINANCIAL BURDEN
OF GOING ON C.A.T.
- CAN REDUCE THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REPORTERS NECESSARY TO
COVER COURTS.
- CAN REDUCE TIME REQUIRED FOR PREPARATION AND FILING OF
TRANSCRIPTS.

ASSUMPTIONS:
1.

COURT WILL PURCHASE MASTER SYSTEM. HAS ALL CAPABILITIES
OF EXPERT SYSTEM EXCEPT DIRECT INPUT, WHICH IS NECESSARY
FOR TRUE-TIME TRANSLATION ONLY.
(MASTER SYSTEM MAY BE
UPDATED LATER FOR $11,396.) COMPUTER LOCATED IN C.C.B.

2.

REPORTERS ON SYSTEM AVERAGE 600 PAGES PER MONTH.

3.

COURT'S MAIN FRAME WILL PROVIDE TRANSLATION SERVICE
ONLY.
PRINTER PROVIDED WITH MAIN FRAME WILL BE USED
FOR BACKUP ONLY.
MAIN FRAME TO BE USED EXCLUSIVELY
BY COURT REPORTERS.
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4.

COURT WILL ALSO PURCHASE A FOUR-TRACK MODEM AFTER
EIGHT USERS ARE ON THE SYSTEM.

5.

COURT WILL PURCHASE MAIN FRAME OUTRIGHT; RATHER THAN
LEASING, SAVING 16% INTEREST OVER FIVE YEARS.

6.

EACH REPORTER, OR GROUPS OF REPORTERS, SHALL PURCHASE
AN EDITING STATION AND PRINTER.
EDITING AND FINAL
PRINTOUT WILL BE DONE BY THE REPORTERS ON THEIR OWN
EQUIPMENT.

7.

ALL EQUIPMENT (COURTS AND REPORTERS') SHALL BE
DEPRECIATED OVER FIVE YEARS.

8.

AN OPERATOR FOR MAIN FRAME OPERATION ONLY WILL BE
NEEDED PART TIME (APPROXIMATELY 25 HOURS A WEEK)
AT 10,000 PAGES PER MONTH; AND FULL TIME AT 18,000
PAGES.
THE OPERATOR SHALL BE AN INDEPENDENT
CONTRACTOR, COMPENSATED AT $6 AN HOUR BY THE USERS.

9.

COURT WILL PROVIDE PHYSICAL LOCATION, TELEPHONE AND
PARKING FOR OPERATORS.

10.

A CONTRACT WOULD BE SIGNED BETWEEN THE REPORTERS
ASSOCIATION AND BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL REPORTERS AND
THE COURT.

11.

OWNERSHIP OF THE REPORTER'S DICTIONARY SHALL REMAIN
TOTALLY AND ABSOLUTELY WITH THE COURT REPORTER.

12.

THE USE OF C.A.T. WOULD BE VOLUNTARY ONLY.

13.

REPORTER MANAGER TO BE DESIGNATED.

TELEPHONE MODEM SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE PURCHASE
(WHEN AVAILABLE) FOR OFF-SITE TRANSMISSION OF DATA.
COST
TO COURT $500; COST TO REPORTER $500.
nBn DRIVE SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR PURCHASE IF REPORTER
11
EQUIPMENT WIL BE SHARED.
B11 DRIVE ALLOHS EQUIPMENT TO
EDIT AND PRINT SIMULTANEOUSLY.
COST TO REPO iER Sl,500.
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XSCRIBE MASTER SYSTEM
COUPT Is

cosTS

VOLUME ON SYSTEM
REPOPTERS
PAGES PER

4
2,400

8
4,800

9
5 I Lf 0 0

1~,000

30
18,000

MASTER SYSTEt"\
FOUR-TRACK t.JiODE tv\
PLUS 6 !2 9o TAX

39,885

39/885

2,593

2,593

39,885
7,500
3,080

39,885
7,500
3!080

39,885
7 1 50 0
3,080

EQUIPMENT TOTAL

42,478

42,478

50,465

50,465

50,465

8,496

8,496

10,093

10,093

10,093

708
180

708
180

84 1
230

841
2 30
600

841
2 30
1.000

$888

$888

$1,070

$1,670

$2,070

~10NTH

20

I NVESH~ENT BY COURT

COST TO COURT
DEPRECIATION
AT FIVE YE/l.RS
OPER/HING C0 S T /~10NTH
DEPRECIATION
I NTENANCE
::oPERATOR
~1A

TOTAL

::oPERATOR TO BE PAID BY USERS, NOT BY COURT.

Gt"'C/ AMM
7/82
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RECOMMENDED FEE STRUCTURE FOR
MAIN-FRAME TRANSLATION

WE RECOMMEND A SLIDING SCALE FOR FEES, AS A PRODUCTION JtJCENTI
FOR USERS.
/.VERAGE RANGE

P.i\GES
1-300
3 0 1-6 0 0::
601-900
900-UP

•25
. 20
. 15
. 10

. 25
. 2 5-. 2 2 5 ;:
.225-.20
.20 -. 175(901-1200

::sINCE \·JE ESTH'\ATE THE JWER/l,GE USER 1 S VOLUfv'E TO BE 500 PAGES
PER MONTH, THE AVERAGE CHARGE PER PAGE WILL BE 22.5¢.

COt'KLUS I 01\lS
THE MASTER SYSTEM, AT A MONTHLY COST OF S888, WILL ACCOMMODATE
UP TO EIGHT USERS.
THE FEES FOR THE FIRST 3,947 PAGES WOU~D
THE t\J EXT 8 5 3 PAGES \-/0 ULD GEi ~ E RATE: A P R0 ::' I T
PAY FOR THE COST.
OF $192, FOR A 229s RETURN ON INVESH1ENT.
THE MASTER SYSTEM WITH A FOUR-TRACK MODEr1, AT A MONTHLY COST
OF $1,070, IS NECESSARY FOR NINE OR MORE USERS AND WILL
ACCOI'WtODATE UP TO 30 USERS.
PRODUCING 5,400-13,000 PAG::S
PER MONTH, THE FEES AT THIS VOLUME WOULD PAY FOR THE COST
PLUS GENERATE A PROFIT OF $145 $2,980 A MONTH, FOR A 14 -279
RETURN ON INVESTMENT.
A TELEPHONE MODEM SHOULD BE CONSIDERED FOR FUTURE USE (WHEN
AVAILABLE) FOR REPORTERS LOCATED OFF-SITE FROM ENVIRONS OF
COMPUTER.
COST TO COURT, $500; COST TO REPORTER, $500.

Gl'1C I AHI'-1

7/82
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EXHIBIT E

California Court Commissioners Association
110 N. Grand
John D. Harris
President
Rebert Axel
1 st Vice President

November 1,

Angeles, California 90012 · (213)
83

Steven C. Burtnett
2nd Vice President
Kevi' "Chip" Martin
Secretary

BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Joseph N. Gruber
Ralph J. Flageollet
Donald D. Rosenberg
Rebert F. Baysinger
Terrance R Duncan
James F. Me Kiernan

Phil C. Bunde
Sam E. Collins
Bobby R. VII1Cent
Irwin H. Garfinkle
Abraham Gorenfeld
Herbert M. Klein
Harold Crowder
Joseph A. Ruffner
Ronald W. TISChe
Helen Rice Frederick
John Murphy
Thomas A. Peterson

Rubin R. Lopez, Chief
California Legi
Assembly Committee on Judiciary
State Capitol
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear !-ir. Lopez:
Enclosed please find the recommendations to the
Committee, proposed
the California Court
Commissioners Association.
Commissioner Nyby and myself will, hopefully,
be present at the Committee meeting on the
8th of November.
I wi
be calling you to
request a specific time that we would appear
to answer questions regarding the suggestions.

RBA: spd
Enclosure
cc:

James Simpson
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a showing of probable
restricted
"judge of the jus
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defendant over to
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would not result
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amended to include
of magistrates.
This
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and search warrants upon
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is proposed to be
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"court commissioner."
district attorney
be party to
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enable a court

of "magistrate"
of a felony matter.

Section 810 PC
as judie 1
hours,
Court that is
as a
our research, is not statutor
Code of Civil P
In order to
both superior
CCP be

te cor:uniss
during non-court
Los Ange
but, to
at the present
s

a court COilli"Tliss
that Sec
259a
all counties through-

(2)

RECOMHENDATIONS TO THE COHNITTEE
out the State. At the present time it is designated for
Los Angeles County, wherein alL of the· superior court
commissioners sit pro tern in a variety of areas, but there
appears to be no reason why that should not be extended to
all counties in the State.
In addition, following along the
designated lines of handling matters that amount to something
less than a final determination of any contested issue,
commissioners should preside over discovery proceedings without a stipulation, as well as other pretrial motions,
excluding 1538.5 PC hearings, which are not a final determination of any contested issue.

I
Assignment of Retired Commissioners by the judicial Council
At the present time the Judicial Council does not include
retired commissioners for consideration for assigP~ents statewide to hear matters as magistrates or other uncontested or
ex parte hearings throughout the State.
If the legislature
adopts the expansion of areas listed above, it would follow
that retired commissioners should be included in the Judicial
Council assignment of judicial officers throughout the State,
which would enable an individual court to more efficiently
and, possibly, more expeditiously, handle their existing
court business.
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..
RICHARD D. HUFFMAN
Assistant District Attorney

OFFICE OF

THE DISTRICT

WILLIAM H. KENNEDY
Chief Deputy, District Attorney
WAYNE A. BURGESS
Chief Investigator

AlTORNEY

COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
EDWIN L. MILLER, JR.

EXHIBIT F
Cf>UNTY 20l'RTHOL'SE
SAN DIH;o,
l

lQX-KXJ5JtX:X

(619)

236-238

DISTRICT ATIORNEY

October 31, 1983

Ms. Linnea Kehlet
Conmittee Coordinator
CDAA
1130 K Street
Suite 200
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Linnea:
Enclosed is a copy of the discovery statute I Kill be discussing at the interim hearing on Judicial Efficiency and
Improvement on November 8th.
I plan to discuss the current problems with discovery
practice, the effect of that practice on courtroom time
and the enclosed proposal for codifying criminal discovery
law.
Could you let me know the time limits involved in this
presentation?
Sincerely,
EDWIN L. MILLER, JR.
District Attorne~~

oLL~ ~/J

-

~'-

DUANE E. SHINNICK
Deputy District Attorney
Fraud Division
DES/in
Enc.
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CODIFICATION
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section.

S~ARY

1054.

DISCOVERY

1054.1

DISCO'~~y

Prosecutor's Obligation

(b)

Collateral or Exculpatory

(c)

Scope

(d)

Matters Not Subject to Disclosure

(e)

1054.3

1054.4

DEFEND~NT

(a)

(l)
(2}

1054.2

BY

OF THE STATUTE

~1atter

tvi thout Request

Work Product
Statutory Privileges

Discovery Before Superior Court Arraignment

DISCLOSURE TO THE

PROSECU~ION

t~e

(a)

The Person of

(b)

Medical and Sc1entific Reports

(c)

t'iit:;.esses

(d}

Documents and Tangible Objects

(e)

Notice of Withheld Infor::-.ati on

REGr~ATION

Defenrant

OF DISCOVE?Y

(a)

Conti:;.uinCJ Duty to Dis close

(b)

Custody of Items or rn:or.r.ation

(c)

Protective Orders

(d)

Excision

(e)

In Camera Proceedings

(f)

Sanctions

(g)

Costs

DISCOVERY OF

STATE~E~TS

-

OF

2 -
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WIT~ESSES

DUPING TRIAL

1054.
The
disclosure of
in advance of

a
r

f

The
Legislature's e
judicially est
disclosure in
or by or fr
intent of th
occur in criminal
other express stat
stitution of the
State of Cali
roc:ll discoY
tainment of the
cases and that
stitution of the
State of C i
this statute.

1054.1.
(a)

discovery is rna
shall be made
Indictment.
the Superior
fice. Exc t
matters not s
e t
protective orders,
defendant~'s atto
available

se
en

re

statements, within
Witnesses :means
dians of material
attorney then
(2)
all
substance of any
fendant, or made by
(3)
all
in connection with
suits of physical or
tests, experiments or

(41
all
,
Uncluding motion pictures
tangible objects, or
material to the
or which L~ prosecut
the trial, or which
defendant; and
(51
the record
ness whose credibi1i
i
come of the trial.

If the prosec~ting at
tion within Section 1054.1
then the prosecuting attorn
the defendant or his at
mation has not been d c
nature of the privilege
the privilege.

'a possession.
t.nesses, custowhom the prosecuting
statements and the
statements made by the deor
lice;
statements of experts made
including the reand of scientific
ts, photographs
tapes}, writL~gs, or
thereof, which are
of the defense,
intends to use in
or belong to the
ctions of any witcritical to the outions of informainfonnation,
information if
privileged inferon shall state the
person claiming

l054.l{b) Colla':
The prose ~~~~~==~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
sonable time of learning
fendant's attorney:
(1)
whether
guilt or innocence whi

(2)
whe
ceedings which have not
( 3)
whether there
lance of material
party or of his premises;
( 4}
all
possession favorab
guilt, punishment,

tion relating to
an informant;
jury pro-

c surveildefendant was a
th.in his
ating to
witness.

l054.1(c}
The prosecuting
's obligations under
subdivisions
and (b) of
section extend to all items
or information to which a defendant is entitled under these
statutes and which is in the possession of the prose=uting attorney or members of the pr~secuting attorney's staff.
l054.l(.d) Matters Not Subject to Disclosure.
(1) Work Product. Disclosure shall not be requ~red
of
1 research or of records, correspondence, reports, or
memoranda to the extent that they contain the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the prosecuting attorney or members of his legal staff.
(2) Statutory Privileges. All existing statutory
privileges against disclosure are not to be affected by this
section.

1054.1~) Discoverv Before Sunerior Court Arraic~ent.
Discovery pursuant to section 1054.l(e) s~ll be the exclusive means
of discovery by the defendant or his attorney prior to the preliminary examination. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose
a:1d make available for ins:;:>ection and copying:

(1) items furnished pursuant to Penal Code sections
859 and 1430;
(2) all substantial material evidence known to t~e
prosecuting attorney and within his possession, custody, or
control favorable to the defendant, whether relating to quilt,
punishment, or the credibility of a prosecution witness; and
(31 the results of a line-up when ordered by a court
where eyewitness identification is a material issue and where
re exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken id~~tifica
tion that a lineup would tend to resolve.
1054.2

Disc~osure

(a)

to the

*

The Person of the

{1)
defendant to:

*

1t

Prcsec~t:on.
Defe~dant.

The prosecuting attorney may require the
(A)
(B)

participate in lineups;
speak for identification by witnesses;

-

5 -
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(C)
{D)
(E)
(F)
{G)

lH)
(I}
(J}

(Kl

be fingerprinted:
pose for photographs;
try on articles of clothing:
permit the taking of specimens of
material under his fingernails;
permit the taking of samples of his
blood, hair anC!. other bodily items
which involve no unreasonable intrusion thereof;
provide specimens of his handwriting;
submit to a reasonable phys
1 or
medical examination;
submit to a reasonable mental examination, if a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity has been entered, or
if notice of intent is given, as described by subdivision (c) to rely upon
a defense related to mental disease,
mental defect, mental disorder, intoxication or other cause tending to negate
the existence of a mental state essential to guilt, or to mitigate p~~ishrnent.
Statements of the defendant made in the
course of such an examination s~ll not
be admissible except to disclose ~~e information on which the examiner based
his opinion, or to impeach the testimony
of the defendant given at trial cr L~ a
hearing related to the case: an=
participate in the taking or prcd~ction
of other non-testimonial evidence.

(2}
Reasonable notice of the time and place of
any personal appearance of the defendant required fer the
foregoing purposes shall be given by the prosecuting attorney to the defendant and his attorney. An order adrr~~ting
the defendant to bail or providing for his release may be
made conditional upon the defendant's appearance for ~~e
foregoing purposes.

. (3) Failure of the defendant to comply wit~
?ectlon shall result in an instruction to the judge
or jury hearing the case that such refusal may be considered as consciousness of quilt.
.

th~s
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l054.2(c) (1) or l054.2{c) (2) or 1054.2(c) (3}, but in no event
less than ten (10} days before
r
the prosecuting attorney
shall se~ve
the defendant or the defendant's attorney a
written notice stating the names and addresses of the
tnesses
upon whom the prosecuting attorney intends to rely to rebut ~~e
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of any of the dis osed
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054.2(dl Documents and Tangible Objects. A defendant who personal
or through defense counsel has requested and received
ing attorney the disclosures
scribed
Section
5 .l(a) (4) shall within a reasonable time, but in no event
less than
(20) days before trial, permit the prosecuting
attorney to inspect and copy any books, papers, documents, photo(
motion pictures and video tapes), or tangib
objects, or copies or portions thereof which are within the
possession of the defendant and which the defendant intends to
introduce as evidence in chief at the trial.
ten (10) days after a disclosure under
on
1054.l(d)
in no event less than ten (10} days before trial,
the prosecuting attorney shall serve upon the defendant or the
defendant's attorney a written notice stating the names and addresses of the witnesses upon wr~m the prosecuting attorney intends to rely to rebut any of the disclosed evidence.

*
l054.2(e) ~:o::ice of Withheld Information.
If the defendant or
the defendant's attorney concludes that portions of information
wi~in Section 1054.2 contain privileged information, then the
de_
tor t:.e defendant's attorney may withhold such infor.mat
prosecuting attorney is notified that privileged innot been disclosed. The notification shall state
the nature of the privilege and L~e identity of the person
cla
the
ivilege.

1054.3.

ReGulation of Discovery.

(a) Continuina Dutv to Disclose.
If, after com?liance with these statutes or orders pursuant thereto, a party or
attorney discovers additional items or information which is subject to disclosure, the party or attorney shall promptly notify
the other par
or attorney of the existence of such additional
items or information, and if the additional items or informa on
discovered
ina trial, the court shall also be notified.
The items or information shall also be promptly disclosed to the
other party or attorney.

1054.3 ) Custodv of Ite:7is or Information. The prosecuti
attorney may maintain possession, custody and control of all
sical evidence, and may monitor any inspection, testing or examination of such evidence in person or by having a representative
present.
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ed disclosures
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cause"
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s
the safe
to
integrity
loss or
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of the case.

i'ihen port
s of items or in
r
tions are
ese statutes
ions may be exci
nondiscoverab
Items or
order
vision (c) of this section.
1 be
uant to judicial
court, and only a court may
conte::1ts. ·
discover

r

*

*

l054.3(e) In Camera Proceedinos. Upon request
rson,
the court
as reasonably necess
pe
t
of
cause
ial or regulation of
sclosures or portion of
su
show
be made in camera.

If such a request is
the court
de
t
by the de
outs
the
attorney

by the
attorney,
all hold such a hea
outside
sence of the
defendant's attorney.
If
request s made
dant's attorney, the court shall ho
such a
ring
presence of the prosecuting attorney. The party or
sent at the hearing
present
dence to
ca

A reporter shall be present at the in camera hearing.
Any transcription of the proceedings at the
camera hearing,
as well as any physical evidence presented at the hearing, shall
be ordered sealed by the court, and only a court may order access
to its contents.
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1054.3

) If at any time during
course of the proceedbrought to the attention
court that a party
to
wi
these dis
or an order
sued pursuant thereto, the court may
party to pert the discovery of material and information not previously
disclosed, grant a continuance, or enter such order other than
dismissal as deemed just under ~~e circumstances.
(2) Willful violation by an attorney of an applicable
discovery statute or other order issued pursuant thereto may subject the attorney to appropriate sanctions
the court.

1054.3(g) Costs. All costs of discovery, including copying
costs, shall be borne by the person or party seeking discovery.
Nothing in these statutes shall require that eit:her attorney
prepare a separate list of witnesses or e~~ibits or other information if the information itself is contained
reports or
items made available to the opposing party or attorney.
*
1054.4.

Discoverv of Statements of Witnesses Durinc Trial.
(a) After a witness other
the defendant has
testified on di~cct examination, the court, on motion of a
par~y who did not call the witness, shall order
prosecuting attorney, or the defendant and the defendant's attorney,
as the case ~~y be, to produce, for the examination and use
of the moving party, any statement of the wit:'less t!::.at is in
their possession, custody or control, that relates to the witness' testimony.
Ub) Upon delivery of the statement to the moving
party, the cour-:, upon application of that party, may recess
the proceedings in the trial for such reas::!'.able period of ti.:';je
as to allow for the examination of such state~ent
for preparation for its use in the trial.
(c)
ness means:

As used in this section, ''state..":'lent" of a wit(1)
(2)

(3)

a written statement made by ~~e witness
that is signed or othe~ise adopted or
approved by hi.m;
a substantially verbatin recital of an
oral statement made by the witness that
is recorded contemporaneously with the
making of the statement, and tr~t is
contaL~ed in a stenographic, mechanical,
electrical, or other recording or transcription thereof;
a statement made
a witness to the grand
jury, however taken or recorded.
- 10 -
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SECTION BY SECTION

In th
1.
cases,

analysis, the following format is used:
ed wording

The

on

each se

The operation of the section and its purpose are

and
3.

The source of the section, if

1.:ed to a provision of law,

is stated.

is c

ely rela-

v1here useful

ground section itself is repeated for comparison.
with

(or in sene

sections) of the statute is set forth:

2.
sta

AN.~LYSIS

the backComparisons

er states are treated as examples of representative

statutes, rather than exhaustively.

*
DISCC:':EPY

S'T.Z~.TL"TE

-

*

PR::J..MBLE/LEG:kSLATIVE PUP.P0SE

The Legislature finds and declares that t!1e ?urpcse
of trial in a crim~nal case is the ascertainment of the truth,
and
t just~ce is put at risk w!1enever information or access
to infor~at~on is withheld which rnav cast licht on the issues.
The
islature further finds and declares that discover./ a::1d
disclosure of information by the parties to and from eac!1 other
in advance of trial aids in the ascertainment of the truth.
The Sur:;,reme Court of Ca2.~fornia h.avins- invited the
Leaislature's efforts to codifv criminal discovery law, all
judicially established provisions concerning discovery and
disclosure in criminal cases, whether by or from the People
or
or fron the defendant, are hereby abrogated.
It is t~e
inte~t of the Legislature that no discovery or disclos~re shall
occur in criminal cases except as provided by this Act, by
other express stat~tory provision, or as mandated by the Constitution of the U~ited States or bv the Constitution of the
State of California.
The Legislature also finds and declares that reciprocal discovery provisions are <:-ssential to t.~e 'Jrderly ascertainment of the truth in criminal cases no less than in civil
cases and that, to the fullest extent possible under the Constitution of the United States and the Constltution of the
State of California, reciprocal discovery shall be required by
this statute.
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COMMENTS
The preamble is self-explanatory.

1054.1.

Discovery by Defendant.

(a) Prosecutor's Obligation.
If such a request for
discovery is made by the defendant or his attorney, such request
shall be made at or after the arraiqnment on t~e Information or
Indictm~~t.
The request shall be made in writing, filed with
the Superior Court, and served upon the District Attorney's office.
Except as provided in subdivision (d) of this section fer
matters not subject to disclosure and in Section 1054.3(d) for
protect
orders, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to
defendant's attorney within ten (10) days after service and rnake
available for ins?ection and copying:
(1)
the names and addresses of all witnesses
then known to him and their material written or recorded
state~ents, within the prosecuting attorney's possession.
Witnesses means eyewitnesses, percipient witnesses, custodia;:s of material records, and persons whom the prosecl:.ting
attcrne: then inte;:ds to use in the trial;
(2)
all writte;: or recorded statements and the
s;;l:stance of any material oral stateme::ts made by the defendant, or r:1ade by a codefenda:-.t or accomplice;
(3)
all rePorts or stater:1e::ts of experts made
in ccr.nect~on with the particular case, including the resu ts of physical or mental examinations and of scientific
tes~s, experil':1ents or conparisons:
(4)
all books, papers, docurne;:ts, photographs
(including motion pictures and video tapes), wri ti.ngs, or
tangible otjects, or copies or portior:s ~~ereof, whic~ are
material to t~e preparation or presenta~:on of the defense,
or w~ich t~e prosecuting attorney then intends to use in
the trial, or which were obtained from or belong to the
defenda:~t; and
15)
the record of felony convictions of any witness whose credibility is likely to be critical to the outcome of the trial.

If the prosecuti:~g attorney concludes that portions of information within Sect:on 1054.l(a) contain privileged information,
then the prosecuting attor:~ey may withhold s'Jch information if
the defendant or his attornev is notified t~at privileged information has Aot bee;: disclose~.
The notificat:on shall state the
nature of the privilege and the identity of the person claiming
the privilege.
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COMMENTS
Section 1054.l(a) provides information to which the
defendant is currently entitled under California case law.
While a defendant is not required by the proposed statute to
request this information, if he does request the information
he will be allowed to obtain it without showing cause and he
will also be obligated to provide reciprocal discovery to the
extent listed in the statute.
The request procedure applies only in Superior Court.
:iscoverv before Superior Court proceedings is governed by
Section l054.l(e).
T~ese
~f

case holdings were relied upon in the

form~:a-

1054.1:

Prior

state~ents

of defense witnesses.

Peocle v. Carter, 48 Cal.2d 737 11957)
2.

Identity of an
People v.

3.

info~ant

~cShann,

material to guilt or innocence.

50 Cal.2d 802 (1958)

Recordings of the defendant's conversations wi~~ police
and a victim's statement played for tte de~endant durinc
the conversaticn.
Vance v. Sucerior Court, 51 Cal.2d 92 (1958)

4.

Written statements of prosecution witnesses.
Funk v. Sucerior Court, 52 Cal.2d 423 {1959)

5.

Duty to disclose and preserve evidence favorable to the
defense.
Peocle v. Hitct, 12 Cal.3d 641 11974)

6.

Recordings of conversations between the defendant and an
undercover police officer in a solicitation case.
Cash v. Sucerior Court, 53 Cal.2d 72

- 13 -
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(1959)

7

Notes used by a prosecution witness to refresh recollection.
People v. Estrada, 54 Cal.2d 713 (1960)

B.

Trial court discretion concerning the timing of disclosure
of prosecution witnesses.
People v. Lopez, 60 Cal.2d 223 (1963)

9.

Trial court may excise unrelated matters from a witness'
prior testimony when privileges apply.
In Re Waltreus, 62 Cal.2d 218 (1965)

10.

Discovery and preservation of notes of police officer.
Peoole v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal.2d 733 (1981)

11.

Judicial discretion in formulating discovery rules in the
absence of legislation.
Joe Z. v. Suoericr Court, 3 Cal.3d 797 (1970)
Shively v. Superior Court, 65 Cal.2d 475 (1966}
Hill v. Suoerior Court, 10 Cal.3d 812 (1974)
Some of the language in Section 1054.l(a) comes from

fede=al discovery rules, e.g., the prosecuting attorney's
"possession, c;.;stody, or control;" Fed.Rule 16(a)(l).(c}.

This

has been interpreted to include bank records in the

lang~age

oossession of the prosecuting attorney, where such records were
obtained by the government through seizure or process.
Fanche=, 195 F.Supp. 448 (1961).

U.S. v.

On the other hand, where the

documents remain outside the control of the prosecuting attorney's agency, the defense may be required to use a subpoena or
other legal process to obtain the do...-:...-:n:nts direct1y from the third
party.

Thor v. u.s., 574 F.2d 215 <1978).
Some of the language in Section l054.l(a) comes from

the 1970 ABA standards.

In particular, ABA Standard 2.l(a)

provides:

-14- -171-

2.1

Prosecutor's obligations.

(a) Except as is otherwise provided as to matters not
subject to disclosure (section 2.6) and protective orders (section 4.4), the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to defense
counsel the following material and information within his
possession or control:
(i) the names an~ addresses of persons whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial, together with their relevant written or recorded statements:
(ii)
any written or recorded statements and ~~e substance of any oral statements made by the accused, or made
by a codefendant if the trial is to be a joint one;

(iii) ~~ose portions of grand jury ~inutes containing
testimony of the accused and relevant testimony of persons
whom the prosecuting attorney intends to call as witr.esses
at t~e hearing or trial;

(iv)

any reports or state~ents of expe=ts, made in
with the partic~la= case, includi~g res~l~s cf
physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests,
experiments or comparisons:
cc~nection

(v) any books, papers, documents, photographs or
tangible objects, which the prosecuting attorney inte~ds
to use in the hearing or trial or which were obtained from
or belong to the accused; and
{vi) any record of prior criminal convictions of persons who~ the prosecuting attorneyinta~ds to call as witnesses at the hearing or trial.

- 15 -
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*

*

*

l054.l(b) Collateral or Exculpatory Matter Without Request.
The prosecuting attorney shall without request within a reasonab
time of learning of the information disclose to defendant's attorney:
(1) whether there is any information relating to
guilt or innocence which has been provided by an informant:
{2)
whether there are any material grand jt.try proceedings which have not been transcribed:

(3) whether there has been any electronic surveillance of material conversations to which the defendant was a
party or of his premises; and
(4)
all substantial material evidence within his
possession favorable to the defendant, whether relati~g to
guilt, punishment, or the credibility of a prose=ution witness.
COH~1EN':'S

Section
s~re

1054.1~)

provides fer the automatic disclo-

without request from defense counsel of the following in-

formation:

exculpatory information under Bradv and Ferguson,

and a notice to the defense of the existence of informants, untranscribed proceedings, and electronic surveillance.

Once such

a notice has beer. given, then the issue can be resolved by motion
o!'

agreeme:~t.

~nder
e:~ce

of

California case law, disclosure

surveilla:~ce

o:

the exist-

or lnformant information is particularly

relevant if it could be exculpatory.

People v. Ruthford, 14

Cal.3d 399 (1975).
Th~s

notice procedure is similar to that currently

. used in PC 859, which allows privileged information to be
held from the defense if the defense is

notifie~

that there is

some privileged i!if ormation which is being •.vi thhe ld:

- 16 -
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wi~~-

" ... the prosecuting attorney shall, within two calendar
days, deliver to, or make accessible for inspection and
copying by, the defendant or counsel, copies of police,
arrest and crime reports. Portions of such reports containing privileged information need not be disclosed if
the defendant or counsel has been notified that privileged information has not been disclosed." PC 859
Similar language appears in ABA Standards

2.l(b)

and 2.l(c):
(b)

The prosecuting attorney shall inform defense counsel:

(i) if he has any relevant material or information
which has been provided by an informant:
(ii) if there is any relevant grand j~ry testimony
which has not been transcribed; and
(iii) if there has been anv electronic surveillance
(including wiretapping) of c~r.~ersations to which the
accused was a party or of his premises.
(c) Except as is otherwise :t:rovidec'! as to protective orders (section 4.4), the prosecuting attorney shall disclose to
defense counsel any material or infor~ation within his possession or contr~l which tends to negate the guilt of the acc~sed
as to the offe:.se charaed or wo~ld tend to reduce his ounishment
therefor.
~
-

t
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*

1054.1(c) Scope. The prosecuting attorney's obligations under
subdivisions C~l and (b) of this section extend to all items
or· information to which a defendant is entitled under these
statutes and which is in the possession of the prosecuting attorney or members of the prosecuting attorney's staff.
COMMENTS
The phrase "possession, custody or control" is taken
from the federal rules.

F.R.Cr.P. 16(a) (1) (c).

If

~~e

defense

can point out other material in the possession of another governmental agency, our ensuing responsibility is to use reasonable
good faith efforts to make it available.

The federal standar1

for this effort calls for the exercise of due diligence to know
of such information.
The ABA standards for this effort are §§2.l(rl}, 2.2
and 2.4:
2.1

Prosecutor's obligations.
(d) The prosecuting attorney's obligations under this
section extend to material and information in the pcssess1on
or control of me~~ers of his staff and of anv others who have
participated in the investigation or evaluation of the case
and who either reoularlv renort or with reference to ~he particular case ~ave reported to this office.
2.2

Prosecutor's performance of obligations.
(a) The prosecuting attorney should perform his o~liga
tions under section 2.1 as soon as practicable following the
filing of charges against the accused.
(b) The prosecuting attorney may perform these obligations in any rr~nner mutually agreeable to himself and defense
counsel or by:
(i)
notifying defense counsel that material and informatlon, described in general terms, may be inspected,
obtained, tested, copied or photographed, during specified, reasonable times; and

(ii} making available to defense counsel at the time
specified such material and information, and suitable facilities or other arrangements for inspection, testing,
copying and photographing such material and infer-nation.
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(c) The prosecuting attorney should ensure that a flow
of information is maintained between the various investigative
personnel and his office sufficient to place within his possession or control all material and information relevant to the
accused and the offense charged.
2.4

Material held by other governmental personnel.
Upon defense counsel's request and designation of material
or information which would be discoverable if in the possession
or control of the prosecuting attorney and which is in the possession or con~rol of other governmental personnel, the prosecuting attorney shall use diligent good faith efforts to cause
such material to be made available to defense counsel; and if
t~e prosecuting attorney's efforts are unsuccessful and such
material or other governmental personnel are subject to the
jurisdication of the court, the court shall issue suitable subpoe:Jas or orcers to cause such material to be ma::le a':al :a::.:e tc
de~ense counsel.
Ot~er

states have

tor's respcns1=ility:

si~llar

::lescriptions of the prosecu-

see, e.g.,

Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure 15.1 (d)
Cc.>:::-.ecticu": Fc..:les o: Cri.rninal Procedure 54-86 Cal
Florida ?'..lles of Criminal Procedure 3.220 (a) (1)
Kar.sas S<:at'..ltes §22-3212 11) (a)
~ebraska Stat'..ltes §29-1914
~evada Statutes §174,235(1)
~,;ew York Laws of Criminal Procedure §240.20(2)
Sout~ Dakota Codified Laws 23 A-13-1!1)
Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure 16 (a) (l)
Was~lngt=~ Revised Code §4.7(a) Ill
Wes<: Virglnia Code § 62-lB-2
l<'yoming ?;;.les of Criminal Procedure 18 (al (2)
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*

*

*

1054.l(d) Matters Not Subject to Disclosure.
(1) Work Product.
Disclosure shall not be required
of legal research or of records, correspondence, reports, or
memoranda to the extent that they contain the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of the prosecuting attorney or members of his legal staff.
{2) Statutory Privileges. All existing statutory
privileges against disclosure are not to be affected by ~~is
section.
COM!'1E~"TS

Section 1054.l(d)

establis~es

a prosecution work pro-

duct privilege, subject to waiver during the trial.
1054.4.

See section

Parallel language is used to protect the defense work

product under section l054.2(b).
Informant identity is also protected in
This section, plus

t~e

t~is

section.

preamble to the statute, should make it

clear that there is no intention to change the current statutory
procedures

rela~ing

to disclosure of informant's identity or

official infor.nation.

Evidence Code §§ 1040-1042.

The parallel ABA standard is 2.6:
2.6

Matters not subject to

disclosure~

(a)
Work Product.
Disclosure shall not be required of
legal research or of records, correspondence, re?orts or menoranda to the extent that thev contain the ooinions, theories or
conclusions of the prosecuting attorney or member? of his legal
staff.
(b)
Infor::-.ants.
Disclosure of an informant's identity
shall not be required where his identity is a prosecution secret
and a failure to disclose will not infringe the constitutional
rights of the accused.
Disclosure shall not be denied hereunder
of the identity of witnesses to be produced at a hearinq or trial.
(c)
National securitv.
Disclosure shall ~ot be required
where it invo:ves a substantial rlsk of grave prejudice to national security and a failure to disclose will not infringe the
constituti6nal rights of the accusen. Disclosure shall not thus
be denied hereunder regarding witnesses or materlal to be produced at a hearing or trial.

- 20 -

-177-

*

*

*

l054.l(el Discovery Before Superior Court Arraignment. Discovery pursuant to section lOS4.l(e) shall be the exclusive means
of discovery by the defendant or his attorney prior to the preliminary examination. The prosecuting attorney shall disclose
and make available for inspection and copying:
(1) items furnished pursuant to Penal Code sections
859 and

1430~

(2) all substantial material evidence known to the
prosecuting attorney and within his possession, custody, or
control favorable to the defendant, whether relating to guilt,
punishment, or the credibility of a prosecution witness; and
(3) the results of a line-up when ordered by a court
where eyewitness identification is a material issue and where
there exists a reasonable likelih~od of a ~istake~ ide~~ifi:a
tion that a lineup would tend to resolve.
COMME~TS

Sectior. l054.l(e) states a legislative purpose

~~at

the only pre-preliminary hearing discover] is the material furnished under
~isde~eanor

Pe~al

Code sections 859 and 1430, for felonies and
T~

charcres, respectively.

this material

added the exculpatory material under Bradv and

~ust

be

~e~auscn.

Hcl::-.a:: v. Suoerior Court, 29 Cal.3d 480 (19811, held
that courts de have discretion to order pre-prelireinary hearing

By a legislative s:atement

discovery upon a proper showing.

concerning such discovery, the statute should pre-empt the
field, much as statutes prevented a pretrial deposition in
criminal cases.
523

Peoole v. Mu.:;icioal C:ourt (P.unvanl, 20 Cal.3d

11978).

This section depends on continued rulings that there

is no constitutional right to discovery in a criminal case, ether
'

than for exculpatory material.

It is felt that the discovery

mentioned (arrest, crime and police reports) will be sufficient
to satisfy any cross

exa~ination

or confrontation rights as they

would be interpreted by the courts.
- 21 -
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1054.2

*

*

*

Disclosure to the Prosecution.
(a)

The Person of the Defendant.

(1)
defendant to:

The prosecuting attorney may require the
(A)
(B}
(C)
(D)
(E)
(F)
(G)

(H)
(I)
(Jl

(K)

participate in lineups:
speak for identification by witnesses;
be fingerprinted:
pose for photographs;
try on articles of clothing;
permit the taking of specimens of
material under his fingernails;
permit the taking of samples of his
blood, hair an~ other bodily items
which involve no unreasonable intrusion thereof;
provide specimens of his handwriting;
submit to a reasonable physical or
medical examination;
submit to a reasonable mental examination, if a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity has been entered, or
if notice of intent is given, as described by subdivision (c) to rely upon
a defense related to mental disease,
mental defec~, mental disorder. intoxication or other cause tending to negate
the existence of a mental state essential to guilt, or to mltigate punishment.
Statements of tte de!er.dan~ rr~de in t~e
course of such an examination shall r.at
be admissible except to disclose the information on which the examiner based
his opinion, or to impeach the testimony
of the defendant given at trial or in a
hearing related to the case; and
participa~e in the taking or production
of other non-~estirnonial evidence.

!2)
Reasonable notice of the time and place of
any p€rsonal appearance of the defendant reauired for the
foregoing purposes shall be given by the prosecuting attorney to_the defendant and his attorney. An order admitting
the defendant to bail cr providing for his release may be
made c=nditional upon the defennant's appearance for the
foregoing purposes.
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(3) Failure of the defendant to comply with
this section shall result in an instruction to the judge
or jury hearing the case that such refusal may be considered as consciousness of nuilt.
Section 1054.2(a) restates the principle of automatic discovery of non-testimonial evidence.

The list is not

exclusive, to allow for further development of this area of law.
7his section does not affect

a~y

investi~ative

proce-

dures before the initiation of a criminal complaint.
Subsection (2) codifies what in 7lost cc.:::-.:::....:s is t:Ce:
practice:
B~t

reasonable notice of the taking of sue:: evidence.

no court order is required under this section, and it is

r.cped

:..~at

the codification of t!-.is kind of discc\•ery will re-

sult in fewer opposition motions being filed by the defense and
in fewer

de:r,a~ds

~he

a;::

on court time for such motions.

final

ar ar.ce fer t::e

trea~i~g

se~tence
taki:~g

allows bail to be conditioned on

of non-test.i.-"'"Cnial evide:1ce,

t.~

us

sue:: ap;::earance with the authority of a court apnear-

ance.
ABA standard 3.1 provides:
3.1

person of the accused.
!al ~ot~~t::standing the initiation of judicial proceedin~s, and subject to constitutional limitations, a jud:cial
officer ~ay req~ire the accused to:
ti) appear in a line-up;
Iii) speak for identification by witnesses to an
offense;
(iii) be fingerprinted;
livJ pose for photographs not involving reenactment
of a scene;
~he

- 23 -
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(.v}
(vi)
(vii)
(viii)
(ix)

try on articles of clothing:
permit the taking of specimen of material
under his fingernails:
permit the taking of samples of his blood,
hair and ot~er materials of his body which
involve no unreasonable intrusion thereof;
provide specimens of his handwriting; and
submit to a reasonable physical or medical
inspection of his body.

{b) Whenever the personal appearance of the accused is
required for the foregoing purposes, reasonable notice of the
ti~e and place of such Appearance shall be given by the prosecuting attC",rney to the accused and his counsel. Provision .may
be made for appearances for such purposes in an order a~uitt~ng
the accused to bail or providing for his release.
ABA standard 3.2 states:
3.2

Medical and scientific reports.

S'Jbject to constitutional limitations, the trial court may
require that the prosecuting attorney be infor~ed of and permitted to inspect and copy or photograph any reports or results, or
tes~incr.v relative t~ereto, of o~vsical or mental ex~~inations
or of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons, or any other
repcrts or statements of ex?erts which defense counsel intends
to ~se a~ a hearing or trial.

-
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*

*

1054.2(b) Medical and Scientific Reports. A defendant who
himself or through his attorney has requested and received
from the prosecuting attorney the disclosures described in
section 1054.l(a) (3) shall, within a reasonable time, inform
the prosecuting attorney of and permit the prosecuting attorney to inspect and copy any reports or results, or testimony
relative t~ereto, of physical or mental examinations or of
scientific tests, experiments or comparisons, or any other
reports or statements of experts which the de~ense intends
to use at a hearino or trial. In disclosino such information,
~~e defendant or defense attorney may request an order, under
section 1054.3(c) and 1054.3(e) protecting against disclosure
of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal
theories of defendant's attorney, members of his staff, or
other
~ts of ~~e defense, including investigators.
COWK..ENTS

Section 1054.2(b) requires the defense, if a request
is made for medical and scientific evidence from the prosecutic~,

to disclose expert materials upon which the defense in-

tends to rely at trial.
Pr~vision

is made for protective orders if privileged

in!crrnation is contained in the reports, or other items.
that

eve~

~ote

this privilege will be waived by testimonial use of

the material, under section 1054.4.
Federal rule 16(b) (1)

{.9)

(Discovery during trial.)
states:

Reports c: exar.:inat ions and tests.
If the defe:~dant
requests disclosure under subdiv1sicn (a) (1) (C) or (D)
of this rule, upon compliance with such request by the
government, the defendant, on reauest of the aover~~ent,
shall pe~it the government to i~spect and copy or photograph any results or reports of physical or mental examinations and of scientific tests or experiments made
in connection with the particular case, or copies t~ere
of, wit~in the possession or control of the defendar.t,
which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in
chief at the trial or which were prepared by a witness
whom the defendant intends to call at t~e trial when t~e
results or reports relate to his testimony.

-
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ABA standard 3.2 states:
3.2

Medical and scientific reports.

Subject to constitutional limitations, the trial court
may require that the prosecuting attorney be informed of and
permitted to inspect and copy or photograph any reports or
results, or testimony relative thereto, of physical or mental
examinations or of scientific tests, experiments or comparisons, or any other reports or statements of experts which
defense counsel intends to use at a hearing or trial.
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*

*

*

1054.2(c) Witnesses. A defendant who personally or through
defense counsel has requested and received from the prosecuting attorney the disclosures described in Section 1054.l(a} (1)
shall within a reasonable time, but in no event less than twenty (20) days before trial, disclose to the prosecuting attorney:
(1) the names and addresses of witnesses upon whom and
other evidence upcn which the defendant intends to rely to establish that the defendant was not present at the time, date, and
place at which the alleged offense was committed;

(2) the names and addresses of persons upon whose expert testimony and defendant intends to reply with respect to
me~tal disease, mental defect, mental disorder, intoxication or
other cause tending to negate the existence of a mental state essential to guilt, or to mitigate punishment. Notwithstanding
any oL~er provision of law, if the notice of intent to rely upon
expert witnesses given hereunder by a defendant is such as under
the circumstances to require further trial preparation by the
prosecuting attorney, a reasonable continuance for that purpose
shall be granted by the court;

(3) the names and addresses of persons upon whom and
other evidence upon which the defendant intends to rely to establish an affirmative defense, when such evidence does not
have a tendency to incriminate the defendant.
Within ten (10) days after a disclosure under Section
l054.2(c) Ill or l054.2(c) (2) or l054.2rc) (3), but in no event
less than ten 110) days before trial, the prosecuting attorney
shall serve upon the defendant or the defenda~t's attorney a
written notice statino the names and addresses of the ~itnesses
upon whom the prosecuting attorney intends to rely to rebut the
testimony of any of the disclosed witnesses.
COMMFNTS
Section l054.2(c)

provi~es

pretrial

prcsecu~icn

dis-

covery of alibi and expert testimony, if the defe::se requests
the names, addresses, reports, etc., of

~rosecution

witnesses.

These two areas were selected as the only apparent
areas of constitutional validity in pretrial prosecuticn discovery in California.

Jones v. Suoerior Court, 58 Cal.2d 56

(19621: Re1nolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal.3d 334 (1974}.
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Notice to the prosecution of such testimony must be
20 or more days before trial; the prosecution must provide rebuttal information 10 or more days before trial.

Both duties are

subject to a continuing duty to disclose under section 1054.3(a).
Federal Rule 12.1 provides the alibi notice· model:
Rule 12.1
NOTICE OF ALIBI
(a) Notice by defendant. Upon written demand of the
attorney for the government stating the time, date, and
place at which the alleged offense was committed, the defendant whall serve within ten days, or at such different
time as the court mav direct, upon the attornev for the
government a written notice of his intention to offer a
defense of alibi. Such notice bv the defendant shall state
the specific place or places at which the defendant claims
to tave been at the time of the alleged offense and the
names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom he intends
to rely to establish such alibi.
(b} Disclosure of information and witnesses. Within
ten davs thereafter, but in no event less than ten days
before trial, unless the court otherwise directs, the attorney for the government shall serve upon the defendant
or his attornev a written notice statina the names and
addresses cf the witnesses upon whom the government intends
to rely to establish the defendant's presence at the scene
of the alleged offense and any other witnesses to be relied
on to rebut testimony of any of the defendant's alibi witnesses.
(c) Continuing duty to disclose. If prior to or during trial, a party learns of an ad~itional witness whose
identity, if known, should have oeen included in the information furnished under subdivision (a) or (b), the party
shall promptly notify the other party or his attorney of the
existence and identity of such additional witness.
(d) Failure to comply. Upon the failure of either
party to comply with the requirements of this rule, the
court may exclude the testimony of any undisclosed witness
offered by such party as to the defendant's absence from or
presence at, the scene of the alleged offense. This rule
shall net limit the right of the defendant to testify in
his own behalf.
·

-
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(e) Exceptions. For good cause shown, the court
may grant an exception to any of the requirements of
subdivisions (a) through (b) of this rule.
(f)
Inadmissibility of withdrawn alibi. Evidence
of an intention to rely upon an alibi defense, later withdrawn, or of statements made in connection with such intention, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who gave notice of the intentio~.
Added April 22, 1974, eff. Dec. 1, 1975; amended July 31,
1975, Pub.L.94-64, §3(13), 89 Stat.372 .

•
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*

*

*

1054.2(dl Documents and Tangible Ob~ects. A defendant who personally or through defense counsel as requested and received
from the prosecuting attorney the disclosures described in Section 1054.l(a) (4) shall within a reasonable time, but in no event
less than twenty (20) days before trial, permit the prosecuting
attorney to inspect and copy any books, papers, documents, photographs (including motion pictures and video tapes), or tangible
objects, or copies or portions thereof which are within the
possession of the defendant and which the defendant intends to
introduce as evidence in chief at the trial.
Within ten (10) days after a disclosure under Section
1054.l(d), but in no event less than ten (10) days before trial,
the prosecuting attorney shall serve upon the defendant or the
defendant's attorney a written notice stating the names and addresses of the witnesses upon whom the prosecuting attorney intends to rely to rebut any of the disclosed evidence.
COMHENTS
Sec~ion

1054.l(d) provides reciprocal disclosure ob-

ligations for documents and other real evidence.
is from Federal Rule 16 (b)

(l)

The language

(A):

(A)

Documents and tanaible ob~ects. If the defendant
disclosure under subdivision (a) (1) (C) or (D) of
this rule, upon compliance with such request by the government, ~~e defendant, on request of the government, shall permit the g-overnment to inspect and copy or photograph books,
papers, documents, photographs, tang;i.bie objects, or copies
or port:.o:1s thereof, which are within the possession, custody,
or control of the defendant and which the defendant intends
to introd~ce as evidence in chief at the trial.
reques~s
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*

*

*

l054.2(e) Notice of Withheld Information. If the defendant or
the defendant's attorney concludes that portions of information
within Section 1054.2 contain privileged information, then the
defendant or the defendant's attorney may withhold such information if the prosecuting attorney is notified that privileged information has not been disclosed. The notification shall state
the nature of the privilege and the identity of the person
claiming the privilege.
C0~1ENTS

Section l054.2(e) provides notice to the prosecution
if the defense intends to claim a privilege or to withhold assertedly privileged information.

This notice, in turn, provides

the basis for further motions by the prosecuting attorney if desired to obtain a court order verifying the existence cf a privi lege or allowing the excision of the pri '\!i leged ir.f.or.::a :ion.

This section is parallel to the section which requires
t:-.e t:rosec:.:tio:: to notify the defe:::se if privileged infor:r..aticn
~s

being withheld.

Section 1054.1(a).

- 31 -
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*
1054.3.

*

*

Regulaticn of Discovery.

(a) Continuing Duty to Disclose. If, after compliance with these statutes or orders pursuant thereto, a party or
attorney discovers additional items or information which is subject to disclosure, the party or attorney shall promptly notify
the other party or attorney of the existence of such additional
items or information, and if the additional items or information
is discovered during trial, the court shall also be notified.
The items or information shall also be promptly disclosed to the
other party or attorney.

Section 1054.3(a)

prov~des

a continuing duty of dis-

closure, including a duty during trial.

More specific duties

concerning discovery during trial are provided in section 1054.4.
A continuing duty was felt to be necessary to avoid

abuse of the discovery system.

The standard of "prompt" dis-

closure was meant to insure that quicker discovery occurs after
the initial compliance by both parties, and as trial preparation
evolves.
Sirnilar language is used in Federal Rule

16(c~:

lc) Continuing auty to disclose. If, prior to or
during trial, a party discovers additional evidence or
material previously requested or ordered, which is subject to discovert or inspection under this rule, he shall
promptly notify the other party or his attorney or the
court of the existence of the additional evidence or
material.
ABA Standard 4.2 states:
4.2

Continuing duty to disclose.

r:, subseauent to comoliance with these standards or
orders pursuant thereto, a"party discovers additional material or information whic~ is subject to disclosure, hP
shall 'promptly notify the other party or his counsel of
the existence of such addit1onal material, and if the
additional material or information is discovered during
trial, the court shall also be notified.

-189-
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*

l054.3(b) Custody of Items or Information.
The prosecuting attorney rnay maintain possession, custody and control of all physical evidence, and may monitor any inspection, testing or examination of such evidence in person or by having a representative
present.
Any items furnished to an attorney pursuant to these
statutes shall remain in the attorney's exclusive custody and
be used only for the purposes of conducting the attorney's side
of the case.
This rule shall not prohibit counsel from transferring any items to other substitute counsel. Custody of any
items or information shall be subject to such other terms and
conditions as the court may provide.
The defense attorney may maintain possession, custody,
and control of all physical evidence produced by t~e defe~se
pursuant to Section 1054.2, and may monitor any inspection,
test1ng or examination of such evidence in person or by having
a representative present.

Section

1054.3~)

the responsibility and

~,e

provides that opposing counsel has
authority for custody of the

ials subject to discovery or

exa~ination.

prevent client abuses or use for unrelated

~a~er-

This was included to
purposes~

The obli-

sation extends to both parties in the case; sanctions for Vlolations

s~ould

be part of section l054.3(f).

The language stems from ABA Standard 4.3:
4.3

Custodv of materials.

Any materials furnished to an attorney pursuant to
these standards shall remain in his exclusive custody and
be used only for the purnoses of conductinq his side of
the case, and shall be subject to such other terms a~d
conditions as the court may prov1de.
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*

*

1054.3(c) Protective Orders. Upon a showing of good cause, the
court may at any time order that specified disclosures be denied,
restricted, or deferred, or make such other order as is appropriate provided that all items and information to which a party or
attorney is entitled must be disclosed in time to permit the
party's attorney to make beneficial use thereof. "Good cause"
includes threats to the safety of a victim or witness, possible
loss or destruction of evidence, and threats to the integrity
of the case.
COMHENTS
Section 1054.3(c) gives the court the latitude torestrict disclosure for "cause".

The limitation is that the tim-

of disclosure must be in time to make use of the material.
The source of this language is 1970 ABA Standard 4.4:
4.4

orders.
Cpon a showing of cause, the court may at any time
order that specified disclosures be restricted or deferred,
or make such other order as is appropriate, provided that
all matieral and information to which a party is entitled
must be disclosed in time to permit his counsel to make
beneficial use thereof.
Protec~ive

The de:fini tion of "good cause" is a troublesome feature.

The alternative is to try to list all possible "causes"

which could justify restrictions on disclosure, including privileges of
some

varic~s

unar.ticipa~ed

disclosure.

types, personal safety reasons, or perhaps
reasons that would justify restrictions on

This statement of "good cause" may provide a con-

stitutionally saving

feat~re,

although one would hope that the

phrase "good ca'.::.se" would not be interpreted so broadly as to
negate any

sigr.~ficant

discovery.

-
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Federal Rule l6(d) (1) uses the phrase "sufficient
showing":
(d)

Regulation of discovery
(1) Protective and modifying orders. Upon a sufficient showing the court may at any time order that the discovery or inspection be denied, restricted, or deferred, or
make such other order as is appropriate. Upon motion by a
party, the court may permit the party to make such showing,
in whole or in part, in the form of a written statement to
be inspected by the judge alone. If the court enters an order granting relief following such an ex parte showing, the
entire text of the party's statement shall be sealed a~d preserved in the records of the court to be made available to
the appellate court in the event of an appeal.
The 1970 ABA comments refer to intimidation of witnesses, or harm tc witnesses, or thwarting an on-going
gation.

The 1978 ABA comMents refer to witness or

i~vesti-

victi~

th=ea~s,

possible loss or destruction of evidence, or threats to the integrity of the case.

All

co~~~ments

exce?tional circumstances are wi

5 -

are in agreement that only
n

th
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provision.

l054.3(d) Excision. When portions of items or information are
discoverable under these statutes, and other portions are not
discoverable, the nondiscoverable portions may be excised by
order under subdivision (c) of this section. Items or information excised pursuant to judicial order shall be ordered sealed
by the court, and only a court may order access to the sealed
contents.
CO}II(t.~ENTS

Section 1054.3(d) provides the practical remedy of
excision of privileged or non-disclosable matter, while requiring the disclosure of the balance of the

informa~ion.

This section is also based on the 1970 ABA Standards.
The record is preserved for appeal purposes, a standard feature
whe~

dealing with privileged information of any sort.

The pre-

servation is also suggested in the 1970 ABA Standards:
4.5

Excision.
hTien some parts of certain material are discoverable
~~der these standards, and other parts not discoverable,
as much of thematerial should be disclosed as is consistent
with the standarJs. Excision of certain material and disclosure of the balance is preferable to withholding the
whole. Material excised pursuant to judicial order shall
be sealed and preserved in the records of the court, to be
made available to the appellate court in the event of an
appeal.

-193-
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1054.3(e)
the court
cause for denial
such showing, to

of any person,
showing of
or portion of

If such a request is
the cour~ shall hold such a hea
defendant and the defendant's
by the defendant's attorney,
outside L~e presence of the
attorney present at the

the prosecuting attorney,
outsi
the presence of the
If the request is made
sh 1 hold such a hearing
attorney.
The party or
sent evidence to show cause.

A reporter shall be present at the in camera hearing.
Any transcription of the
at
camera hearing,
as well as any physical evidence
ted at the hearing, shall
be ordered sealed by the court, and
a court may order access
to its contents.

Section 1054.3(e) prov des for
when necessary to show that non-d sc
sure should be ordered or al

::arr.era proceedi.:1ss

ure or restricted disclosection also stems from

the 1970 ABA Stan
4.6

In camera proceed

s.

rson, the court may permit any
Cpon re~uest of any
re
ation or disclosures,
showing of cause for denia
be made in camera. A recor portion of such showing
If the court enters
ore shall be made of such
a showing in camera, the
an order granting relief fol
be sealed and preserved
entire record of such
available to the
in the records of the cour
a?pellate court in the
Federal Rule 16 (d)

(1)

also

Although there

ing by a judge

lifornia a threshhold

s

ngs are allowed, such
a showing is usually min

1.

This draft would retain a requirement that the moving
party show that in camera proceeding.s ·are "reasonably necessary".
While this allows considerable discretion to the trial court,
this discretion is no different .from the current standard.

-
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-
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l054.3(f) Sanctions.
(1)
If at any
the course of the proceedings it is brought to
the court that a party
has failed to comply with
discovery statutes or an order
issued pursuant thereto,
court
order such party to permit the discovery of material
tion not previously
disclosed, grant a continuance,
such order other than
dismissal as deemed just under
tances.

(2) Willful violat
discovery statute or other or
je~t the attor~eJ to

attorney of an applicable
pursuant thereto ffiay subens by the court.

Section 1054.3(f) provides

sanctions for viola-

tions of the discovery statute or any orders relating to the
dis::::8ver:'·

Sa:-.c:ions are :::!:::.·:·:.8
~his

!or

des very general remedies

sanction section

v:c:a~:~~s.

t~ons.

r"ecessary to prevent abuses.

Many other state

See, e.g.,

Ver~ont

P~

Cthe!: states

e

ave general sanction secnal

of

1

soecifi

alsc cften include a general s
court to fashion a particular

t

allo~s

§174.295,

~ew

~ebraska

Statutes §29-1919,

York Laws on Cr

Crimi~al

Procedure 1

as a sanction,

Cri~inal

Proce-

Statutes

240.40, Pennsyl-

a Laws 13 A-13-1 7 , i<Jyom.i.ng

The second half of
conte~?t

~evada

al

vania Statutes §305(d ,
Rules cf

the trial

See, e.g., Arizona Rules

lor da Pules cf
dure 3.22IJ).

12.1 (c).

ts cf sanctions, but

ct on
re~e

Proced~re

tho

dies are not beyond the court's

\

J.

designed to include

section

tai ly fines or other reme- to the extent that

96-

constitutional provis

s or prosecutor-

ial immunity are not
The 1970 ABA
4.7

Sanctions.
(a)
If at any time dur
course of the
proceedings it is brought to the atten
of the
court that a party has failed to comply with an
applicable discovery rule or an order issued pursuant thereto, the court may order such
to permit
the discove
of material
informat
not previously disclosed, grant a continuance, or enter such
other order as
deems just under the circumstances.
(b) Willful violations by counsel of an applicable discovery rule or an order issued p~rsuant thereto may subject counsel to appropriate sanctions by the
court.
Federal Rule 16 (d) ( 2 J provides a

sanction:

(2)
Failure to comp
with a
t.
If at any time
during the course of the proceed
is brought to the
a~tention of the court that a par
failed to comply
with this rule, the court may
rty to perm~t
t~e discovery or in
ction, grant a
nuance, or prohibit the pa
from
cueing evidence not
sclosed, or
it may enter such other order as it deems ust under the
circurnsta;,ces. The court may specify the time,
lace and
-~anner of making the discovery and inspection
may prescribe sue~ terms and condit
s as are ust.

1054.3(g) Costs. All costs of discovery, including copying
costs, shall be borne by the person or party seeking discovery.
Nothing in t."lese statutes shall reauire that either attorney
prepare a separate list of witnesses or exhibits or other information if the information itself is contained in reports or
items made available to the opposing party or attorney.
COMMENTS
Section 1054.3(g) clarifies
involved in discovery.

~"le

allocation of costs

Furthermore, the section makes it clear

that the statute does not require any additional documents or
lists, beyond reports that are currer.tly available.
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54 4.
a)

testified on
p:1rty who did
ing attorney, or the
as the case mav
, to
of the moving party,
their possession, cus
ness • testimony.

, for
statement
the
or control, that

, the court,
the proceedings
as to allow for
aration for its use
(c)

prept-

, "statement" of a

As

ness means:
(1

an

a substantially verba
stater:'.ent made
d contemporaneous
of the statement,

(2)

trans-

ze the truth-seek-

Secticn 10 4.4

s
irt enhance effect

is premised on
uld have
ized frcrn

witnesses.
a

t

i

na

It
case

t

t

tness takes the st

ce a

vious!y recorded statements

that

4

tnes

any preto the

testimony elicited on direct examination or cross-examination
become subject to disclosure to the party who did not call that
witness.

Should such statements, as defined in §1054.4(c), exist,

the court has the power to grant a recess, of reasonable length,
in order that the moving party may examine such statements and
prepare for their use in trial.

While such recesses may dis-

rupt the continuity of the proceedings, it is hoped that in practice such statements will be turned ever prier to the witness'
taking the stand as has been the practice in the federal courts
under F.R.Cr.P. 26.2.
sr.ould the non-moving party claim t!i.at parts of t'"le
witness' recorded statement do not relate to t!i.e testimony elicited of that witness, or that certain privileges apply, or that
such statements contain sensitive information t!i.e revealing of
s 1054.3 (c) (d) and (e) which reg-

which would cause harm, sect

ulate protective orders, excision, and
apply.

i~

camera inspection

wo~ld

Furthermore, §1054.3(£) which is concer?led ·with sanctior:s

for non-compliance would regulate any problems arising from refusals to provide such statements.

Sanctions under §1Q54.4 would

include the court's striking the witness' testimony should the
non-::tcving party refuse to comp

with its terms.

Section 1054.4 is based almost entirely on Rule 26.2
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
by Congress on
1980.

Apr~l

Rule 26.2 was

30, 1979, ann became effective on

adcp~ed

Decer.~er

The Rule was adopted as a response to the decision of

t~e

United States Supreme Court in United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S.

-
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1,

225 (1975)

[Notes of Advisory Committee on

es].

In Nobles,

to a

a case involving a claim of wrongful
bankrobbery, defense counsel

of
his

to

s-

tigator on the stand to impeach a government witness based on
statements the witness had allegea

made to the investigator

at a time closer to the occurrence of the offense.
upheld the trial court's ruling

de

The court
d not

counsel

call the investigator to the stand until he complied with a
request from the attorney for the government to allow

hL~

to

examine the statements allegedly made to the investigator.

Rule

26.2, the:1, combined the decision in Nobles with language from

the

~encks

Act.

A copy of Rule 26.2

attached infra.

Although §1054.4 provides for a new

proced~re

in dis-

coverl as far as California is concerned, it is very similar to
the type of discovery order at
Cal. 3d 43

iss~e

in

Cl981), in which the court dec ined to

is

secutorial discovery procedures, inviting the
perform this function instead.
case

la~,

it is bel

Framed

d net to of

const:tutional rights as interpreted
Ccurt.

- 44 -

i~

li

nd any of

the

ture to

t of the current
t~e

defendan 's

ifcrnia Supreme

j

'

...

~ ····· .. ; :,'::·:"tt:•;..,.,\.'.':'·· ,. r:·
1'
fl 1 ~
.:'·Jiu"f

l ,.,r; f',

L 1:.1

~ •.

)!r•i

('I

1

~t<C

,f

On ftlll!IIOI! Of ll. fllliTI;J"

fp

for the

:;:4

C" .. ntft• at'"'" of rrutUft,_.....
U11H0 c,f JUd&:f•a !•..,•-Hittf•..,_ Jit•t
f . . . wr!<
llf'~ JUdtf' •hnttlti t'f'rtff! Ublll )u·
"""' hdmJtarl,..tJ fnruat•U' •·ttiJ , .... ,.,.rd ¢•f'
ICL

Jf

~·

*'"''"''It

tr••'

sUttll!'meru eo!'lt&IDI

t: ,,.,rnmtoDL 1D t•r•ier

delh·ered
the
tht portlou or
et>rnlng ..- hleh

on

rti'Dttld

tL&t

"-oufd

pro .. r.o"'r"'

t1• •'*l'·fltEl thf' nrtJf'f

iJf

!'f"\JUiff"G

n•nH~··.;nJtAI'lOti

J;h.n•

f"

-. Hh

1h...,

Uldn·tt1uat• , ..... -Q a •·•par aDd
rr .......-Dr tianctr tu wnD.-·"' aotJ thar thttr..
"-~ff oo .._ ... _. dt ... ruJltlt"t m~an• that trtaJ
)!Jtl ..# ("nUJtJ h81'f' U•Pd tf• ~~f'H(H'"f tflf' W'f!
lti<'A•
\\'h...,ltt 1'. t·. IS .. C..& WuL.lllel.
6-10 F ~d 1116
"ui•<!&Jitl&i .. .-idl'l><'f' OUJif!Mif'd f;ltltll!>&:
th8t DO nnJath')Q nt WifDP~I> ,..-quf",.\fltiu&J
"rJtr "''·urrt'd aDd that It II did tilt'
ur••f ,.,fi ..QUl m·trhf'afd br dtftodaot'J
"1ft &!>d "l~j-d&LJ:"hlf'f d•d DOl alft<'l tl:>•
\lttnt-1•
lt'J.I;mHD'r, f'ro.fW"'('"JAiil !Ja ,., ••. of
wnff" lo aa\J .. lf'JHIIUC'htf'f11 pos;itiOD !D &
ruum aO;a<"'ff'Dt fu llall\t ar \ll"hf'rt auiJJW"t
r 1n' f"taatlODJ' aufi' ..~dtr oc--rurr.d aod. tbf'
P!lnfliC't Ul t hf'if ff"C:~ l mrU)'J'' r 8 T '\\'"U·
:,un• C .A {"olo.lP7ll 00!'> F.:d 4~. f'l!'f·

tsamfl'd

•,H••••cU
r.

i'"''it1

( t} PY•o.:h:u:·tion

•.

1\'llft_....
Ja art•"D ID •·hl<"h fPd•UI pr••"l>n
f'hAJl,..DC"Pd f•o'"'t"'foDh·nrlDJ! urt\f•r r~ruhlbit
tnt hun frttJn t·a,mmunwetJO&' wUt1 t .. D
i•Afh..IJ lDdi\'ldUIII"'. •·hic-h •A'"' imfttt""flrod lD
ordt-t tn J'ff't"tDt l;ata•<~>tnt-Df nf a vntDt..,.l'l

4

L·'a~l d•n•"d JOH S.C! z-:11. ++< t'.S ll::r::.
I..t:a..::d 1~

c::

Pi•rlv•ur. of tact that a ~~:on•rnme:z:ll
.,. t~arrinpatUu; to tn• ._.Hor,. ..
,.Pf'urtt~ '-''''>M:ttm tJ a mattt-r •·hJd• muttt
'"' handlf'd d"l"at~l,...
<i~f¥!lli4' ho• •
~OHD .. IIl

Tlt:"ht

to ah""' that thf" ..-I'Xlf'til' wtnte 1D
r-rnf{ram
ha;. tf"'(""f'in•d "lJ1·1;. 1 J\D'1&1

rhf
h .. nrf;ta. t: S ,. Paron. r A Ga.lP:-; !>".:!
F ..::d fl:!l rprtl<>rar> df'n•f'<i !Ia SCt ::SO~ 4:W
t' S 1103. 54 LE<l.~d l!lll
A. '«'lfDfl"t:q.' !&JIUre' U•
anr d....t'f Do!
nwDT"
t·. S.

eerntnr

'IWbld:~

With IIUCll I:!:!IIH!!'lll.l ~"'""""'a.

shall
of a

(dl~

mt>nt to the D:l!n1ng

reeeaa proeeedJnrprepan.tlo~:~ tor

for

(e) Slil.Ddfo!l for

not to eompl:r
the eoun: 11hall
the reeord IU!d uuu
meDt wbo ele-tu
lntere11t of

( fl Dt-finition.
(l)

fEJOD'f

l'ODT"

l('tlOlH~

Oti

1nt Df'iti'-'

•l>tM; J~!~odlll!l flllf'd
reau.c·c.atilf not1N of iJHt-Dddl~ to
ratH ao i'!ue •·tt.b r?b~t to ia• of for·
~lin) ('OLIDtf! &.Dd JOfY JtJ:W>W 8UCb Wll·
Df'&l. Cfllllln&l t"ODTH'OO!lP UDdt'r JapaD~~
laY
!~lUlU"
Of
{'tt('UID"-flt){"f>~
UDdflf
\\ hil""h dt'f\OI!i~~ort• 'trf'f'+' J'lT'ft!l JiDd N!Ufl
dH1. ~l"f' I S:f!H•l""a1 t,...dir li'H' ltl~i.J"iJf"'f!Oll
t
S T 1-\earD~'. C'A.CaJ.l977 J6l1 T .:d
Jl.'\ol, N>rtl<•rar• o~a>f'<i ~ !l.Ct. !1.:::::!. i:W
r .s. 1r.1. ~ L.:td.:a

.eo

Chaf"afhJa• for Jan
A.ltboui'D prot,..f l"'""dur. 1~ fur judi!.'•
rau~~r thaD Jurr to dt-t~rmint qufl'EtlOO~'
nf furetC'll la•
H
d•,..lo bOt D~"'~'+'"'t.tlti!J
full<•..- ll>at pu!!ID!: rnatu•r t<> JUT" •• ,....
,-f!'r.,lLlf ~rrot ttlDC'f' thflrt 1~ nv aururuatH
Jlft"JUC1Jt'f' tC IUHlltADtitll r1R"hU r,f dt'fttflt!
at.: lllbf:re.Dt lD lt'tUDg jUff dKHl~ QUU
tJfJC OC },&.11 of t!!lJ'f'Tt 14-'-rill~>ltl)
t· ~
or_ ~c-C'laJIJ C..A Te1 ltr."lt :.:.1~ F.:d ~ ~t·

S.

~

lll

,JC&

sl8tf'

tHlf&rl

::r to
of

.a

othet~illle

n
the

(:J)

JM'f'f'

du•Pd 100 !!l C:

II:: L.Ed.:.!d 1'1'3..

ZJ.I.

++< r.s &le.

pan:r.

the appellate
decllilcn

II

tl:!enof.

J A J·l Of'U
rrf'dlbll!!'

the

the ~mbject matter eo»·
U.l!IJl order
u be
ll:llii:Hi~etJOI~. tiM! court llhall ll!'lfti311'
tbl! ~Subject
thai

~

thl" Otlll.l

}' on>i;:n U&w

tbt> other pan:y ehalm 111

of tbt

ele-ttnal.

F .:d OT..

or tbf'
euml·

Of t&tJ!II 't!'IUUlY

T.

te> f'f'QIIil't' •ul'f>f('Uinll Of ...-.tl<•t>f'<!' UIHit'V
r ... ch•rat rttDIIfi1UtH.tna: la• "' f.-df>r&J atat
utnrr "' •·•~• la11'. t'. Iii .- I•udPI... C'.A
• •hlo 111:o. !'.3(> , • .::d ll!l4.

fer

manu eoDeerl':lll!l

~nntHil. C A Guam l!i~. ~~
t• :.:•1 l:IUII. • .. rtlnfllft df>DI.,d !li) l'i.C'I. ~
Hl 1'.1' !lUll. lit L •:11.:11 T.4
1'. ,.._

~ro,·•rnment

~m:e,

Added .Ap:"

tht> other patty ele-eu
to the: moYlllg pan::r.
wltneu be strletef:i fn:~m
ill UH! &Horney
rovem·
a ml.nna! lf rt>Qulred by

Directors
VIRGINIA J. LUM, San Francisco
V{ce-Pn:sJdent

JAMES F. POKORNY, San Diego
MARC S. ROTHENBERG, Long Beach

561-8200

1.

Proposal

CASES AFTER

Cases cou
lawyers, with
i
settlement conferences.
at various stages
unnecessary discovery
should have discret
substantial discovery
conference.
In
mandatory, and
Method:
Cost:
volunteer ef
2.

Propos

SINGLE

Dis
same judge
a.
more
b.
c. Greater
greater li
discovery,
discourage
d. Enable j
have greater res
forward (
court-i
settlement discussions);
e.
r certai
be handled by
Method:
Program
Cost:
Dis

Commiss

to

s

Exce s ve

wi
cases
ass
or

To

J

TO OBJECT TO VENUE IN

CASES

ci 1 cases
administrator or judge to rev
venue.
Statute
None
PANEL

REPLACE JURY IN COMPLEX LITIGATION

civi litigation cases could be heard by a panel of
or j
laypersons with expertise in the area.
matters can often be too difficult for laypersons to
Moreover, such matters might be heard more
ial panel.
imental Program
None
RULING IN LAW AND MOTION
Bill 781 (198 1983 session) • This
passed by the Assembly Committee on the
by Senate Committee. The proposed
California lawyers at the 1981
Statute
None
Court Juri

ict

Statute
None

s Association
4-1952
Francisco, CA. 94102

4-

